THE KOREA REVIEW

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[201]

**Korean Sketches**

(Reproduced from the “Messenger”)

1. In the Forest,

I

SILENT the mountain mass,

Steely the sky;

Darkly through sombre pines

The snowflakes fly.

II.

Over the fire of leaves

Swarthy, unkempt,

Silent, the hunter crew

Shadow-like bent.

III.

On match-lock and powder flask

The fire-light gleams,

While from the smould'ring fuse

Thin smoke upstreams.

II. On the Road—Twilight.

Twilight—shade on the hills—the depths of the valley in gloom

Winding over the earth, the pine smoke's thickening shroud.

Grey thatch under the hill.... the drone of a sleepy tale [202 ]

.... Far through the gathering dusk the tired jingle of bells—

And the whinny of ponies, scenting their rest,—

Shouts of the eager drivers, homing at last—

....And the barking of drowsy dogs.

III. On the Road—Night.

Dark the road,—in gloom enveloped the valley;

Out of the tomb of night only the trickle of water

Is heard—and the panting of horses, the shouts of the drivers—

Weary and foot sore they urge on the staggering brutes.

Is there no rest tonight—No rest for the wand'rer?

In all this wilderness no sheltering thatch?....

Over the barren fields a breath of pine smoke....

Pungent and acrid, floats through the quickening night.

A light,—the barking of dogs,—a woman's voice calling,—

Whimper of wakening babe—.........then shelter at last.

IV. On the Road—Dawn.

I.

Far in the misty deep

White waters gleaming;

Under grey, homely thatch

The village lies dreaming.

II.

Deep in some mountain glen

Temple bells throbbing;

Softly and unafraid,

A forest dove sobbing.

III.

Softly the pine smoke spreads

Spreads too, the forest balm;

Slow blush the mountain wastes

Hushed in a holy calm.

IV.

Deep, mystic-Buddha's peace

Broods over vale and hill

Land of the Morning Calm—

Land of Nirvana still.

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**Kennan and Korea.**

The first article by Mr. Kennan in the *Outlook* appeared in the issue of October 7th, 1905. The editors announced that' "This is the first of a series of articles founded upon Mr. Kennan's observation and study of conditions in Korea the past Summer. They will deal with the personality of the Korean Emperor, the venality of Korean officials, the degradation of the people, the Japanese administration of affairs in that country and the future of Korea."

It is quite fair for us to ask what qualifications and opportunities this distinguished writer had to speak authoritatively on this question. As the editors state, it was in the summer of 1905 that Mr. Kennan was in Korea. To the present writer's personal knowledge Mr. Kennan was not in Korea more than a month. He lodged at a hotel in the foreign quarter quite removed from the ordinary life of the Korean people and, as everyone in Korea knows, the rainy season of 1905 was one of the heaviest of the past decade. There was no opportunity to go about among the people and study their condition as could have been done in Spring or Autumn. No time of the year could have been less auspicious for such a work,

The natural result was that he made but little study of the Korean at first hand. This is worth while illustrating, because of the wide circulation given to his statements. A year or more before this he had made a flying trip to Seoul where he had stayed a few days. He wrote a letter at that time which was criticized in this magazine, and numerous blunders were exposed. Among them was his statement that there are no scavenger birds in Seoul. The KOREA REVIEW traversed this statement as being quite contrary to fact, for everyone living in this city knows that an enormous number of hawks hover over the city and swoop down on every morsel of garbage they can find. Now on this second visit Mr. [204] Kennan took the writer to task, saying that his statement was true. He said that he had looked for hawks and had seen none. Now the reader must note that in the midst of the rainy season there is an interval of a few weeks when the hawks are not as commonly seen, though not by any means scarce. On the strength of this Mr. Kennan held to his point against the evidence of a man who has lived in this city for twenty years. This is a significant fact and is thoroughly characteristic of Mr. Kennan's method. His observation covering a few weeks was conclusive of the whole matter and was only less amusing than that of the traveller who upon landing in a certain country saw a yellow dog on the street and wrote back to his friends that all the dogs in that country were yellow.

In the second place Mr. Kennan's observations were almost wholly confined to the capital and one or two ports where the population is not typical of the whole country. In the capital are gathered together the officials and their retinues and there is a large number of men who are either hangers-on of these officials or are waiting a chance to get office. We do not defend these men from the charge of laziness, though they are not as a rule degenerates. But they are by no means typical of the country at large.

Then again in the hot summer months it is customary for all the working classes to take a long noon rest, a siesta, and it is plain that Mr. Kennan's observations. were made largely between ten and two. It is evident that he did not get up at daylight and go to the market places and watch the people, alert, wide-awake and virile. The Korean gets to work in the morning at least two hours before the workman of America. He makes it up by resting at noon, thereby calling down upon himself the objurgations of such superficial observers as Mr. Kennan.

But there is a still more important deduction to be drawn from the introductory note of the Editors of the *Outlook*. Five specific phases of Korean life are mentioned as being dealt with by Mr. Kennan (1) the personality of the Emperor; (2) the venality of the officials, (3) the [205] degradation of the people, (4) Japanese administration, (6) Korea's future. Only the first three have to do with the Korean people distinctively. We would ask the candid reader whether this program is a fair one to the Korean people. Nothing can prove more conclusively than this table of contents that Mr. Kennan was a special pleader. He came to Korea to prove that the Koreans were all that is bad and he made no attempt whatever to balance the account by saying anything about their good qualities. He leaves the inference that there are no good qualities to describe. We do not believe that Mr. Kennan was qualified either by the length of his stay, the keenness of his observation or the fairness of his mind to give other than a prejudiced and distorted view of the situation.

If this is not evident from what we have already said, the following facts are available for the purpose. When Mr. Kennan took up his quarters in Seoul and was unable on account of the rainy season to do any considerable first hand work on the subject he called in certain residents of Seoul who knew something of the facts. Among these was the present writer who, supposing that the distinguished traveller desired to make a fair showing of the case, spent many hours with him answering a long list of questions about the state of affairs. We related to him our own observations of the nature of Japanese rule in Korea but besides this gave him a careful statement of the results of our study of the Korean character and temperament, a study which extended over two decades and which was as careful and accurate as an intimate acquaintance with various classes of Korean society could make it. Now out of all this matter which the traveller borrowed what did he use? Nothing but the account of Japanese atrocities in the peninsula. He used that freely, giving it almost in the words of the writer, but he omitted every statement we made as to the redeeming features of Korean civilization and in place of them gathered together all the irresponsible gossip of the streets and the statements of those who make a business of caricaturing the Koreans, added [206] this to his own inadequate observation and out of it all made a generalization as to the Korean people which for gross prejudice and for culpable inaccuracy can scarcely be matched in literature. This we propose to show. He used us and accepted our statements implicitly and almost verbatim along one line, thereby acknowledging their accuracy and our desire for a truthful presentation of the subject, but along all other lines he ignored our statements; and not only so but he no where states that our attitude which he so freely indorsed along certain important lines was diametrically opposite to his statements along other lines. This is a species of treachery whereby he practically makes us indorse his hideous caricature of the Korean Emperor and people. We naturally object. And we feel a personal responsibility in repudiating his implications and showing wherein lies their damaging falsity. Whether we can eliminate the element of personal prejudice from the indictment can be judged only from the words of the indictment itself.

Mr. Kennan starts out by affirming that Japan "is making' a serious and determined effort to transform and civilize" Korea—that she is making "a conscious and intelligent attempt to regenerate" Korea . This was said concerning the few months immediately preceding the writing of the article, or roughly speaking the last half of 1904 and the first half of 1905.

If the reader will turn to the third article of Mr. Kennan's series he will be able to judge from that writer's own statements whether the words above quoted are at all applicable. The contents of that third Article of Mr. Kennan's can be found almost entire in the pages of the KOREA REVIEW. It states our point of view with great exactitude and there is no important point there laid down, and hardly an illustration, that we have not publicly given in the Review. We must therefore inquire to what degree if any these different articles hang together .

In the first article we read that Japan is making a "serious” "determined," "conscious" and "intelligent" attempt to regenerate Korea. In the third we find a very different state of things. Judging from these adjectives [207] one would expect to hear that a really intelligent and statesmanlike policy had been inaugurated by the Japanese in Korea, but listen to Mr. Kennan's words in his third article, not that he knew personally anything about the matter but in this one phase of the subject he drew from the observation of those who had made a careful study of it.

