



TRANSACTIONS

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ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

KOREA BRANCH

The Chientao Incident (1920) and Britain

by Daeyeol Ku

Early Korean Writing Systems


by Adrian Buzo

Musical Aspects of the Modern
Korean Art Song

by Dorothy C. Underwood

Early American Contacts with Korea

by Harold F. Cook



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The Chientao Incident (1920) and Britain*

by Daeyeol Ku

This is a study of the military expedition which the Japanese sent to Chientao in October 1920 in order to clear the area of the Korean independence movement, and of the attitude of the British government towards the Japanese encroachment in that part of Chinese territory. Chientao, or Kando in Korean and Japanese, lies to the north of the Tumen river which forms the eastern part of the border between China and Korea, and is a stretch of territory about 300 miles long by 60 wide, encompassing the four districts of Holung, Yenchi, Wangshing and Hunchun. At the time of this study, it constituted a kind of oasis of exceptionally fertile valleys in the wild mountains and forests of northern Korea and Manchuria, and had, therefore, attracted a large number of Koreans since the 1860s, in spite of the prohibition by the Korean government against crossing the frontier. The Korean population there had increased steadily, being 71,000 in 1907, 109,500 in 1910, 253,916 in 1918 and 307,806 in 1921, while the number of the Chinese was less than one third, being 21,983 in 1907 and 73,746 in 1921. The area west of Chientao was called Sōkando, or west Chientao, and was also inhabited by a number of Koreans.¹

A border dispute between the two countries flared up in 1882 as the Chinese government took note of the rapid increase of the Koreans in the area. This was eventually settled under the Chientao Agreement concluded between China and Japan on September 4, 1909 at a time when the latter maintained her residency-general in Seoul.

* This paper was first published in 1980 as part of the International Study series of the London School of Economics and Political Science. The author was a research assistant at the International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines at the London School of Economics, working for the project on expansion in Asia and the response of Asian countries between October 1978 and January 1980. This paper is a report on research which was carried out in London during that period. It is linked to the author's more detailed study entitled 'Korean Resistance to Japanese Colonialism: The March First Movement of 1919 and Britain's Role in its Outcome' which was accepted for the degree of Ph. D by the University of London. The author is grateful to the ICERD for support and thanks Dr. Ian H. Nish for his guidance during this study.

The agreement covered only the three districts of Holung, Yenching and Wangshing, a fact which led to Hunchun and Sokando being generally excluded from the Chientao area since then. By the agreement, China obtained Japan's recognition of her sovereignty over the region and her jurisdiction over its Korean inhabitants, whilst making several concessions to Japan, including the right to extend the Changchun-Kirin railway to the Korean frontier; opening of four trade-marts in Chientao; and the right to establish consulates or branch offices in the area.²

The Japanese authorities in Seoul did not stop the emigration of the Koreans to Chientao either after they promulgated the emigration protection law in July 1906 (by which no Koreans were allowed to go abroad) or even after the annexation of Korea in 1910. An official document noted that Korean emigration to Chientao had increased yearly, because 'the emigrants were beguiled by the misleading information given by Korean political refugees who had made Chientao their base.'³ In 1919, a report of the British Foreign Office stated that a large crowd of such people, numbering about 1,000 a week, had been noticed at Seoul railway station.⁴ Since the Japanese knew that Korean exiles tended to be strongly nationalistic, it is hard to see any other reason for the Japanese to licence this emigration except to make room for Japanese emigrants in the peninsula and to scatter Koreans outside the border region so that Japan could have an excuse for intervention there under the pretext of 'protecting' her Korean subjects.⁵ On the other hand, the suffering and hardship of these Korean emigrants explain their hostility towards the Japanese. Thus Chientao became one of the main arenas for the anti-Japanese movement on the part of Korean exiles, when the control of their country passed to Japan. One aspect of their activities was military adventurism over the border, whereas their colleagues in the United States and Shanghai were more inclined to undertake diplomatic manoeuvres.

In March 1919, mass anti-Japanese demonstration, called the March First Movement, took place throughout Korea. The movement had first been conceived by Korean exiles in the United States and then supported by their colleagues in other parts of the world in order to take the case of their country on appeal to the forthcoming Paris peace conference. In the peninsula, a similar venture was undertaken by some religious leaders; and this was eventually transformed into the most spectacular mass movement during the Japanese colonial period in the wake of the death of the ex-Korean emperor. Although the Korean movement

failed because of high-handed suppression by the Japanese authorities, it expanded over the border into Korean communities in Chientao and Siberia and resulted in the establishment of the Korean provisional government in Shanghai.

In Chientao, it took the form of military attacks by the Korean independence army, called *Tongnipkun*, on the Japanese garrison units along the border from the latter part of 1919. Some big *Tongnipkun* units numbered, according to the Japanese military authorities, as many as 1,000 men. They established military training grounds in various parts of Chientao; issued orders calling up Korean youths for the *Tongnipkun*; levied contributions from all Koreans in the region; and stored war material for future military action. The Japanese authorities in Seoul met the threat from the Koreans over the Tumen by increasing the number of border guards at the end of September, and ordering that Japanese troops should cross the Tumen to pursue and annihilate the Koreans. This resulted in a number of skirmishes over the border area, in which the Koreans claimed victory in some cases.⁶

THE JAPANESE EXPEDITION TO CHIEN TAO

The Seoul authorities were of the opinion that the armed challenges of the Koreans in the Chientao area were made possible by the acquiescence of the Chinese authorities in Manchuria. Local Chinese officials, the Japanese maintained, openly sympathized with the Koreans' movement and had assisted them in their anti-Japanese agitations.⁷ The deterioration of the situation in Chientao was further aided by the presence of Chinese mounted bandits called *Hunghutzu* in the neighboring area. The Japanese military authorities believed that the Chinese local government in Mukden was unable to put an end to such a situation. The Chinese army in Chientao was chronically under strength, with battalions consisting nominally of 500 men actually numbering less than 300. Further, its officers had no knowledge and experience of military matters, some of them even being former leaders of the *Hunghutzu*. A Japanese military report summed up the Chinese army in Chientao as just coolies in military uniform.⁸

In these circumstances, the Japanese residents in Lungching on April 25, 1920 requested the Japanese authorities, including the army commander in Korea, 'to consider some measures' to stop the violence of

the Koreans in the area.⁹ They said that the Koreans, who had been accumulating arms with the help of the Russian Bolsheviks since March of the previous year, were threatening the lives and properties of the Japanese in Chientao, while Chinese promises of 'rigorous suppression' habitually ended in compromise with the Koreans, because the Chinese government 'spoke with their mouths and not with their hearts.'¹⁰ The Japanese claimed that it was 'absolutely impossible' to rely on the Chinese authorities for the suppression of the Koreans and as a result trading activities by the Japanese residents had been seriously affected.¹¹

The Japanese army in Korea replied to Japanese citizens in Chientao that it was difficult to comply with their request because of international law and because of bilateral considerations.¹² But the Tokyo government took immediate action to persuade the regional authorities in Mukden to cooperate. From May to August of 1920, Japanese consular officials in Manchuria, army officers and police officers in Korea met three times in Mukden to discuss their proposals with the Chinese authorities. At the first conference, held early in May, the Japanese side proposed that joint parties of suppression, composed of Japanese police and gendarmes from their consulates in Chientao, Chinese police and some Korean informants, should investigate and arrest anti-Japanese Koreans in Chientao and Funtien Province. Although the Chinese authorities in Mukden agreed to the Japanese proposal, Hsü Ting-lin, the governor of Kirin Province, objected to it as he regarded the Koreans as political refugees and claimed that there had been no disturbances in Chientao. The Kirin government, however, promised to assume responsibility for the maintenance of order in the area.¹³

But the Japanese soon found that the results of the single-handed operation by the Chinese authorities were quite unsatisfactory. On the contrary, the situation in Chientao had worsened and the police alone could not suppress or eradicate the Korean movement without the aid of Japanese troops. On July 17, the Japanese consul-general in Mukden put it to Chang Tso-lin, the leader of the local government there, that a joint inspection should be carried out by Japanese and Chinese authorities and that for this purpose Japanese troops should be allowed to participate in the suppression operation. According to the Japanese suggestion, the operations could be completed in two months by one regiment of Japanese troops. But the Chinese did not commit themselves to the Japanese proposal, and only conceded to the extent that Japanese advisors could be attached to Chinese operational parties.¹⁴ These were

the terms which Hayashi Gonsuke, the Japanese ambassador in London, passed on to the British Foreign Office, saying that the Japanese government had repeatedly drawn the attention of the Chinese authorities in Peking as well as in Mukden to the situation but the Chinese had ignored these approaches on various pretexts.¹⁵

From then until the end of September operations continued to be carried out by Chinese troops. In the eyes of the Japanese government, however, the Chinese campaign against the Koreans was entirely fruitless.¹⁶ The Chinese were bribed by the Koreans, seizing money from them but returning any arms they captured to them; even anti-Japanese Korean elements were included in Chinese suppression parties, informing the Koreans in advance so that they could make good their escape.¹⁷ From the Korean point of view, however, the Chinese operation cut down their anti-Japanese activities. The Chinese destroyed eleven military camps maintained by the Koreans, including a military cadet school, which had produced young leaders of the Korean army in Manchuria.¹⁸


Japan's expedition to Chientao, which was in a sense the culmination of her punitive actions against the Korean challenge in the border area, was precipitated against this background. In August 1920, the Japanese consul in Hunchun requested his Foreign Ministry in Tokyo to augment the size of the Japanese police force 'to meet emergencies', which had taken place in the past and would most certainly happen in the future. The Foreign Ministry was afraid that the anti-Japanese feeling, which had flared up in China over Shantung, would work to the advantage of the Koreans if the Japanese government reinforced the police, and sought the opinion of Governor-General Saito Makoto in Seoul. The governor-general of Korea asserted that it was difficult to curb the Koreans in Chientao as they were even armed with machine guns, and recommended to the Tokyo government that a quick joint operation be undertaken by the Japanese and Chinese authorities.¹⁹

The reply of the Seoul authorities was in fact a recommendation for quick military action. As a military document of the period put it, the military authorities in Korea determined this time to take resolute action, not simply 'chasing away flies over the dinner table'.²⁰ According to Sir Charles Eliot, the British ambassador in Tokyo, this idea was warmly supported and encouraged by nationalist groups in Japan. In July, Uchida Ryōhei, the leader of *Kokuryūkai* (The Black Dragon Society), had circulated a memorandum on the danger from the Koreans in Siberia

and Manchuria. This memorandum, the British ambassador observed, expressed the views of the aggressive school of Japanese politicians, including many members of the General Staff and the Seoul authorities, and eventually resulted in a military expedition to Chientao. The gist of the memorandum was that the cause of the internal disturbances in Korea lay outside the peninsula. Uchida claimed exaggeratedly that about 130,000 Koreans in Siberia and 1,200,000 or 1,500,000 in Manchuria were full of the spirit of independence and were doing their best for their national cause. They were eagerly watching for an opportunity to invade Korea or to instigate their countrymen to insurrection. Now that internal peace had been restored after the suppression of the March First uprising, the next step to be taken for the lasting pacification of the Korean situation was to tackle the root-cause of the disturbances.²¹

A report of the British embassy in Tokyo shows that the expedition had been planned as early as May 1920.²² Considering the sequence of events, this might be true, but the final decision for preparations seems to have been a hurried one as hopes of cooperation from the Chinese authorities dwindled only at the end of July.²³ Early in September definite plans were drawn up. The military authorities felt that the expedition would need two months: one month for the destruction of Korean bases and the annihilation of the exiles' main forces, while a further month would be required to mop up remnants. It would come under the overall charge of the commander of the 19th Division in Nanam, North Hamgyōng Province, near the Russian border. Expeditionary forces were to be divided into four groups, one group each for Hunchun, Wangshing, Lunching and the rest of the Chinese side of the Tumen river.²⁴ The preparations seem to have been completed in the middle of September; and Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya informed Sir Charles Eliot on the 16th during their discussions on other matters that Japanese troops would be used to disperse bands of Korean revolutionaries in Chientao.²⁵

An extra impetus for the expedition was provided by Chinese bandits. On September 12 about 300 *Hunghutzu* raided Hunchun, about 100 miles southwest of Vladivostok. The Chinese garrison army in the city made no attempt to repulse the bandits; on the contrary, it forbade Japanese citizens to fire on the bandits. This caused the Chinese army to be described in one Japanese report as a group dangerous to Japanese residents in the city next to the *Hunghutzu*.²⁶ Three weeks later, 'a mixed body of bandits consisting of Chinese, Koreans and Russian Bolsheviks, and even including some men in the uniform of Chinese regulars' made another attack on the city on October 2. They were finally driven off after



Source : F.O.371/6586(2771/3/10)

fierce fighting with the Japanese consular police, during which the Japanese consulate in the city was burned down and fourteen Japanese policemen, including their chief officer, and about forty civilians were killed.²⁷ This was followed by a massive expedition of Japanese troops from Korea with the avowed purpose of clearing the area of bandits and protecting Japanese citizens and property.