In the first place he tells us that the Japanese in Korea are "disappointing," both as to their "methods and achievements,'' that "they have not displayed in that field anything like the intelligent prevision, the conspicuous ability and the remarkable capacity for pre-arrangement that they have shown in the arena of war."

The first mistake of Japan's that he sees is the idea that they could handle the situation without forming a protectorate in the first instance. Well, this is part of the truth. They failed to handle Korea well without such a hold and according to Mr. Kennan's showing it can be done well only by a constant show of force even as Russia today holds Poland or the Caucasus. But the fact of the case is Japan did guarantee the independence of Korea and Mr. Kennan has yet to show that if Japanese methods had been of an enlightened character she could not have held the position secure and accomplished a greater triumph in the peninsula than she did in Manchuria. But that "if" is a very big one. It was not in the power of the Japanese to exercise the requisite amount of self-control and the breaking of her treaty of 1904 was the only chance of carrying out her policy in Korea. Mr. Kennan talks about obstruction on the part of Korean officials. They would have been fools and cowards if they had not opposed the Nagamori Scheme and the financial policy of Mr. Megata, and many another purely selfish plot against Korean wealth and resources. We take exception to the morals of Mr. Kennan's argument. He says that in taking over the postal department Japan virtually broke down Korean sovereignty and for this reason they might as well go the whole length of destroying it entirely. But it was wholly voluntary on Japan's part when she guaranteed [208] Korea's independence in 1904. Does Mr. Kennan mean to tell us that having guaranteed Korea's independence and then finding that she could not exercise the necessary self-control to guide the Korean ship of state properly, Japan had a right to abrogate her treaty and do as she pleased? We had thought this was a distinctively Russian method of handling treaties. Mr. Kennan's whole argument is vicious and its logical conclusion is that treaties are of value only so long as they are convenient.

The second mistake, according to Mr. Kennan, was "bad judgment as to the necessary reforms and measures that were most urgently needed.” He treats the Nagamori scheme to contempt which was its due. He shows how this scheme alienated the good will of the Korean people from Japan and he adds significantly, ''Having the people on their side they might have done almost anything with the bureaucracy." How does this coincide with his previous statement that nothing could be done without seizing the entire power of the country?

The fact seems to be that there was not much hope of reform from Japan in any case, for they had not the breadth of mind and the sympathy and self-control necessary for the gaining of the confidence of the people, and the seizure of the country only aggravated tenfold the hatred that already existed.

The third mistake according to Mr. Kennan was to allow Japanese to swarm into Korea before preparations had been made for their proper jurisdiction. He then cites numerous cases of revolting oppression and brutality. How does all this look alongside those four adjectives, "serious," "determined” "conscious" and “intelligent''?

As for the matter of organizing an honest and efficient ministry in Seoul Mr. Kennan scores the Japanese policy as "irresolute and weak." He cities the case of Yi Yong-ik who went away to Japan for his country's good and then came riding back into the Ministry of War. We know something about how that was accomplished but as we were told in confidence we must pass it by. Mr. Kerman was right however in denouncing it. When he did so, [pages 209-210 are missing in pdf] 209 where had he left that first paragraph of his first article, in which he said Japan was trying to “transform,” “civilize,” “uplift” and “regenerate” Korea? Yi Yong-ik was so corrupt that the Korean people would have torn him limb from limb if they could have put their hands on him, but Japan put him again in power.

Having cited numerous cases in which the Japanese treated Koreans no better than a highwayman treats a traveller Mr. Kennan calls them cases of “conflicting rights or interests.” They were not conflicting rights, for the right was all on the side of the Korean in most cases and it takes two rights to make a conflict. Things should be called by their right names.

But he goes on to say that even in view of all these outrages “the Japanese did not even strengthen the clerical force of its Korean consulates with a view to meeting” the increasing need. He even cites Formosa which should have been an object lesson to Japan and the failures of which should not have been repeated in Korea. Without distinctly saying so Mr. Kennan clearly implies that Japan neither remedied the evils mentioned nor cared to do so. Where he finds in all this an “intelligent effort” to regenerate Korea, we fail to see.

But leaving aside the acts of Japanese private citizens Mr. Kennan also arraigns the Japanese officials and says some true and pertinent things about them. The matter of seizing land for railroads when the Korean government could not find the money to pay for it, and the seizure of land outside the South Gate of Seoul for military barracks, these are things that show an entire lack of that equity and judgment which should be the first aim of a power placed as Japan is vis-a-vis Korea.

We must point to another curious comparison. In one place Mr. Kennan argues that the only thing was to seize the country—and declare a protectorate, and in another place he says that it is not necessary to form a protectorate “but if the Japanese would give the Korean people justice, protect their rights and thus win their confidence” they could soon reform the government and render Russian intrigue innocuous. Either or neither [210] of these things may be true but they cannot both be true.

In his fourth article Mr. Kennan discusses what Japan has done in Korea. He begins with the complaint that the Korean officials would not listen to the advice of the Japanese but put obstacles of all kinds in the way and thwarted every attempt to better conditions in the peninsula. Mr. Kennan could have found an answer to all this in his own words if he had turned to the right page, for while these advisers were advising, the people of Korea were being robbed and maltreated and browbeaten on every side and this naturally had a reflex influence on the officials. They argued, whether rightly or wrongly, that men who would permit such things to be done by their own nationals were unfit to try to ‘‘regenerate” Korea. It was a case of wanting to pick a mote out of Korea’s eye when there was a beam in Japan’s eye. Why should the Japanese try to stop Korean oppression and “squeezing” when the Koreans were suffering more from Japanese abuse than from the native article ? Why preach about bribery when Korean magistrates were complaining that they had to pay two prices for their offices, one to Koreans and the other to Japanese ? Why listen to talk of sanitation when the Japanese police advisers made Koreans cover their ditches with rough sticks and dirt which would only give darkness to breed more disease and which the first heavy rain would wash away? Why talk about monetary reform when the Japanese adviser by his wildcat financiering was driving Korean merchants to the wall and then preventing the Emperor from helping them by forbidding him to draw his own private money from the bank for the purpose ? Why try to reform education when after promising the teachers a certain raise of wages throughout the service certain grades were arbitrarily lowered again ? Why talk about improvement of means of communication when every mile of railroad meant that a score of Korean farmers would have their lands wrenched from them at less than half their worth and when enforced work on the line at one third of a day’s wage was making certain [211] towns pay thousands of dollars blackmail to the Japanese? If Mr. Kennan had seriously asked himself these questions he would perhaps have arrived at the answer to his.

Another cause of obstruction might have been found in the fact that so many of the proposed reforms were almost solely favorable to the Japanese. For example, the monetary system, while bad for all, was especially bad for the Japanese merchants who did most of the retailing of imported goods. Every Korean knew that the agitation for monetary reform was almost solely in the interests of the Japanese.

Surprising as some of Mr. Kennan's statements are regarding the political situation it is in his assumption of knowledge of the underlying character of the Korean that he proves most conclusively his prejudiced point of view. After three or four weeks of observation which was further restricted by climatic conditions he treads with perfect confidence where those who have studied the question for years hardly dare to make generalizations. Not only has he gotten the facts wrong in numberless instances but he couches his crude ideas in such dogmatic form that he furnishes an a priori argument against their accuracy.

“In moral and intellectual characteristics the Koreans and Japanese are as far apart as the Venezuelans and the Dutch." Here is one of his extreme assertions which will not stand the test of analysis. If he speaks here of morality in its narrow sense of sexual relations, I affirm without fear of serious contradiction that the Koreans are as moral as the Japanese. The Japanese word *geisha* and the Korean word *kisang* are identical in derivation, in meaning and in moral quality, and Mr. Kennan might have found out without difficulty that the Japanese *geisha* are more in evidence in Japan than the *kisang* are in Korea. Even as I write these words the Japanese papers arrive telling how agents of disorderly houses are buying young girls from their parents by hundreds in the famine districts of northern Japan. Such a thing would be impossible in Korea. For a parent [212] to treat a child in this way would bring down upon him instant condemnation from the public and severe punishment from the authorities. There is no question that the morals of Korea are of a low order but they are not one whit lower than in Japan. The trouble is that Mr. Kennan did not know what he was talking about. He gave here no particulars whatever, quoted no authorities but made this sweeping statement out of the storehouse of a vivid imagination and to all appearances with the set purpose of making out the Koreans to be all that is bad without a single redeeming feature.