No sooner had the raid occurred on October 2 than the Japanese government, and especially the military, declared that they viewed it with great seriousness. The General Staff considered the incident to be the first of a series of similar attacks upon Japanese consulates and small garrisons by Chinese bandits and Koreans, encouraged by Bolsheviks, and feared a repetition of the Nikolaevsk incident, where 700 Japanese had been killed by the Russians in early 1920.²⁸ The Hunchun outrage, they claimed, was not, therefore, a mere predatory assault by the *Hunghutzu* but an incursion inspired by the Bolsheviks.²⁹ This view was later modified by the military to the effect that the incident was 'a combined action on the part of Korean malcontents and Russian Bolsheviks', completely ignoring the leading role of the Chinese bandits.³⁰ In these circumstances, the Japanese maintained that a large reinforcement must be sent to Chientao in order to put an end to the frontier menace by clearing these districts once and for all of Korean rebels and other 'lawless elements'. The expedition, however, soon turned out to be aimed, as British officials in China pointed out, at the Korean residents in the area, while no apparent action was taken against the Chinese bandits.³¹ The first communication of the Japanese embassy in London to the British government also revealed that Japanese troops concentrated on four open trade-mart places in Chientao, with Hunchun as a secondary objective.³²

In this connection, suspicions that the whole scenario had been planned by the Japanese were rife. Korean sources have claimed that a retired Japanese officer supplied the bandits with arms, so that they could make effective raids and so pave the way for Japanese intervention.³³ Six months later Wilfred Cunningham, the former British vice-consul in Seoul, who visited the area, expressed the view that, although Japan might have known that a raid was likely, she did not directly instigate it.³⁴ At the time of the Japanese expedition, however, Frederick Wilkinson, the British consul-general in Mukden, supported the Koreans' view by writing that the Japanese failure to take measures against the bandits seems 'to point to the truth of the view held in many quarters that the whole affair had been premeditated by the Japanese, even the attack at Hunchun (by the bandits)'.³⁵

The expeditionary forces consisted of six battalions, numbering 6,000 in strength,³⁶ mainly drawn from the 19th Division in northern Korea. In addition, one brigade drawn from among Japanese troops in Vladivostok marched through Chientao, cooperating with the main forces there, and finally returned to Japan through the Korean peninsula; and one battalion of infantry and one cavalry regiment from the Kwantung army, located at Tiehling and Changchun respectively, marched to the northwest of Korea, concentrating at Tunghua, and suppressed the Koreans in that part of Manchuria.³⁷

The expedition created several problems. First of all, Japan had to obtain the consent of the Chinese government for her dispatch of forces to Chinese territory. The Peking government acceded to the Japanese request for an expedition on October 9 but three days later strongly objected to it.³⁸ In Manchuria, however, Chang Tso-lin's Mukden government had on September 2 dismissed Hsü, the anti-Japanese governor of Kirin, under pressure from the Japanese, at the same time intimating that Chang would welcome the dispatch of Japanese troops to Chientao, though he would have to issue some public protest about it.³⁹ The Mukden authorities, therefore, stated that they were unable to cooperate with the Japanese without the consent of the central government at Peking, but indicated that they would dispatch a small detachment to act independently in Chientao.⁴⁰ These Chinese forces consisted of 3,100 infantry and 282 cavalry under the command of Chang Hsüeh-liang, Chang Tso-lin's son, who was at this stage only twenty years old.⁴¹ The Japanese government, and especially the military authorities, did not take the Chinese attitude seriously and decided to go ahead with its plans, 'in view of the critical situation in the frontier district and of the purely temporary nature of the expedition'.⁴²

The expedition was undoubtedly regarded by all countries concerned to be as more political than military. The military aspect of the campaign was a foregone conclusion as a British military report wrote,⁴³ because it was obvious that the Japanese would speedily suppress the Koreans in the area. The files of the British Foreign Office do not give much information about the expedition except for one report from a missionary which contained just a line to the effect that fighting was in progress about thirty *li* from Ultogao.⁴⁴ But it must be remembered that this was the time when the Korean independence army was most active in Manchuria and therefore military clashes between the two troops were inevitable.

From the Japanese military point of view, the expedition was not satisfactory, although the expeditionary force captured large quantities of

arms and ammunition in addition to many rebels.⁴⁵ According to Junius B. Wood, an American journalist who was sent by the Kokusai News Agency to Manchuria to report on the expedition, and who obtained his information largely from official sources, most of the Korean rebels disappeared northward in the densely forested hills and would live to fight another day.⁴⁶ Japanese military reports on the progress of the expedition fully supported this view. The Japanese tried to annihilate the Koreans but gained little; they tried to pursue the Koreans but the latter avoided clashes. Every move of the Japanese army and officials was quickly reported to the Korean leaders by spies, but it was very difficult to detect these spies as they were usually disguised as farmers or woodcutters. If skirmishes took place, therefore, they were largely initiated by the Koreans who employed guerrilla tactics and usually fought during the night. As a result, the losses of the Koreans could not be calculated.⁴⁷

The Koreans, however, claimed a big victory by the *Tongnipkun* at Chingshan-li near Lungching, where they inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese in about ten engagements from October 20 to 23. The 'fight near Ultogoa' in the previous missionary report actually referred to one of these skirmishes. According to the version given by the Korean provisional government in Shanghai, the Korean *Tongnipkun* under Kim Chwajin was searching for a new base near the Changpei mountains in accordance with the advice of General Meng Te-pu, the Chinese army commander in the area, who had asked Kim and other Korean leaders to move their bases away from the Korean frontier, because the Chinese authorities were so pressed by the Japanese over the presence of armed Koreans in Chientao.

The move of Kim's army was the background to the Japanese complaint that General Meng's expedition only resulted in the further spreading of the Korean malcontents to the whole Chientao district.⁴⁸ A British military report also wrote of this move that the Koreans together with Chinese bandits and several Bolsheviks were moving westward along the Korean boundary in the middle of October.⁴⁹ Kim's *Tongnipkun*, called *Kunjōngsō*, was properly armed by the Russian Bolsheviks, and was therefore dominant among the Korean independence armies in Chientao to the extent that other Korean armies resented the arbitrary actions of the *Kunjōngsō*.⁵⁰

According to Korean writings, Kim Chwajin's army, numbering about 2,800 including non-combatants, trapped and surprised one of the Japanese expeditionary forces in a deep and long valley in Chingshan-li and killed about 1,200 of them, including a regimental commander,

during a four-day battle. After the fighting, they retreated to the Siberian border.⁵¹

Of course, Japanese military reports do not support the Korean version. According to Japanese records of the fight, a platoon of a Japanese pursuit party, numbering ninety men, was operating on October 21 when it found two places where about six hundred Korean *Tongnipkun* had stayed during the past few days. Continuing their pursuit, the Japanese suddenly came under fire from the Koreans who were hidden in the forest. The Japanese party immediately countered, and after an exchange of bullets lasting thirty minutes, the Koreans retreated. The casualties on the Japanese side were four dead and three wounded, while the Koreans left sixteen dead. On October 22 about two hundred Korean guerrillas attacked a Japanese advance base, killing one and wounding one. In the continuous fighting the Koreans attacked from higher ground, while the Japanese party had to counter-attack from a disadvantageous direction. After four hours of fighting, the Koreans retreated to the forest. The Japanese suffered three dead and thirteen wounded, while the Koreans suffered fifty casualties in addition to five arrested, and lost two rifles, one gun, one light machine gun and 2,200 rounds of ammunition.⁵²

It was certain that the Korean *Tongnipkun* in Chientao took advantage of the terrain and fought guerrilla warfare against superior odds. The skirmishes were largely initiated by the Koreans, and inflicted heavy casualties—by Japanese standards—on the expeditionary forces. In this sense, the claim by the Koreans to have gained some ‘victories’ is accurate to some extent, although the number of the Japanese casualties is likely to have been exaggerated.

The expedition officially came to an end on December 10 with the results of the campaign being made public, although the last unit of Japanese troops did not withdraw until May 5, 1921.⁵³ According to a statement from army headquarters in Seoul, the number of Koreans killed was 375, and those captured 177, in addition to 1,558 who surrendered. The Japanese had suffered eleven killed and twenty-five wounded. Buildings burned included 193 Korean houses, thirteen Korean barracks, two churches and five schools.⁵⁴

The Chientao expedition attracted greater attention for its political and humanitarian implications than for its military significance. During the campaign Japan repeatedly hinted that historically, racially, and strategically Chientao was a potential source of dispute between Japan and China, a fact which did not hide her designs on that part of Chinese territory. An officer from the General Staff in Tokyo said that, although everything

north of the Tumen river was looked upon as Chinese territory, former records and a monument in the area showed it once to have been a part of Korea.⁵⁵ The expedition was, therefore, to show that for political, economic and racial reasons, as well as for the sake of law and order and the safety of life and property, that portion of Manchuria between the Tumen river and the Changpei mountains ought to be annexed to Korea.⁵⁶ This view was further explained to Major J.W. Marsden, the acting British military attaché in Tokyo, by officers at the Japanese army headquarters in Vladivostok, including Major-General Doi Masuhiko, an expert on China. The general, who was on his way to the Chientao area to assist with the main body of the expeditionary forces, told Junius Wood that the district had in ancient times formed part of Korea and should have passed into Japanese hands at the time of the annexation—in other words, the acquisition of Chientao, whether under the terms of a lease or by direct annexation, would be only a matter of time.⁵⁷

The last, and probably most prominent, aspect of the expedition was the severity of the Japanese soldiers towards the Korean residents in the district. According to Junius Wood, the expedition had three objects: the punishment of the Korean *Tongnipkun* and the Chinese bandits; the demonstration of political ambitions; and the chastisement of the Koreans in Manchuria. Among these, the last point was, the American journalist observed, 'undoubtedly accomplished'.⁵⁸ The Japanese chastisement of the Koreans resulted naturally in atrocities, which, a contemporary Korean claimed, equalled in severity and horror some of the worst cases in Korea during the early part of the uprising in the previous year. The soldiers not only killed people, but systematically burned villages, devastated fields and destroyed grain supplies. Korean sources wrote that during the two months of the expedition from October to November, 3,128 Koreans were murdered, while 2,404 homes, 31 schools, ten churches and 818,620 bushels of grain were burned.⁵⁹ As far as the casualties were concerned, this figure was eight times higher than that of the Japanese official statistics. This propaganda-like claim by Korean exiles in the United States and China was substantially supported and further amplified by the reports of Canadian missionaries on the scene during the expedition.

MISSIONARIES IN THE CHIENTAO INCIDENT

The Canadian Presbyterian mission, whose local headquarters were at Wōnsan on the east coast of Korea, had fewer than twenty missionaries and

worked mainly at the St. Andrew's Hospital in Lungching.⁶⁰ This mission was originally established in June 1913 in Chientao as a number of Koreans including many Christian converts had gone into exile there before and after the annexation of Korea. The missionaries' medical and spiritual activities were, therefore, primarily connected with the Korean residents.⁶¹ The Canadians naturally had sympathies with their Korean followers who had constantly suffered ill-treatment at the hands of the Japanese consular police.⁶² This sympathetic attitude on the part of the missionaries towards the Koreans was further strengthened by the anti-Japanese feeling which, according to a British intelligence report, was rife among foreign officials, merchants and missionaries in the area and was fueled by Japanese commercial behavior and especially by the trade in morphine undertaken by the Japanese.⁶³ Since the outbreak of the uprising in the peninsula, the missionaries' relationship with the Japanese consular officials in Chientao had seriously deteriorated, and the missionaries and their mission hospital had been suspected by the Japanese to be the source of unrest by the Koreans in the area.

Central figures in the campaign were Rev. W.R. Foote and Dr. Stanley H. Martin, the head and the superintendent of the mission respectively. In the three weeks from October 24, 1920, Martin wrote three letters to Wilkinson, the British consul-general at Mukden, in which he revealed several cases where Korean villages, churches and schools had been burned and Korean residents in the district killed.⁶⁴ According to his letters, a large school in a village called Myōngdong, which accommodated 300 boys and was supported partly by Canadian funds, was completely burned down. In a village near Ultogao, about seventy houses were burned, most of the men having previously fled. Every house known to belong to independence fighters was burned, together with their crops. On one occasion, Dr. Martin claimed, the Japanese threw five Korean male prisoners, bound hand and foot, into a large fire. On another occasion, Koreans were beaten, dragged out of their houses, and many were brought in with halters around their necks, tied to horses. Thousands of these Koreans were forced to sign statements saying that 'we are sorry we helped the independence movement', which was in turn published in Tokyo as evidence that the Korean malcontents had apologized and the independence movement was over.

Apart from the human suffering caused, Dr. Martin also added his observation on the political aspects of the expedition. He repudiated the Japanese claim of Bolshevik involvement in the Hunchun raid as 'an exaggeration'. Instead, the Japanese had practically annexed that part of

China; the Chōsen Bank, the Oriental Development Company, and many Japanese families were being rushed into Chientao and their Hinomaru flags now flew from every little house or shack; they had ordered Chinese troops in Yenchi, the capital of the district, to leave the city and to live on the other side of the river; and passports from the Chinese authorities permitting people to travel at night were not recognized by the Japanese and torn up. Japanese soldiers had also invaded the missionary compound on several occasions, but such incidents had resulted in apologies by a Japanese officer in the name of their commander.