The same may be said of the intellectual characteristics of the Korean people. It has been my vocation for many years to teach mathematics to Koreans, and my somewhat wide experience of Korean boys and their mental capacity has led me to the definite conclusion that they are naturally as bright as Japanese or American boys of the same age. They grasp the problems of arithmetic, algebra and geometry with a readiness and quickness of comprehension that would surprise Mr. Kennan or anyone else who has seen them simply on the street. What does Mr. Kennan know of the intellectual capacity of the Korean, or what does anyone know who does not get close enough to them to gain their confidence and enter into their mental processes? Official corruption has nothing to do with intellectual caliber except that in Korea as in every country: it takes a very sharp man to become a great rascal. Take the case of the man Yi Yong-Ik whom Mr. Kennan rightly holds up to public scorn. Would Mr. Kennan deny to that man intellectual ability of a high order? I would not, especial1y since I am aware that he once outwitted and be-fooled one of the most distinguished statesmen of the Far East. Even Dr. Gale as quoted by Mr. Kennan says "It is a wonder why so many bright minds are content with so low a civilization.” If they are bright minds it would hardly appear that they are as far apart from the Japanese as the Venezuelans are from the Dutch.

We are told that the civilization of Korea “has not become stagnant, it has rotted." It would appear from [213] this that it is dead, but we are told in the next sentence but one that it can be restored only by a long course of remedial treatment. These two statements do not show that carefulness of adjustment which we should have expected from the pen of so distinguished a writer. What Mr. Millard in his remarkably accurate and convincing book *The New Far East*, says about China is true of Korea. Speaking of national decadence he says that the best test of virility is durability. This is almost axiomatic in its simplicity and lucidity. If Korea has been rotten for centuries how does it happen that the people are physically virile, mentally bright and keenly awake to the insults that have been heaped upon them ?

If Mr. Kennan would like to hear a valid and almost self-evident reason for the present lack of that untiring thrift which characterizes the Chinese he will have it in a nutshell in the following statement. The relation of population to the area of cultivable land. The amount of good farm land per capita of the population is enormously greater in Korea than in Japan or in China. Until Korea was opened up to foreign intercourse the average of comfort in Korea was vastly in advance of either of her neighbors. The average Korean dressed more comfortably and ate better food than did the Japanese or Chinese. Time and again the rice crop was so abundant that travellers were not asked to pay for the rice they ate. The country produced more than it could consume. Now it is quite plain that under these conditions the almost frantic struggle in which the average Chinese was engaged in order to keep body and soul together was not necessary in Korea. The common people of Korea could easily produce all that was necessary to maintain a high degree of comfort, and mendicancy was almost unknown. Not until after we had been in Korea five or six years did we ever see an adult beggar. The competition consequent upon the opening of the country soon began to affect the people. The export of cereals and. the speedy appreciation in cost of almost all commodities resulted in a lowering of the average degree of comfort in Korea, and the Korean has [214] been suffering ever since from the fact that hard necessity had not taught him the thrift that was now to be the price of comfort. I wou1d submit that here is a natural explanation of the phenomenon of Korean unthrift, which even Mr. Kennan must acknowledge It is not that Korea is dead and rotten but because her former hermit life prevented the operation of the law of supply and demand as between herself and her two neighbors. The barrier being broken down, natural law tended to make an equilibrium. Since Korea had enjoyed a greater degree of individual comfort than her neighbors, the opening of the country to foreign intercourse and competition was an economic benefit to China and Japan but an injury to Korea herself. There can be no doubt at all that from the purely economic standpoint Korea would be vastly better off today if the policy of the late Regent had prevailed and she had remained a hermit kingdom.

Mr. Kennan divides his caricature of the Korean people into three parts. (a) the Emperor, (b) the Government, (c) the People. He begins his description of the Emperor by a long quotation from "An American gentleman of impartiality, etc., etc.," If by American he means a citizen of the United States we must demur. That description was not' written by a citizen of the United States but of Great Britain. His whole picture of the Emperor is epitomized in one sentence "He is as unconscious as a child, as stubborn as a Boer, as ignorant as a Chinaman and as vain as a Hottentot." I say this sentence epitomizes the whole thing because three out of the four assertions that he here makes prove the very opposite of what he intended. It is somewhat difficult to gauge the meaning of "unconscious as a child." We had never supposed that childhood was a synonym of unconsciousness. On the contrary a child is most intensely conscious and observant. We are willing to grant that the Emperor of Korea is as unconscious as a child. As for the allegation that the Emperor is as stubborn as a Boer we see no reason why he should. consider it other than a compliment. We grant that the stubbornness of the Boer is a very well proven fact but remember [215] that that stubbornness was exhibited in the fiercest fight that man ever put up for what he deemed his native land. That the Emperor is as ignorant as a Chinaman need cause him little alarm in these days when the whole world is beginning to realize that the Chinese are among the shrewdest and most level headed people to be found anywhere. Certainly if the writer of that travesty had wished to make a synonym of ignorance he might have chosen a better subject than the astute Chinese. We are told that the Emperor is as vain as a Hottentot. Much better have stuck to the proverbial peacock, for since the writer of that sentence never saw a Hottentot and knows nothing about them except by hearsay there is some doubt lest his knowledge of the Emperor be of the same nature and that he may be libelling the Emperor, the Hottentot, or both.

"The atmosphere that surrounds him is one of dense ignorance and consequently he is as timid as a fallow deer." Here is another unfortunate simile. Nature has given the fallow deer two means of self defense; keen senses and fleetness of foot. To say that the ignorance of the Emperor includes a lack of perception as to what is going on about him is to my personal knowledge far from true. As a rule the Kings of Korea have been secluded and have been deprived of information except such as the immediate courtiers have been willing to divulge, but to say that the present Emperor is timid because of ignorance is the very opposite of the truth. It is, my gentle caricaturist, because he knows too much. For the past twenty-five years he has had the Chinese, the Russians and the Japanese on his track and has had no means but cunning with which to throw them off the scent. I venture to say that while there are doubtless individuals who know more about Chinese trickery, Russian trickery or Japanese trickery than the Emperor of Korea there is no other man in the world who knows as much of all three as he does.

It is an undoubted truth that the Emperor is timid. It is not a natural trait with him, not inherited; for his father was one of the most recklessly brave men that [216] the Orient has produced during the past century. It is an acquired trait or rather attitude of mind which has been induced by his environment. The very same may be said of the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan of Turkey, and probably to the same degree. The present Emperor's youth was spent amidst the horrors of a sanguinary Roman Catholic persecution and the alarms of threatened invasion by France and the United States. As soon as this was over there began the blood feud between his father and his wife which opened with the destruction of the father, the mother and the brother of the Queen by an infernal machine. It continued in 1882 in the chasing from the palace of the Queen and the murder and mutilation of some of the highest officials before the King's very eyes. In 1884 six of his most trusted ministers and his faithful body servant were hacked to pieces in his presence while on his knees be begged the butchers to forego the knife. In 1895 a band of cut throats invaded his palace, murdered and cremated the Queen and threatened him with death. One faithful official mortally wounded dragged himself into the royal presence and was there despatched. For months after this the King was kept a virtual prisoner beneath the hands of men in league with the murderers of the Queen. He was forced to see the name of his dead consort dragged in the mud and dishonored before the nation. All these things he suffered and a hundred lesser ones without being able to summon other help than that which his own ingenuity could devise. And yet they sneer at him because he is timid. It was his misfortune, not his fault.

The only man who has a moral right to draw a word-picture of a fellow being is he who can, in imagination, put himself in that fellow-being's place and see things from his stand point. Could any exaggeration be more brutal that this—" He regards all his people as flocks and herds intended for his slaughter?" How does this tally with a previous statement that "He is kindly disposed and only the other day sent a special gift to .help a poor old coolie whose tumble down hut and poverty he had happened to see when he was on [217] his way from his burned Chongdong palace?" Mark that this was not during some gala day procession but when he was making his way from the scene of a terrible conflagration which had laid in ashes the only palace in which he considered himself physically safe. With what nimbleness of wit the caricaturist leaps from one point to the other, seemingly oblivious of the fact that the specific instance of self-forgetful love which he cites refutes whole pages of damning innuendo.