After these preliminary communications, one of its staff, Dr. T.D. Mansfield, called at the British consulate-general in Seoul around the middle of November, and handed Consul-General Arthur H. Lay statements made by his colleagues on the situation in Chientao. These statements were also sent to missionary colleagues in Japan, so that they could find a way to the Japanese press.⁶⁵ In the statements, the Canadians used phrases to denounce Japanese behavior towards the Koreans in the district which were stronger than in their previous letters. Japan, under the strongest protest from China, Dr. Martin wrote with some exaggeration, sent over 15,000 men into this part of China with the apparent intention of wiping out, if possible, the whole Christian community, especially all young men. Village after village was being methodically burned, and young men shot. This applied to the whole district of Chientao. Dr. Martin claimed that they had the accurate names of 32 villages where murder and fire had been used. One village had 148 killed in it; many had over thirty killed, and houses had been burned with women and children in them. At a village called Sonunting, fourteen had been stood up in front of a large grave and shot. The bodies had been destroyed with wood and kerosene from the village.⁶⁶

One incident was singled out by the missionaries as typical of the cruel treatment of Koreans during the Japanese operation. This was a killing at a village called Norubawi on 29 October. According to a memorandum prepared by Dr. Martin, this mainly Christian village in the district, twelve miles from Lungching, was surrounded at daybreak by a group of Japanese infantrymen. Starting from the top of the valley they set fire to the immense stacks of unthreshed millet and barley and straw, then ordered the occupants of the houses outside. In each case, as the son or father stepped out of the house he was killed on the spot. Mothers, wives and even children were forced to witness this as well as the burning of their homes. Two days later, Dr. Martin and R.L. Joly, a British subject in the Chinese customs service, visited the village, and counted 34 or 35 killed and fifteen to

nineteen buildings burned, including a church and a school.⁶⁷ The Canadian missionary found 31 graves, each house having its dead buried close by, and took photographs of the ruins of the buildings and charred remains of dead bodies.⁸ The tragedy at Norubawi did not end there. The day after Dr. Martin visited the scene seventeen soldiers and three policemen came to the village. The widows of the dead were summoned to be thoroughly examined regarding the past of those killed, and a lecture was given as to why such severe punishment had been dealt out to them. The people were then told to bring out all the dead bodies which they had previously buried and those were then burned in a mass grave. On November 12, this place was also visited by Mansfield who verified the accounts by his colleagues.⁶⁹

According to Dr. Mansfield, after this incident Rev. W.R. Foote, the head of the Canadian mission, addressed a strong protest to the officer in command of the Japanese expedition, while sending letters to his colleagues in Japan to appeal to them to use their influence to halt this sort of thing. Foote claimed that the victims were all Christians and that the soldiers had committed their 'diabolical deeds' without prior discussion. If only offenders had suffered, the Canadian missionary wrote, the Koreans might not have seriously objected; but there were cases where the perfectly innocent and helpless had been killed without being given an opportunity to say a word on their own behalf.⁷⁰

Other missionaries in Manchuria joined their Canadian colleagues in this campaign. Alex R. McKenzie of the United Free Church of Scotland mission in Manchuria and W.F. Cook, an American Presbyterian there, dealt specially with the movements of the Japanese Kwantung army, which began its operations at the end of October from Hingking, the place of their mission headquarters. A unit of about 500 infantrymen arrived there on October 29 and immediately sent invitations to Koreans around the district to come to their camp. Among those who responded were nine Korean Christian leaders, who were then arrested and imprisoned by the Japanese soldiers. Next day, a Korean church was burned down and two days later another church nearby was sacked. The Japanese soldiers had proposed to burn it, but desisted on the representation of the Chinese, who pointed out that fire would endanger the whole village. The following day, November 4, another church was burned down, and eight were arrested, six of whom were summarily shot.⁷¹ A week later, two other memoranda written by McKenzie on a massacre at Sökando, ten miles south east of Lungching, were handed to Mizuno Rentarō, the civil governor of Korea.⁷² One document reached the conclusion that:

First, the church is the immediate object of attack, nearly all those who suffered were Christians, except where others suffered in the general conflagration that followed upon the burning of the church. Second, the church leaders were sought out and murdered irrespective of age or possible anti-Japanese predilections. Third, as far as is known there was in no case any semblance of an attempt or pretence of a trial of any sort, but unarmed and unwarned they were simply butchered like dogs and cast by the road side with a few shovels of dirt thrown over them.⁷³

According to Wilkinson, McKenzie and his colleagues of the Scottish and Irish Presbyterian missions in Manchuria had passed a vote of censure on the Japanese authorities at the synod which was held at Mukden in January 1921.⁷⁴

Stories of Japanese atrocities reached British official circles in Peking and Tokyo in the middle of November, and the *Japan Advertiser* published reports of the missionaries on December 1 practically in full.⁷⁵ They were also reported on the same day by a British paper, the *Daily Express*.⁷⁶ The first reaction from the Seoul authorities, however, was calm and measured. On November 28, the *Seoul Press*, an English paper issued by the Seoul authorities, admitted that mission schools had been burned down and Koreans killed by the Japanese punitive force in Chientao. The paper argued, however, that the Koreans killed in this manner were not genuine Christians, which implied, according to Lay, that Korean malcontents took refuge under the name of Christian in order to obtain the moral support of the missionaries.⁷⁷ On December 3 the paper gave further reasons for the burning of the churches and schools: they had been used for training rebels and for hiding their ringleaders.⁷⁸

In Japan, the War Ministry on December 1 made a statement on the missionaries' allegations about Japanese atrocities in the form of a reply to an enquiry made by the *Japan Advertiser*, and took the same line as the *Seoul Press*.⁷⁹ It also stated that the War Ministry had dispatched a commission to Chientao headed by Colonel Mizumachi Takeso to investigate the allegations. According to War Minister Tanaka Giichi, the colonel was specially selected as he had previously had considerable experience abroad as the military attaché at Washington. In addition, an official of the Foreign Ministry and Junius B. Wood, an American correspondent, had accompanied the mission in order to verify its proceedings.⁸⁰ But the first action that this mission of mediation took the

day after it arrived at Lungching on November 26 was to present a letter to Rev. Foote before any investigation whatever had been undertaken.⁸¹ The aim of this lengthy letter, which was published in full on December 3 in the *Japan Advertiser*, was, as British Ambassador Sir Charles Eliot observed, 'to combat some of the charges against the Japanese soldiers and at the same time to warn the missionaries against Korean malcontents'.⁸²

The colonel admitted that a number of houses had been burned and many insurgents shot as the result of the Japanese expedition but, contrary to the statement of the War Ministry in the *Japan Advertiser* on December 1, which stated that adequate proof had been furnished prior to the burnings or executions, Mizumachi simply claimed that this was the unavoidable by-product of operations of this kind. He went on to say:

We regret that there may have been some innocent ones amongst those shot, but under the circumstances, where a majority of 300,000 Koreans in Chientao have been expressing their friendly attitude, directly or indirectly, if not openly, sharing the same ideals as the revolutionaries, it has been hardly possible to tell insurgent from innocent.⁸³

Then the colonel warned the Canadian missionaries:

It is an undeniable fact that there are numerous different peoples in your own [British] Dominions who frequently plot rebellion against your Government, such as the recent non-co-operation movement in India. If, therefore, by any chance, you should give assistance, material or immaterial, to either the independence movement in Korea or to anti-Japanese sentiment, the Buddhists in Japan would be able to find a legal reason for giving anti-British assistance to those behind the non-co-operation movement in India. The same thing may be applied to the Irish problem.⁸⁴

A few days later, another statement came from General Sato of the General Staff in Tokyo. The general denied categorically that innocent men or women had been killed or injured in the Chientao district. As to the missionaries, he charged:

Missionaries and mission schools have transcended their spheres as religionists and religious institutions. Some of these have given encouragement to the insurgent bands and their schools have been made training places for them. The missionaries who accuse the Japanese army of committing inhumanities and spread such reports abroad, and take pho-

tographs to substantiate what they say, are themselves the cause of the tragedy which has befallen the insurrectionists. We regret that the Korean insurrectionists are not awake to the fact that it is toward these mischief (-) making missionaries they should really feel grieved.⁸⁵

Thus did the Japanese military place the missionaries firmly behind the Korean insurrectionists, a role that the Foreign Ministry had specifically discounted. This allegation was largely based on reports by the Japanese consular police in Chientao on the activity of the Canadian missionaries in the district since the outbreak of the Korean uprising in 1919. In March 1920, one report of the same nature had been made to the governor-general of Korea. According to Junius Wood, who quoted the report in an article, the police had set out to prove that Korean unrest was largely encouraged by the missionaries who in turn were encouraged by the United States. Thus the Canadian missionaries were alleged to be citizens of the United States and affiliated to Northern American Presbyterians. Their churches, the Japanese believed, had been turned into shelters for rebels, and Foote was singled out as the leader of these anti-Japanese activities.⁸⁶ This seems to have influenced the statement of Colonel Mizumachi, who said later in an interview on his return to Japan that the Japanese authorities in Manchuria had collected 'definite proof of the intrigues of these refractory missionaries', a statement for which he was reprimanded by the war minister. Another officer of his mission also said that they had definite proof that 'the missionaries had been inciting their followers to make trouble in Chientao'.⁸⁷

The story of the Canadian missionaries in Chientao made a strong impact abroad. One reason for this was that no other country apart from Japan herself stationed consular representatives in the area, and consequently the Canadians were the only foreigners who witnessed the behavior of the Japanese expeditionary forces. Apart from a few minor cases, the missionaries and their property were not molested by the expedition. The attention of the Canadians was, therefore, solely concentrated on the treatment of the Koreans, and particularly the Korean Christians. In this respect, however, they seem to have reacted excessively; and this in turn evoked a strong reaction from the Japanese military.

Junius Wood wrote that the missionaries protested not merely against Christians being killed and their homes, churches and schools being burned, but against cruelty to humanity in general and the wanton destruction of property. They could not fairly say that more Christians than non-

Christians had been killed or that the campaign had an anti-Christian motive.⁸⁸ But it was understandable that their attention was drawn to the fate of their Christian followers, and this inevitably created an impression abroad that the Christians were the main target of the expedition. In the next part we will see the reactions of the British government to the issues, largely raised by the activities of these Canadian missionaries.

REACTIONS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

The Foreign Office was kept fairly well informed of the progress of the expedition by the Japanese embassy in London 'in conformity with the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance'⁸⁹ In these communications, the Japanese assured the British government that the expedition was a purely temporary measure, and they would not maintain their troops permanently in Chientao. This point was repeated again and again in official and verbal communications in London and through government statements in Tokyo.⁹⁰

In spite of these various and somewhat inconsistent statements of the Japanese government, the Foreign Office correctly assessed the situation as Miles W. Lampson, who had served as *chargé d'affaires* in Peking from February to April 1920, noted that, although Manchuria as a whole was notoriously full of brigands, pervasive anti-Japanese feeling was at the root of trouble, while Bolshevism was an excuse which the Japanese were fond of quoting on such occasions. Lampson considered that Britain could not but accept Japan's right to dispatch troops to the Chinese territory as a means of protecting those of her subjects who were in danger due to the incapacity of the Chinese government.⁹¹ But Britain could not acquiesce directly in the Japanese dispatch of troops to foreign territory on a punitive mission.⁹² The Foreign Office also took note of the fact that the expedition was widely known to be intimately associated with Japanese ambition on the mainland.⁹³

All these factors—Japan's claim to protect her subjects, Chinese sovereignty, Japanese expansionism combined with their assurance of the temporary nature of the expedition—served to define the scope of the first British reaction. This came in the form of a communication by Lord Curzon, the British foreign secretary, to Ambassador Hayashi nearly three weeks after the start of the expedition in which he hoped that the Japanese expedition would not lead to the indefinite occupation of Chientao, and reminded him of the assurances of the Japanese government

on the withdrawal of these troops as soon as the present dangerous state of affairs terminated in the district.⁹⁴

But the suspicions of the Foreign Office over Japanese ambitions in the area rapidly developed as the expedition progressed. It was thought that the determination of the Japanese General Staff to carry on the expedition in the face of Chinese disapproval might well mean a 'semi-permanent occupation of the N.E. corner of Manchuria'.⁹⁵ In late October Obata Torikichi, the Japanese minister in Peking, informed the Chinese government that Japanese troops would only be withdrawn when all danger of Korean bandits along the frontier had ceased.⁹⁶ Lampson commented:

Even if we acquit Japan of having stirred up the trouble, the fact remains that events are playing into her hands. The occupation of Chientao fits in very appositely with her possession of Vladivostok and her aspirations (which are perfectly natural however illegitimate) to the Chinese Eastern Railway. Japan has already consolidated her position in *South* Manchuria with the collapse of Russia, and hopes to do the same in *North* Manchuria, where her interests (e.g. at Harbin) are already very large and her nationals very pressing... The Chientao district stretches from the Korean frontier (N.E. corner) right up to the Chinese Eastern Railway, and its occupation by Japanese troops may conceivably be part of a prearranged plan. We know that brigands *can* be created by Japan when she wishes to.⁹⁷

A week later, *The Times* reported that Japanese officials were of the opinion that the situation held out little hope of permanent improvement; and Lampson expressed his inner doubts with the remark 'is Japan preparing public opinion for "permanent" occupation, in order that the improvement of local conditions may also be "permanent"?'⁹⁸

On November 10, the Japanese government elaborated its demands: the Chinese government should properly garrison the district; the Chinese should take responsibility for Japanese life and property; and the Chinese government should admit the right of the Japanese to send its troops, should further outrages occur.⁹⁹ The whole sequence of events only strengthened the suspicion of the British government that Japan would modify its original promise of complete withdrawal after the expedition.

Around this time, news of the harsh treatment by Japanese troops of the Koreans in Chientao began to reach British officials in Peking and Tokyo. On November 11, Robert Clive, the chargé d'affaires of the

Peking legation, telegraphed reports that the Japanese had burned churches and schools, including a large college for 300 boys supported partly by Canadian funds, and had shot peaceable villagers throughout the district.¹⁰⁰ A few days later, the same kind of stories came from Tokyo.¹⁰¹ But the Foreign Office was inclined to disregard the reports of the Canadian missionaries as probably overstated, because the Canadians shared 'not infrequently the tendency of their fellow-continentals (American missionaries) to exaggeration'; and authoritative information was difficult to obtain due to the remoteness of the district.¹⁰²

It was in these circumstances that the rather insensitive statements of Colonel Mizumachi and General Satō reached London early in December.¹⁰³ Stunned by them, Lampson remarked as follows:

It is astonishing how clumsy the Japanese are in these matters. In Korea they set the whole world against them, 1) by their cruelties, 2) by their blaming the missionaries for the insurrection. Inexcusable as their conduct was, it was at least on Korean, i.e. Japanese, soil. In Chientao they are on Chinese soil which makes these extraordinary pronouncements of the Japanese military authorities all the worse. That there are grounds for suspecting that the Japanese have been guilty of great severity in their repressive measures in Chientao seems pretty clear.¹⁰⁴

The Foreign Office was now convinced that, even making all allowances for the anti-Japanese bias inherent in every missionary in China and Korea, there seemed little doubt that the Japanese forces had been acting with great severity.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the Japanese attack on the missionaries made it necessary for the Foreign Office to take some sort of action. Accordingly, it instructed Sir Charles Eliot in Tokyo to seek an explanation for the statements of her military officers.¹⁰⁶

Before receiving this instruction from London, Ambassador Eliot had been engaged in a series of discussions with Uchida, the Japanese foreign minister.¹⁰⁷ When Mizumachi made his statement, Eliot warned Uchida in strong terms that, if the Japanese government did not correct these reports by action or by official denial, the indignation which was already felt by British communities in China would spread to Britain.¹⁰⁸ Next day, the Japanese foreign minister issued a statement critical of the allegations of the two officers, adding that they were to be regarded as purely personal views.¹⁰⁹ Evidently the British representation had carried some weight.

Apart from the missionary complications, however, the attitude of

Eliot towards the Japanese expedition was one of disinterest. He does not seem to have been aware of any political implications of the expedition. On December 16, when he wrote a lengthy review of the expedition, he restricted his comments to the activities of the Canadian missionaries and the nature of the Japanese suppression in broad terms, accepting the expedition *per se* as quite reasonable with the remark that the Japanese authorities were sincerely alarmed by the prospect of a general rising along the Korean frontier. He was also inclined to dismiss the allegations of Japanese atrocities by the missionaries. Although the Japanese measures had been 'unnecessarily severe' and in particular the language used by Colonel Mizumachi had been 'provocative and insolent', Britain should refrain from making any detailed criticism because she had only scanty materials for forming any judgement as to the previous condition of the country and the real magnitude of the disorders which, in the opinion of the Japanese government, justified such stringent methods. He felt that the Japanese government was not hostile to missionary work in general, but that British missionaries in Korea and Chientao had 'unfortunately and undeniably' attracted the suspicion of the Japanese authorities. Accordingly, he seems to have been relieved when the initial result of the expedition was made public, because no British subjects were killed or injured and no British property destroyed during the Japanese campaign, the churches and schools destroyed having been the property of Korean communities in Manchuria.¹¹⁰ Two days later, Eliot telegraphed the result to London, adding that he had 'no means of forming an independent opinion respecting the conduct of the punitive expedition'.¹¹¹

British officials in China, on the other hand, attached greater importance to the political implications of the incident. Chargé d'Affaires Robert Clive in Peking acknowledged that the expedition was undoubtedly the result of Chinese inaction.¹¹² But he and Wilkinson in Mukden drew attention to the fact that the Japanese would make the Hunchun incident a pretext for strengthening their hold on a district which they had long coveted.¹¹³ After a month of the campaign, Wilkinson observed as follows:

The fact, too, that no measures are being taken against the bandits, protection from whom for their nationals was the pretext given by the Japanese for sending troops into Chientao, seemed to point to the truth of the view held in many quarters that the whole affair had been premeditated by the Japanese, even the attack at Hunchun, and that there was

little probability that any of the occupied districts would ever return to Chinese sovereignty.¹¹⁴

This became the central theme of the British representatives in China; and any Japanese move to delay the withdrawal of her troops from Chientao was, therefore, viewed with great suspicion.¹¹⁵

In addition, Clive also strongly disapproved the harsh nature of the Japanese operation. No matter how Britain accepted the justification of the Japanese expedition into that part of Chinese territory, the chargé d'affaires observed, the subsequent conduct of their troops in Chientao where inoffensive Koreans had been murdered 'wholesale in cold blood', placed the Japanese completely in the wrong. This aroused a fresh storm of anti-Japanese feeling amongst the Chinese and the foreign communities in China.¹¹⁶ The activities of the Canadian missionaries were in this sense warmly received and supported by the British officials there. Wilkinson wrote several times to London that they were trustworthy and dependable. He recalled that their mission compounds had been invaded by the Japanese police and their students and teachers arrested on the most frivolous of charges. Under these circumstances, the consul-general in Mukden argued, it would be less than human on the part of the missionaries if they were not prejudiced against the Japanese. The only fault which he found with Dr. Martin and his Canadian colleagues was not their sympathy with the Koreans but their refusal to have any contact at all with the Japanese consular authorities in Lungching, and on this point Wilkinson had addressed the Canadians more than once.¹¹⁷

Sir Beilby Alston, who took over the legation at Peking in December 1920, agreed wholly with the views of his consul-general, commenting that the Japanese accusations against the Canadian missionaries were only justified in so far as the latter's sympathies certainly lay with the Koreans. The two British officials were convinced, however, that, apart from this point, there was not the slightest foundation for the charge that the missionaries had ever intentionally encouraged the anti-Japanese movement by the Koreans or given the slightest active assistance to Korean agitators.¹¹⁸

The subsequent attitude of the British government towards the expedition was very much influenced by the assessment of its Peking legation. The Foreign Office expressed its satisfaction when Alston supported the Canadian missionaries against the allegations of the Japanese military.¹¹⁹

At the end of November, the Tokyo government announced the withdrawal of the Japanese troops operation there, as Chientao was

cleared of bandits. But it would leave a few small detachments behind for the protection of the consulates; and moreover it warned that, regardless of the disapproval of the Chinese government, it had a right to dispatch Japanese troops there, should further anti-Japanese disturbances occur in the region.¹²⁰ This partial withdrawal which was completed by the end of 1920 except for two battalions¹²¹ did not remove the suspicion of the British government. Alston telegraphed on January 1, 1921 that no withdrawal had yet taken place, though negotiations had been proceeding for some time past both with the government at Peking and with the Mukden authorities. Quoting a report from Wilkinson, Alston claimed that the Japanese were intentionally dragging out these negotiations in order to postpone evacuation.¹²² Two weeks later, he sent home a similar report, stating that the Chinese government was naturally making vigorous protest, as the Japanese action could only be aimed at the indefinite stationing of their troops on Chinese territory.¹²³

The Foreign Office shared this assessment of its Peking legation. Although it was probably premature to call Japan's attention to the point at this stage, it believed that the Japanese action might well foreshadow another violation of the 'integrity of China' if these troops remained permanently. Aware that questions had already been asked in the House of Commons, the Foreign Office instructed Eliot that he should draw Tokyo's informal attention at a suitable opportunity to the bad effect which the permanent stationing of so many troops on Chinese soil was likely to have.¹²⁴ Ambassador Eliot, however, did not do so. Instead, he telegraphed on January 7 that whether or not the Japanese had ever contemplated the annexation of the Chientao area they had no present intention of pursuing the idea, and pointed out emphatically that 'all troops had been withdrawn except two battalions of infantry', which would be evacuated as soon as the Japanese were convinced that their subjects in the area were in no danger.¹²⁵

But the situation in London did not develop as favorably as the British ambassador in Tokyo expected, as several parliamentary questions were raised on the missionaries' activity, Japanese brutality and the sovereignty of China.¹²⁶ Even in Canada a missionary body requested the Foreign Office to intervene on behalf of its missionaries and its work.¹²⁷

Now the Foreign Office readjusted its position towards the Chientao question in two ways. First, it instructed Ambassador Eliot to draw the attention of the Japanese government to this matter, in fact a repetition of the earlier instruction that the ambassador had not acted upon. As 'no word of defence could be said' for the brutalities of the Japanese troops

in Chientao, the Foreign Office told Eliot to take 'an early opportunity' of bringing to the knowledge of the Japanese foreign minister in a friendly manner the nature of the reports, and to impress upon him the unfortunate effect which such proceedings were bound to have upon public opinion both in this country and in the dominions at a time when that opinion was particularly susceptible on such matters.¹²⁸

The next move came in the middle of March. Victor Wellesley, the superintendent of the Far Eastern Department, suggested that Britain ought to have a vice-consul at Hunchun:

The known territorial ambitions of Japan in that quarter and the persistent assertions that the Hunchun affair was deliberately engineered to afford an excuse for Japanese interference makes me feel rather uneasy as regards future developments. Moreover, it looks as if some protection is needed for the missionaries. The Japanese would of course know at once the reason for such a step on our part but that would not be a bad thing. Hunchun is an open port.¹²⁹

This suggestion was welcomed 'from every point of view' by his colleagues in the Far Eastern Department, and Lord Curzon on March 23 asked the opinion of his representatives in Tokyo and Peking on the matter. According to Curzon's telegram to Eliot and Alston, the main function of the new vice-consul would be to watch for Japanese encroachments and to keep the government fully informed of all such tendencies, as well as to protect British nationals.¹³⁰ Sir Charles Eliot approved of it on condition that the consul should come under the Japanese consular service, even though it was on Chinese territory.¹³¹

But Alston and Wilkinson did not agree to the proposal. The British officials in China argued that the proposed appointment was unnecessary and likely to be strongly resented by the Japanese government because British interests in the district were limited to the presence of a few Canadian missionaries.¹³² As a compromise, however, Alston suggested that a vice-consul from the Japanese service be attached to the consulate-general in Mukden, so that he could make trips to Chientao.¹³³ The Foreign Office considered that this proposal might be enough, although it did not entirely answer to the purpose which they had in mind and might lead the Japanese to conclude that Britain regarded south Manchuria as falling under Japan from the point of view of British consular organization. This point was stressed by Sir William Tyrrell, the assistant under secretary of state.¹³⁴ But the Foreign Office did not think that the criticism really held and appointed Wilfred Cunningham, the former vice-

consul in Seoul who was acting consul in Dairen, for the job on the recommendation of Eliot.¹³⁵

The original intention of the Foreign Office had been to station a local vice-consul permanently in Hunchun or at least in Mukden, but because of the need for Treasury approval which seemed (in the view of the Foreign Office) to be exceedingly doubtful, Cunningham's mission was curtailed to 'visiting Mukden at regular intervals and touring Chientao and other districts of Manchuria as required.'¹³⁶ After a twelve-days investigation trip starting on May 19, he produced two lengthy reports which the Foreign Office and its representatives in the Far East valued highly.¹³⁷

When Cunningham arrived in Chientao, Japanese troops had completed their withdrawal and their place had been taken by some 350 police and ten army officers, of which the latter were acting as liaison officers at the open trade-marts.¹³⁸ The restoration of peace in the district was, therefore, a dominant theme in his reports. He also dealt with the safety of the missionaries (and any steps which the British government should take for their protection) and the subsidiary problem, the persecution of native Christians and Japanese encroachments in the district. But the situation of the Korean residents or their independence activities were virtually excluded from mention.

In general, Cunningham confirmed the views of his colleagues in China. He found that the Canadian missionaries in Chientao were in no need of personal protection.¹³⁹ They had had no hand in encouraging the independence movement of the Koreans, Cunningham maintained, and in this respect, the charges by Colonel Mizumachi were absolutely without foundation. He also confirmed that the Korean Christians had undoubtedly been suspected by the Japanese authorities and had been deliberately singled out for persecution during the expedition. As for Japanese ambitions in that part of Chinese territory, Cunningham observed that the Japanese expeditionary force had withdrawn ostensibly and there was therefore no sign of permanent occupation.