**A Korean Cyclopaedia**.

It is important that those who wish to learn about Korea. and the Korean people should have access to .original documents. Comparatively few of these are available here for ordinary consultation, and it would be of great value to have those who own Korean standard works let it be known so that there could be mutual help given by way of reference. One of the greatest of Korean works is the Mun-hon Pi-go, a copy of which in 112 volumes is to be found at any time at the office of the KOREA REVIEW and can be freely consulted by anyone who may so desire. It is a cyclopaedia containing a very great amount of material. In order that students of Korean matter may know what can be found in it we give the following account of the work and its contents.

About the year 1480 while Korea was enjoying her golden age of literature King Song-jong (成宗) having studied the great Chinese cyclopaedia entitled Mun-hon T'ong-go (文獻通考) expressed a desire to see such a work written about Korea. He called up the Korean scholar No Sa-sin (盧思愼) and set him to work but the result was confined to a geographical treatise called the Yo-ji P'yen-nam (輿地便覽) which was a physical, political and historical geography of the peninsula. Before it was published its name was changed to Yo-ji Seung-nam (輿地勝覽). This occupied the writer's time some five years. The king died without seeing a cyclopaedia written. [218]

About the middle of the 16th century King Chung-jong (中宗) again took up the matter and made out the plan of a cyclopaedia but before he could carry it out he was interrupted by civil strife and the work was again postponed.

King Sun-jo (純祖) came to the throne in 1567 and again took up the work where his grandfather had dropped it. He put it in charge of the scholar Yun Tu-su (尹斗壽) who began by arranging extracts from the geography already mentioned but he in turn was interrupted by the great Japanese Invasion of 1592 and another long term of waiting began.

It was not until the opening of King Yung-jong's (英宗) reign in 1724 that the subject was again brought up. He appointed a college of twenty-six leading scholars to act as collaborators of a thorough cyclopaedia and within four years the work was completed.

The names of these scholars are Hong Pong-ban, Kim Sang-bok, Kim Chi-in, Kim Yang-rak, Han Ik-mo, Kim Sang-ch’ŭl, Yi Ch'ang-eui, Hong Kye-heui, Ku Yun-myeng, Wŭn In-son, Su Myong-ong, Ch'on Che-gong, Yi Ch'oe-jung, Hong Myung-han, Chong Chon-gyŭm, Yi Tam, Kim Ong-sun, Cho Chun, Hong Yong-han, Kim Chong-su, Yun Yang-hu, Yi Teuk-il, Sŭ Ho-su, Whang Tan, Sin Kyong-jun, Hong Ch'an-ha.

The work was primarily based on the Yoji Seungnam and so the first portion was simply a re-edition of that book; but when this was done the scope of the work was enlarged and chapters on astronomy, etiquette, music, and other subjects were written and the name of the book was changed to correspond with its changed status. The name now given was Mun-hon Pigo (文獻備考) "A Collection of Literary Works." But as we shall see it was not a Cyclopaedia of Literature but rather a Cyclopaedia treating of subjects discussed in Korean literature. The order of the treatment of the different subjects was changed and the order adopted was meteorology, geography, etiquette, music, military, law, revenue, economics, population, commerce, national examinations, education, official rank. These subjects [219] filled one hundred chapters. The reason why the order observed in the Chinese Mun-hon T'ong-go was not followed which put the subject of revenue first was because King Chung-jong believed very strongly in the fatherhood of heaven and the motherhood of earth and out of deference to this predilection of his the subject of earth and sky, or as we may say, of meteorology was put first.

But beside the thirteen subjects mentioned above this book went into other themes which did not have a counterpart in the Chinese work which was taken as the model. Seven other topics were added namely omens, architecture, royal genealogies, arts, patronymics, posthumous honors, ceremonies. Later four other topics were added. on coming “of age," marriage, burial, sacrifices. Then two others were added; commissariat, military tactics. Then shrines, libraries; then, historical *errata*, geographical *errata*. The complete work then comprised 246 chapters.

The above headings are only the general classes under which are connoted a multitude of different subjects. To give a clear idea of the great scope of this work which ranks among the masterpieces of Korean literature it will be necessary to give a sketch of the contents in detail.

I METEOROLOGY.

Calendar, the Creation, Divine Government, fixed stars, latitude and longitude, day and night, terrestrial limits, inclination of the earth's axis, the prediction of solar and lunar eclipses, “The Middle Star," The *Ta geuk* "Great Perfection," the circle formed of blue and red, seen on the Korean .flag,. clepsydra, the curfew, measure of time, solar eclipse, stars in conjunction with moon, moon in conjunction with stars, expansion and contraction of the constellation of Pleiades, conjunction of North Star and Pleiades, stars visible by day, temporary stars, shooting stars, heavenly changes, solar and lunar changes, solar and lunar halos and rainbow, stellar changes, meteorites, clouds.

[220] II OMENS.

Ominous winds, ominous rains, ominous frost, ominous snow, hail and rainbows, dew and fog, thunder, dark days, snowless winter, warm winter and cold summer, earthquakes, earth fissures, subsidence of ground, burning soil, "looking-glass soil," avalanches, falling rocks, tidal waves, red and black river water, disturbance in ponds, disturbance in wells, drought, locusts, ''far years," pestilence, superhuman origin, prophecy, boy's bad songs, conflagrations, haunted houses, miscellaneous, unnatural grass, unnatural wood, unnatural plants, dragons, snakes, centipedes; earthworms, tortoises, turtles, toads, frogs, various fish, ants, birds,. tigers, bears, wolves. deer, rabbits, foxes, wild cats, cattle, horses, sheep, pigs, cats, rats.

III GEOGRAPHY.

Limits of territory of the various kingdoms; chronological list of various names of each district; mountains and rivers; distances; garrisons; fortresses; capitals and when built; coast-guard stations; sea routes ; palaces and government buildings.

IV CEREMONIES .

Harvest Sacrificial Hall; Royal Ancestral Tablet Hall; sacrifice at same; first fruits offered at same; procession to same; placing of royal tablet in same; placing of royal records in same; placing of tablets in honor of great statesmen; Royal portraits; spirit table; special sacrifices; altars; wind altars; cloud altars; thunder and lightning altars; rain altars; drought altars; altars to Heaven; altars to the earth; altars to the sun and moon and stars; altars to mountains; altars to sea; altars to lakes; altars to trees; altars to streams; stone piles and rag trees; sacrifice at seed time; silk worm sacrifice; ice melting sacrifice; horse pedigree sacrifice; soldiers memorial sacrifice; Confucian shrines; sacrifice to ancestors of sages; standard sacrifice; temple to God of War; sacrifice to Yi Yu-song and Yang-ho (who helped Korea defeat the Japanese at the time of the great [221] invasion); shrine to So Chong-bang; sacrifices to founders of dynasties; miscellaneous sacrifices; Royal burial; mourning garments; Royal tombs; ceremony of putting on hat; marriage; banquets; birthdays; Royal litter; Royal and court dress; seals of office; official etiquette; ceremonies in honor of authors; adopted son; burial customs ; wearing of hats; marriage customs.

V ROY AL GENEALOGIES.

Chronology; ancestors of T'a-jo Ta-wang, male; ancestors of T’a-jo Ta-wang, female; queens' ancestors and relatives; queens' birth-place and time, death, children, burial place; kings' adopted sons; crown princes; princes; princesses; relatives; origin of adopted sons; anecdotes of kings.

VI LITERATURE

Korean bibliography; list of authors; histories; royal writings; royal patronage; classification of writings under fourteen headings. Confucianism, law, literati, ancient history, voluminous writers, astronomy, geography, war, etymology; penmanship, oratory, medicine, agriculture, Buddhism; personal writings; chronologies; epistolary literature.

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VII PATRONYMICS.

Preface; legends; personal names; dynastic names; family names; family histories; Koryŭ prime ministers; prime ministers of the present dynasty.

VIII POSTHUMOUS HONORS.,

Conferring of posthumous honors; list of honors; official honors; special titles; honors conferred by populace.