However, in addition to the four open market towns where the Japanese consulates were entitled to have a limited number of police, about ten army officers were working there independently, and a police force of some 350 was to be found scattered at fourteen police stations all over the district. In only two cases had the consent of the Chinese authorities been obtained. Considering the fact that the number of Japanese residents in Chientao was 1,200, half of whom were in Lungching, Cunningham wondered why Japan should maintain such a

large police force unless she had political purposes. These were new developments which, Cunningham considered, could lead to a permanent stationing of Japanese military personnel on Chinese soil.

Cunningham also noted that Japanese political and economic encroachment in the district had been greatly expanded due to the expedition. The Japanese had usurped authority over the Korean population, in spite of the Chientao Agreement of 1909 which gave China the right of jurisdiction over Koreans in the district. Japan claimed that Koreans became Japanese subjects by the annexation, and that the position had completely altered as the result of the Twenty-one Demands which Japan presented to the Chinese government in 1915, by which Japanese subjects were given the right to reside in Manchuria and own land there. The Japanese rejected the case of Koreans who had acquired Chinese citizenship, and many had their papers destroyed by the expeditionary troops. Commercially, Japan was dominating the area. Cunningham concluded therefore that, although Japan had withdrawn, she was intensely interested in the area and that, should a favorable opportunity present itself in the future, she would not hesitate to avail herself of it in order, if possible, to add Chientao to her possessions.¹⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

From the Korean point of view, the Chientao incident in 1920 was a by-product of the uprising in the previous year on the Korean peninsula. Throughout the whole period of Japanese colonial rule, there never was so strong a military challenge on the part of Korean exiles in Manchuria to the Japanese regime in Korea as during the brief time immediately after the uprising. Although the Koreans claimed a victory over the expeditionary forces at Chingshan-li, which boosted the morale of Korean nationalists abroad as well as in the peninsula, the Japanese army had no serious difficulty in clearing the area of the Korean independence army. The Japanese finished their mission in two months and were withdrawn as originally planned, although they could not inflict serious damage on the main body of the Korean *Tongnipkun*.

On the other hand, the expedition brought criticism on Japan for her high-handed treatment of the Korean residents in Chientao, and aroused suspicion about Japan's long-term ambitions for that part of Chinese territory. Brutalities by the Japanese soldiers towards the Koreans there were known to the outside world through the efforts of the Canadian

missionaries and became the main factor in attracting public attention in Western countries. Japan's political designs on Chientao, which might lead to another violation of 'the integrity of China', really alarmed the British government. A diplomatic measure to counter this encroachment was once considered by the Foreign Office; but it ended in a visit by a British consular official to Chientao. This incident of 1920 has been forgotten and neglected in the light of greater events in Manchuria in later years—the death of Chang Tso-lin in 1928 and the Manchurian incident in 1931.

NOTES

1. Kang Tōksang (ed.), *Gendaishi Shiryō, Chōsen* (Modern Historical Material, Korea) (Tokyo, 1965-67) (Hereafter cited as *Gendaishi*), Vol. XXVII, vii; Government-General of Chosen, *Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Korea)* (hereafter cited as *Annual Report*) 1910-1911, p. 35.

2. For the Chientao Agreement, see the *British and Foreign State Papers 1908-1909*, Vol. CII, pp. 391-392. For the border dispute from the Korean point of view, see Hyōn Kyuhwan, *Han'guk Yuiminsa* (History of Korean Émigrées Overseas) (Seoul, 1967), Vol. I, pp. 38-44.

3. *Annual Report 1912-1913*, p. 18.

4. Memorandum on Japanese policy in Corea, 5 July 1919, Foreign Office records deposited in the Public Record Office, London (hereafter cited as F.O.) 371/3818 106971/7293).

5. A Japanese report assessed the pros and cons of connivance at Korean emigration to Chientao. Among advantages, economic profit and utilization 'in an emergency' were primarily counted. See Kuksa P'yon-ch'an Wiwōnhoe (compiled), *Han'guk Tongnip Undongsa* (History of the Korean Independence Movement) (Seoul, 1965-1970) (Hereafter cited as *HKIM*), Vol. II, pp. 542-544. See also Clive to Curzon, 22 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (325/3/10).

6. For the March First Movement and the activities of the Korean independence army in Manchuria, see Chongsik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley, 1963), pp. 89-126, 157-159. The author also discussed these subjects in his thesis, 'Korean Resistance to Japanese Colonialism: The March First Movement of 1919 and Britain's Role in Its Outcome' (University of London, 1979).

7. 'The sympathy of the Chinese authorities' towards the Koreans was recorded on several occasions in British and Japanese documents. For example, see Jordan to Curzon, 21 April 1919, F.O. 371/3817 (62758/7293); Korea, Military Report by Captain Bennett, 20 October 1920, F.O. 371/6680 (197/197/23); *Gendaishi*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 75-94.

8. Tongnip Undongsa P'yōngch'an Wiwonhoe (compiled), *Tongnip Undongsa Charyojip* (Source Materials of the Independence Movement) (Seoul, 1970-1978) (Hereafter cited as *SMIM*), Vol. X, pp. 168-169.

9. *Gendaishi*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 61-62.
10. Korea, Military Report by Captain Bennett.
11. *Gendaishi*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 62-64.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 64; *SMIM*, Vol. X, p. 163.
14. *Gendaishi*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 65-66; *SMIM*, Vol. X, pp. 164-166.
15. Hayashi to Curzon, 11 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2431/2358/10).
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Gendaishi*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 84-88, 93-94, 105.
18. *Ibid.* p. 94; *SMIM*, Vol. X, p. 191.
19. *Gendaishi*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 124-126.
20. *SMIM*, Vol. X, p. 176.
21. Eliot to Curzon, 15 November 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3299/2358/10) and its enclosure. For the view of the Japanese military on the Chientao situation, see Korea, Military Report by Captain Bennett.
22. Korea, Military Report by Captain Bennett.
23. *SMIM* Vol. X, p. 167.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 225-226; *Gendaishi*, Vol. XXVIII, p. 117.
25. Eliot to Curzon, 16 September 1920, F.O. 371/5353 (2153/56/23).
26. *SMIM*, Vol. X, pp. 169-170.
27. Eliot to Curzon, 7 October 1920, F.O. 371/5345 (2358/2358/10); Hayashi to Curzon, 13 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2431/2358/10).
28. Eliot to Curzon, 7 October 1920, F.O. 371/5345 (2358/2358/10); Hayashi to Curzon, 13 October 1920, F.O. 371/5345 (2429/2358/10); 13 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2431/2358/10); For the Nikolaevsk incident, see H.B. Morse & H.F. MacNair, *Far Eastern International Relations* (New York, 1931), Vol. II, pp. 939-940; Report on Japanese Army for 1920, 8 January 1921, F.O. 371/6681 (2326/201/23).
29. Hayashi to Curzon, 13 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2431/2358/10).
30. Memorandum on the Hunchun affairs, enclosure in Woodroffe to Eliot, 19 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3043/2358/10).
31. Clive to Curzon, 11 November 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2797/2358/10); Wilkinson to Clive, 1 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (105/3/10); Martin to Wilkinson, (undated), F.O. 371/6585 (325/3/10).
32. Hayashi to Curzon, 9 October 1920, F.O. 371/5345 (2429/2358/10). See also enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 23 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3042/2358/10).
33. *HKIM*, Vol. III, p. 200.
34. Cunningham to Wilkinson, 7 June 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2770/3/10).
35. Wilkinson to Clive, 1 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (105/3/10).
36. Hayashi to Curzon, 9 October 1920, F.O. 371/5345 (2429/2358/10).
37. Eliot to Curzon, 15 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2472/2358/10). Tiehling was on the South Manchurian Railway a little north of Mukden. For the composition of the expedition, see *SMIM*, Vol. X, pp. 225-226, 178-182.
38. Hayashi to Curzon, 18 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2472/2358/10).
39. Gavin McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928* (Stanford, 1977), p. 41.
40. Eliot to Curzon, 23 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3042/2358/10).
41. Wilkinson to Clive, 8 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3361/2358/10).

42. Eliot to Curzon, 15 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2472/2358/10).
43. Report on Japanese army for 1920.
44. Martin to Wilkinson, 27 October 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (105/3/10). One *li* is 2.44 miles.
45. *Japan Advertiser*, December 11, 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 16 December 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10).
46. *Japan Advertiser*, December 21, 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 7 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (547/3/10).
47. *SMIM*, Vol. X, pp. 184-193, 227-236.
48. Hayashi to Curzon, 13 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2431/2358/10); Statement of the Japanese government, enclosure in Hayashi to Curzon, 18 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2471/2358/10).
49. Eliot to Curzon, 14 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2450/2358/10).
50. *SMIM*, Vol. X, pp. 185-191, *Gendaishi*, Vol XXVIII, p. 94.
51. For general descriptions of the fighting at Chingshan-li in Korean sources, see *HKIM*, Vol. III, pp. 204-217; *Tongnip Shinmun* (The Independence Newspaper by the Korean provisional government), December 25, 1920, March 1, 1920; Yi Bömsök, *Udūngbul* (The Campfire) (Seoul, 1971), pp. 21-92. Yi Bömsök was one of the leading officers in Kim's army. For Japanese sources about the fighting, see *SMIM*, Vol. X, pp. 195-196.
52. *SMIM*, Vol. X, pp. 231-233.
53. Eliot to Curzon, 27 May 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2013/3/10).
54. *Japan Advertiser*, December 11, 1920; Extract from *Morning Post*, December 14, 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3315/2358/10).
55. *Japan Advertiser*, 25 December 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, January 7, 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (547/3/10).
56. *Japan Advertiser*, December 17, 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 7 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (547/3/10).
57. Marsden to Eliot, 30 June 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2785/3/10).
58. *Japan Advertiser*, December 17, 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 7 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (547/3/10).
59. Henry Chung, *The Case of Korea* (New York, 1920), pp. 318-319. Pak Ūnsik, *Han'guk Tongnip Undongjihyōlsa* (Bloody History of the Korean Independence Movement), originally published in Chinese in Shanghai, 1920, translated into Korea by Nam Mansōng (Seoul, 1975), Vol. II, pp. 201-211.
60. Cunningham to Wilkinson, 7 June 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2770/3/10).
61. William Scott, *Canadians in Korea: Brief Historical Sketch of Canadian Mission Work* (Toronto, 1975), pp. 73-74; Butler to Jordan, 11 April 1919, F.O. 371/3818 (90971/7293).
62. Wilkinson to Alston, 17 December 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (1301/3/10).
63. Enclosure in Clive to Curzon, 30 July 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2325/2325/10).
64. Martin to Wilkinson, 24 October 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (105/3/10); 27 October 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (105/3/10); Martin to Wilkinson, undated, F.O. 371/6585 (325/3/10).
65. Lay to Eliot, 24 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10).
66. Memorandum by Martin on Norubawie massacre, enclosure No. 3 in Lay to Eliot, 24 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10).
67. Memorandum by Martin on the Norubawie massacre.
68. Foote to Oltmans, 2 November 1920, enclosure in Lay to Eliot, 24 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10).

69. Memorandum by Mansfield, enclosure in Lay to Eliot, 24 November 1920.
70. Foote to Oltmans, 30 October 1920, enclosures in Lay to Eliot, 24 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10).
71. Alex R. McKenzie to Wilkinson, 22 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (1301/3/10).
72. Lay to Eliot, 6 December 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10). These stories were also published in the press in China. McKenzie to Wilkinson, 31 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (1301/3/10).
73. Enclosure in Lay to Eliot, 6 December 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10).
74. Wilkinson to Alston, 4 February 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (1301/3/10).
75. *Japan Advertiser*, December 1, 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 16 December 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10).
76. *Daily Express*, December 1 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3053/2358/10).
77. *Seoul Press*, November 28, 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 16 December 1920.
78. *Seoul Press*, December 3, 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 16 December 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10).
79. *Japan Advertiser*, December 1, 1920. In addition, the official version of the Norubawi incident was given by Sakai Yosakichi, the acting Japanese consul-general in Lungching, to Junius Wood. Here the consul-general did not deny the massacre itself, but rather emphasized the year-long history of anti-Japanese activities by the Koreans in the region. See *Japan Advertiser*, December 22, 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 7 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (547/3/10).
80. Enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 3 February 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (845/3/10).
81. Martin to Wilkinson, 30 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (1301/3/10).
82. Eliot to Curzon, 16 December 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10).
83. *Japan Advertiser*, December 3, 1920, enclosure in *Ibid.*
84. *Ibid.*
85. *Japan Advertiser*, December 8, 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, December 16 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10).
86. *Japan Advertiser*, December 24, 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 7 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (547/3/10).
87. Eliot to Curzon, January 7 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (547/3/10). For the Japanese version of the missionaries' involvement, see *Gendaishi*, Vol. XXVI, pp. 187-190. Rev. Foote was regarded here as the leader of the anti-Japanese agitations.
88. *Japan Advertiser*, December 18, 1920, enclosure in Eliot to Curzon, 7 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (547/3/10).
89. Hayashi to Curzon, 9 October 1920, F.O. 371/5345 (2429/2358/10).
90. *Ibid.*; Eliot to Curzon, 14 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2450/2358/10); statement of the Japanese government, enclosure in Hayashi to Curzon, 18 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2471/2358/10).
91. Minute on Eliot to Curzon, 7 October 1920, F.O. 371/5345 (2358/2358/10).
92. Minute on Parliamentary question, 21 December 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3336/2358/10).
93. Minute on Eliot to Curzon, 14 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2450/2358/10).
94. Curzon to Hayashi, 21 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2471/2358/10).
95. Minute on Eliot to Curzon, 15 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2472/2/2358/10).
96. Clive to Curzon, 22 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2567/2358/10).

97. Minute on Clive to Curzon, 22 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2567/2358/10). Italics are in original.
98. Minute on *The Times*, 28 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2655/2358/10).
99. Clive to Curzon, 11 November 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2797/2358/10).
100. Ibid.
101. Eliot to Curzon, 16 November 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2847/2358/10).
102. Minute on *Daily Express*, 1 December 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3053/2358/10); Parliamentary question, 14 December 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3253/2358/10). The Foreign Office did not leave any minute on the first report on the allegations of Japanese brutalities.
103. Eliot to Curzon, 5 December 1920, F.O. 371/5346/ (3111/2358/10); Eliot to Curzon, 11 December 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3180/2358/10).
104. Minute on Eliot to Curzon, 5 December 1920.
105. Minute on Eliot to Curzon, 11 December 1920.
106. Curzon to Eliot, 11 December 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3111/2358/10).
107. Eliot to Curzon, 16 November 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2847/2358/10); 24 November 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2942/2358/10).
108. Eliot to Curzon, 11 December 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3180/2358/10).
109. Eliot to Curzon, 12 December 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3203/2358/10).
110. Eliot to Curzon, 16 December 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (269/3/10).
111. Eliot to Curzon, 18 December 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3315/2358/10).
112. Clive to Curzon, 22 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2567/2358/10); 22 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (325/3/10).
113. Clive to Curzon, 12 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3361/2358/10); Wilkinson to Clive, 7 October 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3361/2358/10).
114. Wilkinson to Clive, 1 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (105/3/10).
115. Wilkinson to Clive, 3 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (105/3/10).
116. Clive to Curzon, 22 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (325/3/10).
117. Wilkinson to Clive, 30 November 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (1301/3/10); Wilkinson to Alston, 12 December 1920, F.O. 371/6585 (1301/3/10); 1 April 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (1182/3/10).
118. Alston to Curzon, 6 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (89/3/10).
119. Minute on Alston to Curzon, 6 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (89/3/10).
120. Eliot to Curzon, 25 November 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (2956/2358/10).
121. Eliot to Curzon, 23 December 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3395/2358/10).
122. Alston to Curzon, 1 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (3/3/10).
123. Alston to Curzon, 14 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (183/3/10).
124. Curzon to Eliot, 30 December 1920, F.O. 371/5346 (3395/2358/10).
125. Eliot to Curzon, 7 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (547/3/10).
126. F.O. 371/5346 (2968, 3253, 3336, 3337/2358/10); F.O. 371/6585 (789, 1126/3/10).
127. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 26 January 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (303/3/10) and its enclosure. See also Presbyterian Church Office to Foreign Office, 10 March 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (897/3/10).
128. Curzon to Eliot, 14 February 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (303/3/10).
129. Minute on Presbyterian Church Office to Foreign Office, 10 March 1921.
130. Curzon to Alston, 23 March 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (897/3/10).
131. Eliot to Curzon, 6 April 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (1270/3/10).
132. Alston to Curzon, 1 April 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (1182/3/10).

133. Alston to Curzon, 15 April 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (1396/3/10).
134. Minute on Alston to Curzon, 15 April 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (1396/3/10).
135. Eliot to Curzon, 24 April 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (1510/3/10); Curzon to Eliot, 28 April 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (1510/3/10).
136. Curzon to Alston, 21 July 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2358/3/10); Minute on Clive to Wellesley, 12 May 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2358/3/10).
137. Eliot to Curzon, 2 July 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2785/3/10); Wilkinson to Alston, 8 June 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2770/3/10); Curzon to Eliot, 9 August 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2785/3/10).
138. The number of the police in the district was derived from Cunningham's conversation with Chinese officials there. Eliot, however, reported that the evacuation of the last two battalions had been completed on May 9 and the police force was increased by 300. Eliot to Curzon, 27 May 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2013/3/10), 6 April 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (1254/3/10).
139. Alston to Curzon, 17 April 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (1396/3/10); 1 April 1921, F.O. 371/6585 (1182/3/10); Wilkinson to Alston, 12 April 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2118/3/10).
140. Cunningham to Wilkinson. 7 June 1921, F.O. 371/6586 (2771/3/10).

An Introduction to Early Korean Writing Systems

by Adrian Buzo

I. INTRODUCTION

While it is generally accepted that literacy in Korea dates back to at least the period of the Four Han Commanderies (2nd century BC to 3rd century AD), our first direct evidence for it comes in the form of the Kwanggaet'o Stela, a large stone monument located in what is now southern Manchuria, which recounts at length the deeds of the Koguryō monarch Kwanggaet'o (391-412) and bears a date corresponding to 414 AD.¹

The 1,800-character text of the stela is in Chinese, which is fitting because this earliest glimpse we have of native Korean literacy sets the scene for the almost total monopoly that was to be enjoyed by Classical Chinese as the instrument of literate culture in Korea during the next 1,500 years. It is also fitting that it be a Koguryō monument, because Koguryō was the first state east of the Chinese cultural world to acquire literacy in the Chinese language.

This marriage of spoken Korean and written Chinese was a long one. It lasted while the traditional political order lasted, and it crumbled away almost as quickly and as completely as did that order around the end of the 19th century. It was not a totally monogamous marriage, however, and it is with an aspect of the relatively tiny body of writing in the Korean language from the pre-modern era that we are concerned here.

Its history may be divided into two periods, with the division coming rather sharply at the promulgation of the Korean alphabet in 1446. It should be noted at the outset, however, that the basis of this division is largely a technical one, for although this alphabet, known formally in its day as the *hunmin chōngūm* ("Correct Sounds for Instructing the People"), marked a radical improvement in the means by which the Korean language was transcribed, its impact was very limited in the Yi period, being largely confined to the very areas previously covered by the earlier Korean writing systems which we call *idu*, *hyangch'al* and *kugyōl*.

At the same time as we acknowledge the achievement of the *hunmin chōngūm*, it is important to recognize this essential continuum of Korean

language writing throughout the pre-modern era, for it was part of an overall cultural continuum. It is the purpose of this paper to identify the characteristics and trace the development of what we shall call Early Korean Writing Systems, the predecessors to the *hunmin chōngūm* and the means by which the Korean language was transcribed during the thousand years or so prior to 1446.

Source Material

The source material we have for tracing the development of *idu*, *hyangch'al* and *kugyōl* is extremely scanty. In the case of *idu* there is a good deal of material dating from the Yi period, but from the Koryō, Unified Silla and Three Kingdoms periods we have only a handful of short documents and a few brief inscriptions. For *hyangch'al* we have 25 short lyrics known as *hyang-ga*, the texts for some of which may be corrupt. For *kugyōl* there are some documents from the Yi period, five pages of a *kugyōl*-annotated sutra from the Koryo period, and nothing earlier. In addition, there are a fair number of Korean names transcribed with Chinese characters in a variety of contexts, principally in the two major sources for early Korean history, the *Samguk sagi* (1145) and the *Samguk yusa* (13th century).

Much of this material is fragmentary, and all of it comes without any explanation, annotation or commentary. Our ability to use it depends on our ability to reconstruct the spoken forms of the Korean language for these early periods, and for this we are able to go back only as far as the 15th century, the earliest period for which we have substantial material in the Korean language. It also depends on our ability to define with precision the phonetic value of the Chinese characters used in early texts to transcribe native Korean sounds. The chief tool used for this is Karlgren's reconstruction of 7th century Chinese known as Ancient Chinese.² Lastly, and more intangibly, it depends upon our ability to understand the cultural context in which these systems were used.

Despite the considerable amount of work that has been done, we may never have more than a general idea of the sounds and grammatical forms contained in *idu/hyangch'al/kugyōl* source material. There is simply not enough of it, and what there is is not precise enough to allow much in the way of detailed interpretation. If there is any ray of hope, it is in the steady uncovering of old documents previously presumed lost, a process that has been going on since the Japanese colonial period. This plus the continuing process of re-evaluation of existing material enables us to see the outlines of early Korean writing systems far more clearly today than even a generation ago.

Terminology

The lack of linguistic explanation or commentary in *idu/hyangch'al/kugyŏl* source material has tended to obfuscate the basic terminology in popular use. In addition, the terms *idu*³ and *kugyŏl*⁴ first occur in early Yi period sources, several centuries after the first evidence of their actual existence, while we have only one pre-15th century reference to the term *hyangch'al* as a method of poetry/lyric transcription, and that is in the *Kyunyŏ-jŏn* (1075). No known term for the practice of name transcription, which shows some indications of distinct development, has survived.

A basic source of confusion is the apparent application by late Koryŏ times of the term "*idu*" to cover by implication all forms of Korean language transcription. The actual works identified as *idu* works in early Yi times, however—for example, the *idu* translation of the Great Ming Code (*Taemyŏng yuljikhae*, 1396)—clearly relate to a more restricted field of use, that of prose transcription for a formal or official purpose.⁵ Further, the function of poetry/lyric transcription is clearly absent from the account of *idu* usage given by Ch'oe Man-ri in his defense of *idu* against the *hunmin chŏngŭm* before King Sejong.⁶ It is indications like this that suggest that the use of *idu* as a broad generic term is inadequate.

In this situation it is more helpful to proceed from the actual functions and features of these systems rather than from their names. The

<i>Function</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Definition</i>
prose transcription	<i>idu</i>	a comparatively primitive, hybrid written language containing both Chinese and Korean elements.
poetry/lyric transcription	<i>hyangch'al</i>	a full and true transcription of Korean song lyrics using Chinese characters.
translation/interpretation transcription	<i>kugyŏl</i>	a precise, written form used for rendering Chinese texts into Korean, using a system of marginal annotations based on simplified Chinese characters.
name transcription	<i>ŏhui p'yogi</i>	a system for transcribing Korean nouns and proper nouns using Chinese characters.

names applied to them in this article are the ones in current general use in academic circles and provide as effective a working terminology as the paucity of source material on them allows.

It is important to stress that these systems are fundamentally inter-related and that the differences between them are primarily functional ones. *Idu* was not a spoken form because it is not necessary to transcribe spoken forms fully in order to communicate basic information. A person reading *idu* would understand its contents directly, and in communicating them to others he would probably start with a phrase like "It says that ...". On the other hand, the more complex demands of lyric transcription where the actual sound of the the language is of prime importance, and the demands of translation/interpretation transcription where great precision is necessary to render, for example, philosophical concepts, required a far more comprehensive, detailed system. This is the basis for distinguishing between *idu* and *hyangch'al/kugyol*. These latter two in turn require different kinds of precision—*hyangch'al* for its aesthetic effect, *kugyol* for the articulation of philosophy. All three systems appear to have proceeded from the same principles, but they differ markedly in the purpose for which, and thus in the extent to which, they applied these principles.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY KOREAN WRITING SYSTEMS

The Chinese and Korean Languages

The characteristics of early Korean writing systems were determined first of all by the nature of the differences between the Chinese and Korean languages, and a brief consideration of these is relevant here.

Few languages could be more dissimilar than Chinese and Korean. Chinese is a monosyllabic, tonal language in which grammatical functions are determined largely by word order, which in turn follows a basic subject-verb-object pattern. In its written form it employs ideographic characters, each of which possesses both a phonetic and a semantic value. Korean, on the other hand, is a polysyllabic, non-tonal language which follows a basic subject-object-verb pattern and in which grammatical function is indicated by a system of grammatical morphemes attached to substantives in a sentence. Its sound system, especially its use of final

consonants, is more complex than Chinese and its use of particles is also far more extensive.

There were three major implications of these differences for the field of Korean language transcription. The first was that the actual order of words would have to be changed. "I love you" would become "I you love". The second was that grammatical particles not consistently found in Chinese would have to be accounted for—for example in the sentence above, the sentence topic particle, the object particle and the verb endings. Thus, while the Korean sentence

Na tangsin sarang

communicates in a basic fashion as does, say, an English newspaper headline or Hollywood Indian Pidgin English, its full form is

na nŭn tangsin ūl sarang hamnida

and those extra five particles would have to be accounted for in a complete transcription.

The third implication is on the conceptual level, namely, that certain basic items of Chinese vocabulary do not have strict one-to-one correspondences in Korean. For example, the Chinese character 天 means "heaven" but its Korean equivalent, hanŭl, holds both the spiritual meaning of "heaven" and the physical meaning of "sky".

So, depending upon whether one was writing a newspaper headline, a love letter or a philosophical tract, one, two or all of these factors might come into play.

The extreme impracticability, both grammatic and phonetic, of using Chinese ideographs to write Korean is obvious, and the practical development of early Korean writing systems was due to one simple, supreme factor: the immense prestige of Chinese civilization. Just as to Europeans, "writing" meant the Roman alphabet, so to the ancient Koreans it was simply inconceivable that "writing" could have meant anything else but the use of Chinese characters.