IX FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Reception of Japanese and Chinese; foreign visitors; Japanese relations; other foreign relations.

[222] X Music.

Origin of music; the twelve musical instruments; the five sounds; harmony; the eight notes; the three throat sounds; sacrificial music; seven instrumental sounds; musical notation; the sixty tunes; twenty eight vernacular songs; native names of instruments; the five vernacular tunes; effect of climate on instruments; effect of environment on music; history of musical instruments; Ancestral Temple instruments; moonlight songs (serenades); festival songs; foreign music; royal family music; court music; farewell songs; war songs; occasional songs; examination by music; envoy music; musical limitations; classes of instruments; instruments made by kings; instruments used in reception of Japanese; metal instruments; stone instruments; stringed instruments; bamboo instruments; "gourd" instruments; earthen instruments; leather instruments; wooden instruments; hanging instruments; singing with accompaniment; Ancestral Temple music; banquet songs; requiem music; country music; dancing to music; singers clothes; choruses; learning music; provincial music; Ki-ja music; Sam-han music; Ye-mak music; Sil-la music; Ko-gur-yŭ music; Pu-yŭ music; Pak-je music; Kor-yŭ music; modern music; universal songs; sounds of Korean speech; alphabet.

XI MILITARY.

Recruiting, night sentry, military law, seals, tactics, treatise on military, guards, barracks, Seoul guard, country garrisons, navy, commissariat, border guard, fire signals, horses, pasture, horse relay system, rest stations.

XII PENAL CODE.

The written code, evidence, punishment of thieves, prohibition of luxury, prohibition of drunkenness, restrictions as to house building, cruelty to animals, selling diseased beef, the placing of responsibility, responsibility for mendicancy, law study, precedents.

XIII. LAND TAX

Distribution of arable land, field deeds, gift fields, [223] crown lands, fields for soldiers, supply, irrigation, watermills, farming, government tax, tribute rice, transport.

XIV EXCHEQUER.

Revenue, repairs, transport, fish and salt monopolies, gold, silver and copper, currency, linen, cotton, silk.

XV POPULATION.

Chronology of population, name-tags, slaves.

XVI MARKETS.

Shops, Seoul six markets, country shops, foreign trading stations, export and import merchants, Manchu trade, Japanese trade, rice market, annual estimate of crop, royal granaries; famine relief.

XVII GOVERNMENT EXAMINATIONS.

Examination laws, examinations during Koryŭ dynasty, modern examinations, ancient history examination, literary examination, archery examination, sword and spear examination, equestrian examination, rifle examination, dancing examination, poetry examination, memorial examination, strategy examination, noblemen's examination, common people's examination, middle class examination, posthumous honors, recommendations, copyists.

XVIII EDUCATION.

The "Great School," Confucian school, country schools, eight subjects of study, aid for scholars, explanation of mysteries, teachers, curricula, ancient history, architecture, punishments for students, graduate degrees, North, East, South and West schools, country customs, posthumous honors.

(To be continued.)

**Korean and Ainu**.

The question asked recently in Seoul by a correspondent of the *Osaka Mainichi*, "Are not the Koreans a good deal like the Ainus?" is an illuminating commentary [224] upon the attitude of a certain large and influential Class of Japanese. It has become increasingly evident, in spite of the protests of a certain few of the better element in Japan, that the .above question receives an affirmative answer from the great mass of the Japanese who think about the matter at all. The Ainus once inhabited the greater part of Japan, and were a semi-savage race little if any superior to the Esquimaux. Their social and political systems were of the crudest description. These people were gradually driven north by successive waves of immigration from the south. The races which displaced the Ainu were little if any superior in culture but were fighters by nature and training and the result was never in the balance. The relative civilization of the Korean and Japanese today is much the same as that which existed between the Ainu and Japanese at the time the Ainu was being driven north. That is, the general grade of civilization of the masses of Korea and Japan is very much the same. The main difference is that one is warlike and the other is not.

The evident implication of the comparison was that as the Japanese were justified in driving back the Ainu and appropriating their territory, so the Japanese are justified in driving back the Korean and taking the soil for their own uses. Some people would say that such an argument is absurd on the face of it; but there are others, and not a few, who hold that Korea has not developed the resources of the peninsula in a way that gives her the moral right to continue to hold it. This is an arraignment not of the Korean government but of the nation itself. They think that the Japanese have the right to seize the territory and dispossess the Koreans because by so doing the resources of the country will be properly developed.

There are two points that require special attention. The first is the truth or falsity of the statement that Koreans are not utilizing the resources of the country. The second is the question of the degree of moral right which one country possesses to seize territory of another on the ground that the resources are not being developed. [225] Is Korea making a rational use of her resources? If one travels in the interior of Korea he will find a large proportion of arable land under cultivation, and a cultivation of no mean order. A highly intelligent and observant American gentleman who has recently been travelling extensively in northern Korea states that the country is highly cultivated, that neither Japanese nor anyone else could make any marked improvement upon it. This agrees with our own observation and that of every foreigner we have questioned. It cannot truthfully be claimed that the Koreans are withholding from the world's consumption any considerable fraction of her possible food production. It must be borne in mind that production follows demand and Korea has not been long enough opened to the world to fed the full force of the world's demand for food materials. Enormous quantities have been exported but the market has not demanded the exquisite care which the Chinese, for instance, lavish upon their fields. And yet Korea cannot be charged with having withheld her produce or with having refused to do her part toward feeding the world. Now no one knows this better than the Japanese themselves. They have travelled exhaustively throughout Korea and they know beyond peradventure that the excuse of Korean unwillingness to get the most possible out of the soil is untenable.

But Korea has other assets besides her agricultural capacity. The country is rich in minerals which ought to be exploited. But this much must be granted that food products differ widely from mineral products in their immediate importance. If a man has a field and persistently and obstinately refuses to cultivate it, thereby inflicting suffering upon those who are willing to buy from him and who need the produce, there would be an excuse for compelling him to utilize the field or else lose it; but in the case of minerals it is somewhat different. Agricultural wealth is perennial and practically inexhaustible. Land is not injured by wise agriculture. The products of land are largely a gift of nature, and refusal to cultivate is to deny to the world a gift of nature; but [226] mineral wealth is intrinsically different in that, while it is a gift of nature, it is not perennia1 but strictly limited in amount, and once exhausted is gone for all time. It can be used but once and reason urges that the nation possessing such a resource has far greater moral right to postpone its exploitation than that of arable land. But even so we find in Korea no desire to act the dog in the manger and obstinately prevent the exploitation of .this wealth. She demands that it shall be exploited for the benefit of its owners. No reasonable man wou1d deny this. Has the Korean government stood in the way of an equitable arrangement for the development of its mineral. wealth? We say no, and the facts are with us. Many opportunities have been given to foreign syndicates to engage in mining here. We venture to say that Korea has been generous to a marked degree in granting such concessions. The charge that the Korean government is opposed to such development is glaringly untrue; but what is the Japanese attitude toward mining here? Without the capital to engage in the work in a way that would get the most out of the ore they attempt to block at entry point the granting of concessions to those who could and would do so. The present contest over the concession granted to the Manchu Syndicate is a striking instance of the obstructive policy of Japan. This syndicate offers, we understand, to turn over to the Koreans forty per cent of the net profits of its work . When we remember the difficulties to be met in a country so remote from mining supplies and the lack of railway facilities in most parts of the country, who can deny that the Korean government is being generously treated in being given forty per cent of the profits? But what are the Japanese giving the Korean government for the mines that they are working in a desultory way all over the peninsula, in many places without the shadow of a right? We venture to say that the Korean government is getting nothing from them that will begin to compare with the forty per cent guaranteed by the Manchu Syndicate. The cry is raised by the Japanese that the Korean government must be protected from the rapacity of [227] foreign investors and adventurers. History never showed more ludicrous situation than this. While the Japanese are crowding the Koreans at every point, seizing their fisheries, their salt works, their land, they raise the cry that the Koreans must be protected from syndicates that propose to enter into definite and open agreements which have undergone the close scrutiny of both governments and which are entirely above-board and of confessedly mutual advantage. We are reluctantly compelled to believe that it is not Korea that is acting as an obstructionist but that it is Japan. If it were not for her, a dozen foreign syndicates would be, within a year, developing the mineral wealth of Korea on scientific principles and with adequate capital. This would be of advantage to the whole world, Japan included. The marvelous advance of electrical engineering demands increased production of copper. Well, there are magnificent copper mines in Korea blocked today by the obstructive tactics of the Japanese. They have not the capital to develop them and they will allow no one else to do it .

But to return to the Ainu proposition; we must ask in what way the Ainus were dispossessed of their land. Covering most of the country as the North American Indians did America they saw waves of immigration rolling in from the South. These new comers established themselves gradually and their superior physical power and warlike characteristics won for them a commanding position. Then receiving, perhaps from Korea, incentives toward a higher civilization they gradually forged ahead of the aboriginal peoples and attained in a measure to the same right to the soil of Japan that the European gained in America. The Ainu had to go. How different is all this from the present situation! Here we have two nations side by side, each of them having developed a highly articulated form of civilization with written records running back over a thousand years. Two peoples almost equal in mental capacity but widely differentiated in some important respects. On the one side the close contact with China has bred conservatism and has made political life more or less corrupt as it is in [228] China itself. On the other hand we find a new and advanced national spirit which while still far from the goal of western enlightenment is making strenuous efforts to put off at least the habiliments of the past. It has resulted in a striking economic and industrial transformation. The results are laudable though not miraculous. But on what basis of comparison can Japan assume the right to do to the. Korean what she did to the Ainu? The parallelism breaks down at every point. But, you say, what evidence have you that this desire to make the Korean a second Ainu really exists? The reply to this wholly pertinent question lies in the facts that lie right about us and will be abundantly apparent to anyone who wil1 take pains to inquire. The Japanese government is permitting and tacitly encouraging Japanese settlers to come to Korea by the tens of thousands. For these Japanese to acquire land and live promiscuously in the interior is wholly illegal. It is an act of usurpation which is wholly indefensible .by the recognized laws of nations. Before long these illegal residents will aggregate such a large number that even should Japan withdraw from Korea they could arm themselves and terrorize the whole country, impose their will upon the people and sway the destiny of the nation. We say distinctly and with all the force at our command that this monstrous usurpation means the gradual obliteration of the Korean people. The highest Japanese officials may protest that this is not true, that it is far from their intentions, but so long as they allow the Japanese to swarm into the country as they are doing now, so long will it be impossible to believe their protestations, for actions speak louder than words.

**Editorial Comment** .

During the absence of the Editor in America it would have been necessary to suspend the publication of the REVIEW had not kind friends volunteered the reinforce the [229] management by generous contributions of material for its pages. In taking up the work again we would express our appreciation of their kindness in preventing an hiatus in the continuity of the periodical. It is fitting for us also to restate our position as regards the Korean people and the Japanese government. Unfortunately the impression is prevalent among a certain class, that the attitude of the REVIEW is one of hostility toward the Japanese. This we distinctly disavow. We are here to state both and every side of the case to the public, and those phases of Japanese work in the peninsula which are deserving of praise have not been and will not be overlooked. That we have always spoken plainly and without equivocation can be distasteful only to those who do not care to have the plain facts known by the general public. There can be no doubt that Japan has before her a great destiny. In spite of all drawbacks, the energy and spirit of the Japanese will push them on to great achievements, nor would any man of sense wish to see them checked in their progress toward any legitimate goal. We are willing to see them compete with any other nation and if they can perform a service to any nation or any cause superior in quality to that which is already being done we are willing to see them successful in that competition. It is the logical working of the law of the survival of the fittest. But the large question comes up for answer, What rights of other peoples are the Japanese bound to respect? Should they be called upon to put goods upon the market under their own brands and not attempt to deceive. prospective purchasers by imitating brands that have already established reputations in the Far East? Should they be called upon to play the game according to the rules of the game or may they make rules for themselves? We have long held the opinion that though deservedly successful in the late war, due to objective as well as subjective causes, Japan would find it far more difficult to handle the Korean people than to win battles in the field. The reason for this lies at the basis of the Japanese character. They have more dash than patience, [230] more impulsive force in entering upon a policy than ability to look at things from the standpoint of the other side. They are essentially military in their methods and this means that they succeed better in handling things with the mailed hand than on the basis of an ordinary administrative policy. This can be plainly seen in the events of the past ten months. In glancing over the progress which has been made toward any rational goal in Korea the most sanguine adherent of Japan's cause must confess to disappointment. Without making any serious attempt to manage affairs here on a basis of friendship but after exasperating the people by numberless forms of petty or grave aggressions Japan confessed her inability to handle the country under such conditions and forced upon Korea a so-called protectorate which to this day exists de facto though wholly fictitious de jure. During all these months what has been done along the whole firing-line of administrative reform? The basis of any settled government is common justice. We hardly think anyone will contradict the statement that nothing has been done along this line. A good deal has been said about it but what has been done? To-day there lies in the outhouses of the supreme court a man who came up to Seoul a year ago asking for a fair trial of his grievance against a notorious plunderer of the poor. He not only did not get justice but he has been slowly starving to death for the past seven months in the court prison where he was thrown by the connivance of the man who had stolen all his property. He is there now, and other Koreans who came to help him are compelled to hide by day and go along side streets only lest they too be seized and imprisoned. Do the Japanese know this? And if not why do they not know and remedy it? A few weeks ago a Korean who had mortgaged a salt field to a Japanese in Pusan for three years was seized by the Japanese and starved for six days till he consented to write a statement that if the money he owed was not paid in a week the field would be forfeited. He could not pay and so a salt field worth Y10,000 was seized. by the Japanese for Y3,000. [231] Do the Japanese know this? And if they know do they care? There is no such thing as justice today for the ordinary Korean. Now and then we find an exception which is refreshing but as a rule there is no justice. Even since our return Koreans by the scores have appealed to us to save their houses and fields from spoliation. Several women came in only yesterday saying that they had been ordered out of their houses along the road between Seoul and Han Kang and were to receive but Y10 per *kan* for them, when any fairly well informed person knows that they can do next to nothing with such a sum in securing a new home. Probably the gravest charge that can be laid against the Japanese is this total lack of any definite and tangible results along the line of common justice.

In the field of finance where the results would accrue to the benefit of the Japanese as well as the Koreans we find, even according to the confession of the Japanese papers and the most loyal supporters of the Residency, a complete and disastrous failure. Business was almost at a standstill all last winter and it is only just beginning to pick up again. A loan of Y10,000,000 has been made to Korea by Japan and a large fraction of it is to be used it seems in supplying Chemulpo with water works. How this can be called a legitimate government expenditure and why the town of Chemulpo should not finance its own water works are questions that those who forced this loan upon Korea will find it hard to answer. There was, apparently, no need of a loan.

Education is one of the themes which have called forth the most eloquent encomiums of the Japanese, but what has been done in Korea? We can truthfully say, practically nothing. The gentleman who was adviser to the Educational Department has left Korea in disgrace and doubtless in disgust. He advocated the plan of forcing all the common schools in Korea to use Japanese text books. If anything more ludicrously absurd than this can be found in the annals of education we have failed to see it.

In the province of which Taiku is the capital the Korean [232] governor and prefects were allowed to come down upon the people in the good old way for a school tax. Those who know, say that not a tenth part of the enormous sum squeezed from the people will be used for any legitimate purpose. The people were on the verge of revolt and laid the blame upon the Japanese, where it belongs, since they alone could have prevented it.

We have searched the papers in vain for any indication that the Japanese have accomplished anything along the lines so plainly laid down by Marquis Ito when he first took the matter in hand. We do not at all doubt his good intentions but he had still the lesson to learn that a helpful and conciliatory policy can be carried out only at the hands of those who are helpfully inclined, and unless Marquis Ito could command the services of such, even he was and is doomed to failure. There is no public sentiment in Japan demanding insistently that the Koreans be treated as fellow beings. The general sentiment seems to be rather that of the correspondent of the Osaka *Mainichi* who asked a prominent foreign resident of Seoul if he did not think the Koreans were a good deal like the Ainus. His idea evidently was that the Koreans should be driven back as the North American Indian has been.

The Japanese authorities seem to be unaware of the most patent fact that the civilization of the the Japanese has not gone deep enough to keep many of them from reverting to a condition of mediaeval semicivilization when relieved of the close police surveillance under which they live in Japan.