The Three Kingdoms Period (3rd Century-668AD)

As we have mentioned above, the Kwanggaet'o stela is written in Chinese. Some modern commentators have detected signs of the influence of Korean syntax on the monument's text but the evidence for this is extremely slight. The main feature of interest on the stela is the more than 100 Chinese characters used phonetically to transcribe Korean personal names, place names and official ranks. This confirms what one should have in any case expected, that Koguryō had adopted the Chinese practice of using characters purely for their phonetic properties to render foreign

words into Chinese. Another point of interest here is that a good proportion of these characters also occur in later Paekche, Silla and Japanese transliterations, suggesting strongly that this practice reached them via Koguryō.

The translation of names is one thing, the transcription of sentences is another. The latter involves grammatical transformations of varying complexity depending upon the purpose of the exercise. The earliest evidence we have of sentence transcription comes in the form of the inscriptions on a few stone monuments that have been dated to the 5th and 6th centuries.⁸ The inscriptions from Koguryō possess the same features as the Silla ones, implying that Silla, a state in which high literacy developed later than in either Koguryō and Paekche, learned the basic techniques of Korean language transcription from Koguryō.

The Korean language features which these texts display are of two kinds: the clear use of Korean word-order, and the use of Chinese characters as grammatical particles based on their Chinese meaning. Something of the effect of this mix of Chinese and Korean might be gained from considering the following sentence in English: "It is a basic dictum that habeas corpus be the sine-qua-non of just legal procedure," and so on. A total of twelve particles have been identified so far. Following are some examples.

<i>Chinese Character</i>	<i>Modern Korean Equivalent</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
者	은/는	topic marker
令	시키다	to order
爲	하다	to do
以	(으)로	instrumental particle
中	에	locative particle

At this stage of development it is a characteristic of Three Kingdoms period *idu* that all grammatical particles and auxiliary verbs such as those listed above derive their meaning directly from the range of meaning of the Chinese character. This is what is known as "bilingual identification," a more simple process than the abstract uses Chinese characters were later to be put to.⁹

Limited though the Three Kingdoms material is, there are no indications that *idu* was in any sense crude or provincial. The material shows an inner consistency and, of course, we are able to interpret much of it because it is reasonably consistent with later practice. Although some of

the early transcriptions have been found in relatively remote regions, some have also come from the area of the old Silla capital, Kyōngju. Contrary to crude or provincial connotations, there is evidence that the *idu* of the Tanyang inscription might have been composed by a central government bureau,¹⁰ while the association of *idu* with the 755 Silla Hwa-yen sutra copying is an association with high Silla culture.¹¹

Though *idu* later became associated with the lower government official class, whence its present name is derived, this is not the complete story of its use in Silla times and earlier. At this stage it is perhaps better not to prejudge class connotations but instead to measure *idu* against its actual function which at least was constant and specific—the recording of factual information in an accessible fashion.

For the Three Kingdoms period—and for the Unified Silla period (668-918) as well—we have only *idu* material, much as we suspect that *hyangch'al* and *kugyōl* might have already been in existence in some form.

The evidence for this is extremely slight, and hinges basically on indications that the principles which were later used in *hyangch'al* and *kugyōl* were known at this time. There are indications that Chinese characters were being assigned native Korean pronunciation based on their meaning and then used phonetically in name transcriptions.¹² There is also an indication that the principle of using simplified Chinese characters, a fundamental technique of *kugyōl*, was also known.

Another more general type of reasoning for the existence of a type of *hyangch'al* or *kugyōl* at this stage arises from a consideration of at just what level the inadequacy of an alien written form really makes itself felt. Just as domestic literary traditions asserted themselves against Latin and Greek in Medieval Europe, would not native Korean lyrics, especially religious incantations, bid for transcription? Also, if the occasional lack of one-to-one correspondences between Chinese and Korean affected the transmission of Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist teachings, would it not also call for clarification through annotations? In this schema, *idu* is not a primitive script in the pejorative sense but the result of a “spill-over” of sophisticated Korean language transcription techniques already in existence in the 5th and 6th centuries into a more humble arena.

In the end, however, we are still left with only a tiny portion of evidence and with speculation that appears to agree with these few known facts.

Unified Silla and Koryŏ Periods (668-1388)

As we enter the Unified Silla period we begin to see the nature of early Korean writing systems more clearly. Although we still lack documentation on *hyangch'al* and *kugyŏl*—these do not appear before the Koryo period—there is enough evidence of *idu* to enable us to detect a significant development in its technique. A good deal of this story appears to be tied up with the pre-eminent Silla Confucian scholar Sŏl Ch'ong.

Sŏl Ch'ong

Even the dates of Sŏl Ch'ong are only roughly discernible from the fact that his father was the famous priest Wŏnhyo (617-686), and a similar veil of mystery surrounds his literary activities. It is popularly and inaccurately said that Sŏl Ch'ong invented *idu*, but this is not just a modern interpretation; the preface to the *Taemyŏng yuljikhae* (1396) says the same. In accounting for this statement, we should remember that it was made about 700 years after Sŏl's time and in the preface to an *idu* work. The choice of words may have been influenced by the common tendency to attribute great inventions to hero-figures and, as we have seen, by early Yi times *idu* was used as a broad generic term for various Korean language transcription practices.

But although the statement that Sŏl invented *idu* does not bear close examination—it was in use at least 200 years before his time—it is clear that Sŏl had a considerable impact on transcription practices, and for a consideration of this impact we must turn to the early sources.

There are three major Pre-Yi period sources that mention Sŏl's literary activities and none of them mentions *idu*.¹³ They are the *Kyunyŏ-jŏn* (1075), the *Samguk sagi* (1045) and the *Samguk Yusa* (13th century). In all three cases they are brief, single references. The *Kyunyŏ-jŏn* tells us that "Academician Sŏl greatly transformed Confucian writings but the resultant complications made them into rats' tails."¹⁵

The source is not particularly helpful about transcription practices because it does not necessarily refer to an act of physically changing the appearance of Chinese writings but more likely to Sŏl's commentarial activities. The context is the author expressing his opinion that a confused transmission of Confucian doctrine has led to a divergence between Chinese and Korean Confucianism. We may be justified in going no further than noting Sŏl's identity as an eminent—perhaps the most eminent—Silla Confucian commentator on the basis of this quote.

The *Samguk sagi* includes a piece on Sŏl in its biography section and in it we find the following sentence:

“(He) read the Nine (Confucian) Classics using our own language.¹⁵”

Before examining further this reference let us consider the entry in the *Samguk yusa* where, in the course of a section on Wŏnhyo, Ilyŏn states that Sŏl

“translated Chinese and Korean names using our own sounds and interpreted the Six (Confucian) Classics which to this day have been transmitted to us, thereby fully elucidating them.”¹⁶

It is clear that Sŏl's method was a written method rather than an oral presentation because it was handed down through the generations. It is equally clear that it far transcended the limits of *idu*, for it was capable of “fully elucidating” the Classics, a task that would require a good deal of subtlety and precision of language if it were to have any kind of intellectual impact at all. It is this sort of observation that leads us to suspect that what Sŏl used is what was later called *kugyŏl*.

We should also note in passing that the *Samguk yusa* reference alludes to two distinct practices, interpreting the Classics and transcribing names. This field of name transcription is perhaps the least known of all these early systems, but the association of Sŏl with it suggests that it underwent the same kind of process of development that *idu* did about this time.

We thus emerge with a picture of Sŏl as a pre-eminent commentator on the Confucian Classics via a Korean language written script of considerable precision. How does this square with what we know of *kugyŏl*?

Kugyŏl

The term “*kugyŏl*” first appears in the early Yi Period as an apparent abbreviation of the term *Kusu chŏngyŏl*, or “oral transmissions of profound meaning”.¹⁷ A *kugyŏl* text contains two elements: the original Chinese text plus annotations in the margin that convert it into Korean by a method very similar to the Japanese system of *kanbun kundoku*. The following is an English translation of a sentence on the next page illustrating step-by-step elucidation from a Koryŏ *Kugyŏl* text: “At that time there appeared in the world six kinds of upheaval.”¹⁸

From this brief actual example we see that *kugyŏl* aimed at a full and true representation of the original in Korean. Its probable origin was in master-disciple sessions where the master would expound his interpretation of a particular document and the disciple annotate his text accordingly to preserve these interpretations. Hence “oral transmissions of deep, inner meaning.”

Original Text	Full form of <i>kugyōl</i> particles	Korean translation of <i>kugyōl</i> particles	Full Modern Korean translation
是 時 世 界 其 地 六 種 震 動	叱爲隱中 叱 隱 以 爲古飛多	人 의/회 人 는 으 로 고 나 다	이러한 때에 세계의 기지는 육종으로 진동하고 있다。

However, we have no documentary evidence to support our suspicion that *kugyōl* was used in Sōl Ch'ong's time. The earliest document we have comprises five pages from an undated copy of a sutra, the *Inwang-gyōng*, or Prajnaparamita Sutra, which were discovered in 1973. The marginal annotations on the document are in the form of simplified Chinese characters used both for their phonetic and semantic properties. The five pages contain some 314 different grammatical morphemes possessing anything from one to 16 elements, and while they display some differences in their operation from Yi period *kugyōl* they are obviously products of the same tradition.

The circumstances of the discovery of this document led to an initial estimate that it dated to the Late Koryō period, and there is some support for this in the nature of the *kugyōl* used. The actual grammatical forms display some marked differences from 15th century practice and show some affinities with older forms known to us through *idu* and *hyangch'al* texts. On the other hand, the actual characters used appear to have more of an affinity with 15th century practice, and this is the basis for dating it

爾時十号三明大滅諦金剛智釋迦牟尼佛
 初年月八日方坐十地入大寂室三昧思緣
 放大光明照三界中復於頂上出千寶蓮花
 其花上至非想非非想天光亦復爾乃至他
 方恒河沙諸佛國土時無色界雨無量變大
 香花香如車輪花如須彌山王如雲而下十
 八梵天王雨百變異色花六欲諸天雨無量
 色花其佛座前自然而生九百萬億劫花上

ソ7モカ	ヤ3ハン7シ	シ7ウ
ソ7矢シ	ソモハン7=	シ火七
ソニ7シ	ソ白ロモシ3	シナ尸=
ソニソ7	ソトろ7の7	シナナ七
ソニ冷七	ソトろ7のシ	去
ソナ冷7	ソニかソニ7シ	下
ソロ7シ	ソリ白ロハン7	子
ソロモ	ソ去ハン7リシ	尸矢七ソ3
ソ白ろ尸	ソ去ハン7モ七	か
ソ音ソ3	ソ白ロトろ7=	かソ7
ソ7ナナ7	ソ音ソニト7=	ウ
ソニ7リ四	ソ3ノ牙7のウ=	ウ
ソニト7=	ソ7モカリ音ソナ3	毛ソ巴ハ
ソニロシ3	ソ7リ3七 ソ尸のシ	矢
ソナ7リ3	ソニナ七 ソろろ冷ろ	矢か
ソ3ソロ7	ソ3ソナ3ソロハン7	矢音
ソロハン7	ソ音ソナソニナ七	矢7=
ソロモシ3	ソ去ハン7リ=ノ牙ナ	矢ろ
ソ去7モ七	ソ白ろろ ソモハン	矢リ
ソモハンニ	ソ七行ソニト7リ3七ロソモハンカ	矢去ろ
ソモハン3	ロハン7	矢7のシ
ソ白ろ7シ	ロモ7=	矢7のウ
ソ白ろ7ム	モハン	矢リロ7
ソ白ろ尸ム	モハンか	矢リモ七
ソ音ノ7モ	モカリ3	矢7のウ=
ソ7ウシソ尸	モカリナ	矢リロシ3
ソ7ウウソ3	シ	矢音ソナ
ソ7モカリ3	シ3	矢7リ尸の7
ソ7モカリ音	シリ	矢リろ7モ3
ソニろナ七	シナ	矢リナ7リ3

Koryō Kugyōl: When isolated, the particles of the annotated Inwang Sutra display a strong resemblance to Japanese *kana*.

to not too long before the 15th century, the grammatical differences being partly attributable to the innately conservative nature of written language.

The discovery of this annotated *Inwang-gyōng* has enabled us to roll back the known history of *kugyōl* by a couple of hundred years, but apart from showing that a practice which fits the descriptions we have of Sōl's activities was prevalent in Koryō times, it is too far after his time to help us very much. The practice of *kugyōl* in Silla times remains only "likely" in the absence of any documentary evidence to support it.¹⁹

Idu

From the late 6th century to the 750s a gap occurs in *idu* sources, and when *idu* appears again in the 750s it is evident that a change of some significance had taken place. As we have already seen, in the Three Kingdoms period the characteristics of *idu* had already emerged, consisting of Koreanized syntax and the appending of Korean language grammatical morphemes based on the principle of bilingual identification from the Chinese. *Idu* was to undergo just one further development in its long career and that was the adoption, probably under the influence of *kugyōl* and *hyangch'al*, of Chinese characters used in an abstract manner, primarily to depict Korean language grammatical morphemes not found in Chinese.