We have been told that the Japanese are missionaries to Korea because they were sent here to do something. In this case we shall have to inscribe the names of Cortez, Pizarro, Attila, and Ghengiz Khan upon the roll of missionaries. They too were sent to do something. We see no evidences as yet of any set purpose on the part of Japan to gain other than selfish advantages in this peninsula. There may be other purposes but they have borne little fruit. Meanwhile Japanese subjects pour in to the country by the thousands and go wherever they wish without passport entirely contrary to their treaty rights. They settle where they wish, buy property or take it, and set up in business with as complete freedom as in their own country: all the while considering themselves entirely free from control by Korean magistrates and officials and at the same time too far from their consular centers to be held in check by the Japanese constabulary. There are certain limits within which even a protectorate can move, and if the overwhelming of the Korean people by a tide of Japanese immigration keeps on the Powers that are still in treaty relations with Korea must and will grow restive.

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It is very unfortunate that no one can criticize the actions of Japan in Korea without being charged with being in the employ of Russia. That temper of mind which considers everyone an enemy who is not a blind adherent. and an enthusiastic advocate does not speak well for the broad mindedness of the Japanese. We think no reasonable person who has read the pages of this REVIEW will ever charge us with working in the interests of Russia. We would be as as sorry to see Russia usurp the power in Korea as we are to see the present state of affairs. We advocate the cause of the Korean people and their continued existence as a nation. In so far as Japan and Korea can be mutually helpful we advocate the temporary predominance of Japanese power in the peninsula; but the things which we specifically object to are the exploitation of Korea for the Japanese, the prevention of the introduction of foreign capital, the swarming of Japanese in the interior without proper control, the rapid alienation of the soil and the continued propagation of the idea that the so-called treaty of last November is a legal and defensible document. We believe that Marquis Ito means well by Korea but that he has been and will be unable to hold in check the selfish ambitions of his own nationals.

We believe that the only way to exercise a deterrent influence is by giving the facts to the public. And in this connection we must inform our readers that since writing [234] the paragraph on education, which has already gone to press, we are informed that the Japanese authorities deny that Mr. Sidehara proposed to have all the common schools use Japanese text books. The reason for his retirement is said to be that the Residency considered the educational problem such a large and important one that it was necessary to have at its head a man of wider experience than Mr. Sidehara. Now, we have looked into the matter carefully and find that Mr. Sidehara did advise that all the students of the Normal school be taught in Japanese and that in the schools which they should be put in charge of Japanese text books should be used. One of the students objected strenuously and said this was a Korean school and not a Japanese school. The plan was to print a large number of Japanese text

books for use throughout the school system. After his resignation Mr. Sidehara himself told his Korean friends that he believed this was the cause of his removal. Whether so or not, this proved that the proposition was made and urged upon the educational authorities.

We would be scrupulously careful to note every sign of improvement. We are not able as yet to determine whether the so called "Agricultural and Industrial Bank" may be called a forward movement or not. It is a Korean affair started under the auspices of the Finance Department and its purpose is to loan money to Koreans for the purpose of occupying new agricultural land and improving old land through increased irrigating facilities. This is its ostensible purpose. and undoubtedly a laudable one but up to the present time it has merely done the work of a superior kind of loan company, taking deeds of land and houses as security and lending money thereon for any purpose the borrower may desire.

It is significant that the Il Chin-hoi people were the most active in the matter and they are said to have gotten control of considerable land in the interior which they wish to exploit in this manner. Unfortunately the Il Chin-hoi have not been credited with a great deal of productive labor and for this and other reasons we have to suspend judgment as to the genuineness of this movement. [235] We wish success to every effort which will be of benefit to the people.

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The latest movement on the part of the Japanese in separating from the Emperor all the people in whom he has confidence and holding him in practical confinement forms a situation that seems to us to be impossible of permanence. And furthermore it is a matter of such delicacy that we fear even the astuteness of the Japanese will hardly be able to extract any considerable benefit from it. It makes us think of the man who has a bull by the horns and neither dares to keep hold or to let go. The promises of the Japanese to look after the personal welfare of the Imperial family makes it difficult to follow a drastic course and deal with the Emperor as they would apparently desire, but at the same time the perfectly intelligible wish of the Emperor to have some say in the management of his own affairs drives the Japanese to the very crude device of segregating him from all his friends and turning his palace into a jail. This seems to us to be a wholly oriental method of handling the situation. It is proverbially difficult to mix oil and water, and the claim of the Japanese that the treaty of last November was acceptable to the Emperor does not show any logical connection with the charge that the Emperor is fomenting trouble in the interior and trying to interest foreign powers in his predicament. If the former is true the latter is inconceivable. If the latter is true then the acquiescence of last November was, to use the most euphemistic term, perfunctory.

**News Calendar**.

The fact that Japanese rather than Korean soldiers were used to put down the insurrection of the Righteous Army people at Hong-jo aroused a variety of sentiments in the minds of the Korean people. Some thought it put another weapon into the hands of the Japanese in their assumption of authority in Korea, while others, being aware that [236] the insurrection was not a selfish or predatory one but caused by a genuinely patriotic feeling, considered that it would be fratricidal for Koreans to kill them. On the whole it was doubtless better that the Japanese troops should suppress the insurrection. The Korean troops; would probably have had too much sympathy with the insurrectionists to have accomplished their dispersal.

The Finance department will pay 160,000 Yen for waterworks at Chemulpo,

Sim Sang-hun, one of the strongest Koreans of the present time, and a man who stands for the autonomy of Korea, has been sent into polite banishment as governor of Kang-wun Province.

The prefect of Chung-sung in North Kyung-sang Province, fearing that the disaffection in his vicinity would lead to an outbreak similar to that in Hong-ju, sent out a special commissioner to quiet the people. Two hundred and fifty Korean troops were also sent to that district.

The delay in the coming of the Russian Consul General to Seoul is receiving intelligent attention from a large section of the better informed Koreans. It is denied by one of Japan's ardent supporters in Seoul that the coming of Mr. Planeon is delayed by the fact of Russia's unwillingness to do business with Korea through the Residency, and that it is caused only by the delay in the settlement of a few secondary points. Unfortunately we cannot place implicit confidence in statements emanating from this source and we must be allowed to doubt that Russia is waiting for any other cause than the obvious one, namely the express promise of Japan to Korea at the beginning of the war and her promise to Russia at the time of the Portsmouth treaty, that the independence of Korea would be maintained. Without wishing to draw any invidious comparisons, it must appear to any unprejudiced person that, in view of the proofs that have been piled up that the treaty of last November was wholly illegal, the Russian government is the only one today that is pursuing a wholly logical and legally defensible course.

The prefect of Song-do informed the Home Department that a large number of monuments along the roadside near that city must be removed at a cost of Y1,000, for the Japanese threaten to destroy them all if they are not taken away. These are monuments to noted Korean governors of the past. The Japanese want to widen the railway station yard.

On May 27 at eleven o'clock in the morning a Japanese police captain and a Korean police captain with seven other police arrived before the town of Hong-ju where the insurrectionists were entrenched. In the afternoon while they were reconnoitering they were surrounded by the insurrectionists. It looked rather bad for the Japanese but others came up to their aid and the insurrectionists fled. It was found however that the two police captains Japanese and Korean had disappeared. Two days later, the 29th of May. the Japanese troops and the local Korean troops from Chung-ju arrived on .the scene and all day [237] long a lively fight was kept up. Early in the morning of the 31st the gate of the city was blown np with dynamite and the Japanese troops poured into the town, Sixty of the insurrectionists were shot and about 130 were captured and sent to Seoul. Only eighty arrived at the capital. The leader of the insurrectionists, Min Chong-sik , with the remainder of his followers fled westward and escaped. The dead bodies of the Japanese and Korean captains were found in the city. Police were sent from Seoul to bring the bodies to the capital. The family of the Korean captain received Y1,000 as solatium. It is said that forty of the captured insurrectionists are to be shot.

In connection with the Finance Department a Korean Bank has been established avowedly for the purpose of lending money to Koreans who wish to exploit the resources of Korea that still lie fallow. It is a stock company with a capital of V200,000.

Min Yung-gyu has been appointed Prime Minister. The place has been vacant for six or eight months. The reason given for the appointment is that the official is necessary to the proper celebration of the marriage of the Crown Prince. The appointment during the absence of Marquis Ito is said to have incensed the Japanese who seem not to have been consulted in any way.

The Japanese consul at Sung-jin has notified the Superintendent of Trade that the Japanese are about to make extensive surveys along the northeast coast and that it will be necessary for them to make certain white marks on the rocks in some places to place flags and to build temporary huts and he asks the superintendent to tell the people not to be afraid and not to tamper with any of the marks or buildings.

The Home Department has ordered the prefect of Chang-wun (Masanpo) to send explicit information as to the amoun.t of land and of trees that the railway has taken, as this is necessary for the payment of the value to the Korean owners of property.

Dr. Avison and Rev. H. G. Underwood D D., have both been decorated by the Emperor with the order of Ta-geuk, third degree. Besides this Dr. Avison received other and more substantial testimonials of the gratitude of His Majesty for frequent and much appreciated services.

A custom house has been in operation in the border town of Wiju on the Yalu river since the first of June.

At Seoul on the 13th of June Bishop Harris and Dr. W. B. Scranton of the Methodist Church were entertained at a dinner by the members of the Japanese club. Among other things Bishop Harris said that the present status of things had all come about in a natural way, that recent events warranted him in offering to the Japanese his warm congratulations for what they had done in Korea. He said that on two occasions the Japanese had drawn the sword of war in order to secure the peace of the Far East, that the Japanese had come to Korea to deliver the people from the thraldom of the past and infuse a new life among them. He averred that the Japanese people are animated [238] by one spirit of unconquerable determination to achieve greater victories in the domain of peace and civilization. It is to be regretted that Bishop Harris did not have time to give any specific instances upon which these laudatory remarks were based.

This is taken from the report of the speech as given by the *Japan Chronicle*.

Because of the threatened rise of Insurrectionists throughout the country General Hasegawa is reported to have determined to station twenty Japanese soldiers in each prefectural town. This does not agree very well with the statement of Marquis Ito quoted in the *Japan Weekly Herald* of June 29 to the effect that the reports of risings all over the country were untrue and that it was really a small affair. Nor does it seem to coincide with the Marquis' desire "not to employ military force in this connection." There is evidently a wide gap between what we believe to be the genuine desire of Marquis Ito and what is practically possible in the premises.

The n *Whang Sung* daily states that Prof. Sidehara, the ex-adviser to the Educational Department, was severely reprimanded by Marquis Ito for grave mistakes in the conduct of affairs at the department. We believe that mistakes were made but that Prof. Sidehara 's intentions were to benefit the Korean people. The trouble lay in the faulty methods.

Members of the Il Chin society have been much in evidence about the palace, arresting at will any people who seem to them to be inimical to Japanese interests. Neither the Korean nor Japanese police interfere in these wholly illegal arrests. This use of a Korean Society to do the unpleasant odd jobs that have to be done is another characteristically oriental device.

We are sorry to learn that Gordon Paddock. Esq. the United States Consul General in Seoul, is to be superceded. His successor is Mr. Hayward, a former Consul General in Honolulu. All Americans can testify to the promptness and courtesy with which the business of the Consulate has been conducted.

Prof. H. B. Hulbert and family returned early in June from an eight months trip to the United States. Before starting for America he resigned from his position under the Educational Department. He investigated the condition of Koreans in Hawaii and in San Francisco. Coming through San Francisco, on his return, just after the great earthquake he learned that a large number of Koreans had found temporary refuge in Oakland, For the first few days after the catastrophe they were kindly cared for by Dr. A. D. Drew, who has many warm friends in Korea.

O Se-chang, an intimate friend of Pak Yong-hyo, has started a daily newspaper in Seoul. It is called the *Man-se Fo*. It is said to be an entirely independent paper but it is too early to say yet just what its policy is. If it is like Pak Yong-hyo it will be independent. [239]

On the 16th of June the Japanese Gendarmes arrested five leading Koreans, Yi Pong-na, Min Kyung-sik, Min Pyung-han, Pak Yong-wha and Hong Cha-gong. These men were friends of the Emperor and it is said they were charged with having aided in the sending of Kim Seung-mun to Vladivostok with yen 200,000. It is said that these men were tortured to secure evidence against themselves and others. This charge of torturing witnesses is a very grave one but eyewitnesses of this torture are by no means rare. They say the Japanese do not torture by beating but by the use of an iron pincers which grip the head. Eyewitnesses of this torture have been seen by the Editor of this Magazine, and it is not to be supposed that victims of torture will keep still about it. The business seems to be done at the gendarme headquarters.

After the insurrection at Hong-ju had been put down the insurgents (or perhaps better the resurgents) scattered to various southern points and sent out notices urging the members of the organization to gather at specified places and resume operations.

Ten Japanese captains have been engaged to teach the Korean, soldiers,

The Residency has informed the Korean government that since the latter failed to pay according to agreement the total sum for the purchase of land tor the railroads it owes the Japanese 270,000 Yen. Of this Korea must pay 140,000 Yen in 1907 and the remainder in 1908.

Five thousand yen worth of half sen copper money (Korean) has been brought from the Osaka Mint.

At Chong-no a Korean Board of Trade building will be built at a cost of Yen 10,000.

Cho Hyung-ho was appointed Prime minister in place of Min Yung-gyu, resigned. .. -

On June 18 the Japanese arrested Choe Ik-hyun the famous memorialist. He was a strenuous upholder of the cause of the "Righteous Army."

The contract of Mr. Hallifax of the English Language school has been renewed for two years.

The thirteen students who were sent to Russia before the war have succeeded in getting back to their native land after suffering great hardship in St. Petersburg because of lack of funds.

The Residency has told the Korean government that as none of the Koreans in San Francisco were killed there is no use in Koreans worrying about them, especially as Yen 4,000 are to be sent to them.

It is reported that Japanese and Chinese capitalists have formed a company with Yen 2,000,000 capital to exploit the Yalu timber regions. We have not heard that the Korean government is to realize anything out of the transaction. It makes all the difference who it is that is appropriating the assets of the Korean government. [240]

Koreans are interested in the story that while Japanese were tearing down a building at Ham-heung that was once used as a horse stable by the founder of the present Korean dynasty a huge snake came out from under a large stone. The Japanese fled but some of them came back and killed the beast and burned it. The stench is said to have been almost unbearable. At night its mate came out and went all about the town crying for its partner. So the story goes.

Prince Eui Wha arrived in Seoul on the 28th of June. He is residing in the Japanese quarter.

The wife of the Righteous Army leader, Min Chong-sik, and the wife of Choe Ik-hyun whom the Japanese arrested, committed suicide about the last of June.

A new Korean magazine has appeared, the Cho Yang-po—“The Morning Sun.” It is independent in politics but mainly educational in aim. We wish it a long life. A woman’s magazine has also been started called the Ka Chung Chap Chi or “Korean Household Magazine.''

A serious disturbance was caused at Sam Chuk near the East Coast where 300 of the Righteous Army wrecked the houses of the town and looted the place about June 15.

The approaching wedding of Dr. J. B. Ross and Miss Knowles, both of Wonsan, has been announced.

Dr. H. G. Underwood and family left Seoul for Europe on furlough July 3rd. They intended to go by way of the Siberian Railway but reported disturbances in Vladivostok prevented and they went via the Capes.

The Cabinet recommended that Y4.ooo be sent to San Francisco to aid the eighty five Koreans who were rendered destitute by the calamity that overtook that city.

The doughty members of the Il Chin society hearing a rumor that they were all to be arrested by the Korean government assembled on the 21st of June at their headquarters as a sort of joke to wait for their arrest, Gen. Hasegawa telephoned the Cabinet Ministers asking if the rumor were true.

On the 23rd June Marquis Ito returned from Japan. About the beginning of July the Japanese went into the palace and placed a guard about the Emperor, holding him in practical confinement. All his personal friends and servants were removed or fled, causing great inconvenience and no little uneasiness. No one seems to know just why all this was done.

Mr. McKenzie, the well known correspondent of the Daily Mail. was in town for several days. Judging from the excitement caused by his telegrams to his paper he is taking a careful, critical and independent view of the whole situation in the Far East. He will doubtless have something to say about Korea and we await its appearance with great interest.