In an *idu* document dated 755 AD we find an unknown writer setting down the procedure by which the copying of a Buddhist sutra, the *Hwayen Sutra*, was carried out. As he describes the procession that preceded the actual writing he devotes one clause to each facet: "Two acolytes in robes of pure color preceded them holding confirmation staffs, followed by four acolyte musicians in similar garb who played as they went. Yet another sprinkled fragrant water on the pathway and another scattered flowers..." and so on. Each clause ends with a Korean connective particle whose modern equivalent is /myō/, and which has no remote Chinese equivalent. The character used for this is 弥 with a sound approximating /myō/ and no semantic significance. This is the first example we have of the use of pure grammatical morphemes, and it will be immediately apparent that it permits a far greater degree of precision than the older method of bilingual identification. The example of /myō/ is an example of a technique known as *ūmga ch'ayong* (sound-borrowing).

There is evidence of another new technique at work in this document, a technique that is basically the same as the use of 珍 as /tol/ in early name transcriptions; namely, the adoption of Chinese characters for their semantic properties alone. We find, for example, the declarative verb

善起寶王亦如是

悉滿所求諸欲樂

无信眾主不見佛

非是善起心棄捨

大方廣佛花嚴經卷第卒

天寶十三載甲辰八月初三日法誠三月初五日部園丁成內之成內蘭首者皇龍寺緣起法師為內攝慈悲場心刺高由
 亦著三法界一切眾生皆成佛道欲為以成賜乎經成內法者精根中香水散亦生長令內林然後中右稱
 及脫那脫皮練那紙作白士那經寫畢師那經心是那那善薩像畢師志使人那善薩武授命林齋食祿
 右諸人等若大小便為然若師宿我右食中我為者香水用尔沐浴令只但作之愛中進在之經寫
 貯中並得淨為內新淨衣裋水衣裋天冠等法嚴令只者二青衣童子灌頂針棒鉢又
 青木童子者口使樂人等並伎樂為祿又二香水行道中殺祿又一二花棒行道中殺祿又一
 法師香煙像引祿之一法師梵唱引祿諸畢師等香花棒尔右念行道為作震中至者三聲祿尔
 三及頂礼寫內佛菩薩花嚴經等供養為內以禮中坐中早經寫在如經心作祿倍菩薩像作時中青木
 童子伎樂人等除余淨法者上同之經心中一收舍利尔入內如
 我舍營願盡未來 西成經典不爛壞 假使三灾故大千 此經与空不說破 若有眾生於此經 見佛聞經教舍利
 發菩提心不退轉 隨青賢因速成佛 祿作人依祿善緣 黃珠和奈麻經筆師武珠伊阿于奈麻異此經舍令
 毛大舍 義七夫舍 孝赤沙弥 南原京文美沙弥 即吸大舍 高沙夫里 郡陽結余麻 仁羊大舍 房馬大舍 仁即卷
 經心還大京 能吉余麻 于古舍 佛菩薩像 畢師同京義奉 鍊金麻 丁得余麻 无得舍知 豆鳥舍 經題
 畢師同京同智舍 舍 六頭品 又吉得何復

Silla Idu: The afterword to a Hwa-yen Sutra bearing a date corresponding to 754 AD.

ending /ta/, hitherto transcribed as 之 /chi/ from an unusual but valid facet of its Chinese range of meaning, that of being a final embellishing particle, is now also transcribed as 如 . In this case the sound has been ignored and the meaning—"like, resembling"—alone adopted. The Modern Korean verb for "like, resembling" is /tapta/ and the Silla equivalent of its root would have resembled /ta/. This assigning of a native Korean phonetic value to a Chinese character based on its meaning is known as *hun'ga ch'ayong* (meaning-borrowing) and again its advantages for precise transcription are obvious.²⁰

With the acquisition of the principles of *ũmga ch'ayong* and *hun'ga ch'ayong idu* reached the limit of its technical development. But it is not the presence or absence of techniques that defines the nature of *idu*, and it is an interesting reflection of its function-bound nature that it applied *ũmga* and *hun'ga* extremely sparingly, and always within the boundaries of formal, official prose. In the Unified Silla period we see an increase of only 15 particles over the 12 identified from the Three Kingdoms period, and not all of the additions are *ũmga ch'ayong*, or *hun'ga ch'ayong*, but old bilingual identification particles.²¹

Idu manifested signs of continued, limited growth in the Koryŏ period.²² Again, our material is very scanty but there is evidence of a further 30 or 40 Chinese characters in use while the morphemes they represent become relatively more complex, possessing up to seven elements. By the early Yi period it appears to have been widely in use among low-level government officials and those whose knowledge of Chinese, however adequate, had not been won through the examination system. At the time of the promulgation of the *Hunmin chŏngŭm* it was apparently perceived as a useful tool and King Sejong at one stage made a direct parallel between the aims of his system and the function if of *idu*.²³

Idu continued to be used until late Yi times. It had taken firm root in the lower levels of officialdom and examples of its use in conjunction with both Chinese and *hunmin chŏngŭm* survive from the 17th century to attest to its durability. Like certain life-forms, it was so well adapted to its humble purpose that it survived long after its fancier cousins had flourished and passed away.

Hyangch'al

Though *idu* appears to have noted the principles of *ũmga ch'ayong* and *hun'ga ch'ayong* but largely passed them by, these principles are an integral part of both *hyangch'al* and *kugyŏl* because the demands of accurate transcription required their frequent employment. In the case of

去隱春皆理米 毛冬居叱沙哭屋尸以憂音 阿冬
 音乃叱好支賜烏隱 見史年數就音隨去行齊目
 煙迴於尸 七史伊衣 逢烏支惡知作乎下是 郎也
 慕理尸心未 行乎尸道尸 逢次叱巷中宿尸夜音
 有叱下是

聖德王

第三十三聖德王神龍二年丙午歲 不登人民飢
 甚丁未正月初一日至七月三十日救民給租一口一
 日三升為式終事而計三十万五百碩也 王為太宗
 大王初奉德寺設仁王道場七日大赦始有侍中 戰本

hyangch'al we can see them at work but only imperfectly, for the entire body of surviving *hyangch'al* amounts to 25 short lyrics called *hyang-ga*.

The reference to the transcribing of *hyang-ga*—and thus by implication *hyangch'al*—that occurs in the *Samguk sagi* suggests that it was a substantial tradition in the 9th century. For the year 888 AD it is recorded that “Queen Chinsōng and the Priest Taeku made a collection of *hyang-ga* called the *Samdaemok*.”²⁴ This brief reference gives no hint as to the scale of the work, but to be recorded at all in the annals and to involve royal participation it would have had to be substantial.

The earliest surviving example of *hyangch'al* at work that we have is contained in the *Kyunyō-jōn*, a short, eulogistic biography of the early Koryō priest Kyunyō (923-973) written by an 11th century government official by the name of Hyōk-ryōn Chōng in 1075. The work consists of an introduction plus ten episodes from Kyunyō's life, one of which deals with Kyunyō's composition of the *Pohyōn sibwōn-ga*, a cycle of eleven ten-line *hyang-ga* based on a unified them from the Hwayen Sutra. The songs are given with Kyunyō's own introduction and Hyōk-ryōn Chōng comments that they used to be pasted up on walls at the time of their composition, both indications that the texts are probably 10th rather than 11th century texts.²⁵

The term “*hyangch'al*” comes from another section of the *Kyunyō-jōn* in which Hyōk-ryōn incorporates a short work by a contemporary of Kyunyō's, Choe Haeng-gwi. Choe's purpose is to give Chinese translations of the songs for the benefit of the Chinese who, naturally, would only be able to understand the occasional substantive in the *hyangch'al* script. In the course of a long introduction to his translations, in which he gives an extremely valuable description of how a 10th-century Korean saw his own literary traditions, Choe comments as follows:

“T'ang writing, like the Imperial Network, embraces us and so we can easily read it. However, our printed letters are similar to the way Sanskrit writing is strung together, and so they are difficult for others to understand.”²⁶

“Our printed letters” is rendered as *hyangch'al* (郷札) while by Sanskrit writing Choe means the practice of phonetically transcribing Sanskrit Buddhist terms into Chinese syllable by syllable. This is the sole reference we have to the term *hyangch'al* in pre-modern sources. It refers rather succinctly to a native Korean form of writing an example of which is the method used to transcribe the songs of Kyunyō.

Because the songs are composed by one person at one time and because their texts have come down to us via an early woodblock

printing, we are reasonably convinced of their fidelity. In addition, we have Choe Haeng-kwi's rather free but helpful Chinese translations to aid us in deciphering them. This contrasts somewhat with the fourteen *hyang-ga* in the *Samguk yusa* where not only are the texts possibly corrupt in places but also we are not sure of the actual dates of their transcription. Our best text of the *Samguk yusa* is a 16th century woodblock printing that copies Ilyōn's 13th century work in which the songs are ascribed mainly to the 7th-8th centuries.²⁷ Despite the difficulties involved in interpreting them, however, we can still detect signs of a substantial lyric tradition in them. For example, there is the song "Grieving for my Lord Taemal," attributed to Taemal's protege Sil-o in the late 7th century.

When I look back upon all our past springs
 I helplessly weep in my sorrow.
 On your fair face where beauty had shone
 The toll of the years kept mounting.
 If only once more, if just for an instant,
 We could be together once more...
 Taemal, my lord! Now my grieving heart
 Spends its nights in the weed-strewn wilderness.

The interpretation of *kugyōl* texts is relatively easy. Not only is there an original Chinese text to assist us but the vocabulary consists almost entirely of Sino-Korean compounds. In the case of *hyangch'al*, however, we are dealing with song lyrics, and while some Sino-Korean surfaces occasionally as Buddhist metaphysical vocabulary in the *Pohyōn sibwōn-ga*, the *hyang-ga* are almost entirely in pure Korean that dates to at least several centuries before the earliest reliable reconstructions of these forms. Let us look briefly at the means by which the first two lines of "Grieving for my Lord Taemal" (*Mo chukchirang-ga*) can be deciphered. The text is as follows:

去隱春皆理米 毛冬居叱沙哭屋履以憂音

We start off by applying a fundamental principle that the nouns and verb roots in a *hyangch'al* text are presented by means of bi-lingual identification. Thus we postulate that the following are nouns and verb roots and attempt to construct grammatical forms around them.

<i>Chinese Character</i>	<i>Pronunciation (Modern Korean)</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
去	/ka/	go
春	/pom/	spring
皆	/ka/	total
哭	/ul/	tears
憂	/sörüm/	sorrow

The reconstruction of these grammatical forms is often only partially possible. In some cases they are directly inferable from *idu* or *kugyōl* practice—隱 for n, for example. In other cases the phonetic reconstruction and syntax aids us. The two lines under discussion give a literal rendering “When I pile up past springs, with unstoppable tears is my sorrow.”²⁸

<i>Chinese Characters</i>	<i>Pronunciation in Modern Korean</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
隱	/n/	adjectival form for the verb “to go” – past tense. Thus /kan/ meaning “past.”
理	/ri/	component of the verb /karida/ – to amass, etc.
米	/mae/	verb ending meaning “when”, “as soon as”.
毛冬	/mot/	verbal prefix “unable”
毛冬居叱沙	uncertain	uncertain – a negative attributive to the following verb “to cry” -perhaps “unbearable”, “unstoppable
屋履	/ul/	gerund-thus “crying”
以	/ro/	instrumental particle “with”
音	/m/	final consonant for /sörüm/

From this brief example one can appreciate the difficulties surrounding *Hyangch'al* interpretation, but this is not to support the oft-heard

statement that *hyangch'al* was extremely complicated and it ultimately fell into confusion and disuse. This assertion is usually made to account for the absence of any *hyangch'al* material after the time of the *Samguk yusa's* compilation, but it is an assertion that relies on the absence of documents from a time when few documents of any kind have survived. Certainly *hyangch'al* was complicated, but so would any such system be. It seems a little hard to suggest that Koryo poets would abandon a long and deep poetic tradition because transcription presented too many problems. While we cannot be sure of all the factors involved, the disappearance of *hyangch'al* by the time of the *hunmin chongum* (1446) must have been partly linked to the waning of the *hyang-ga* themselves. This waning is intimated by the contrast between Choe Haeng-kwi, who in the 10th century matter-of-factly portrays the *sanui-ga*, a sub-category of the *hyang-ga* genre, as a tradition comparable with the Chinese poetic tradition, and the *Koryo-sa* (1450) where an orthodox Confucian judgment is passed on them and they are described as a minor genre, "folk songs".²⁹

Hyangch'al appears and disappears. Although it was used well into the Koryo period, when the *Koryō kayo*, a miscellany of songs came to be transcribed in the 15th century, the *hunmin chōngūm* were used. One of them, *Chong kwa-jong*, is in the same ten-line form as Kyunyo's songs and is a superior lyric poem, but it is not to these qualities that it owes its survival, but to its accompanying music and dance. The Korean lyric tradition had now been claimed by other forms, and its transcription was the province of the *hunmin chongum*.

III. SOME IMPLICATIONS

We have now seen something of the three early Korean writing systems, *idu*, *hyangch'al* and *kugyōl*. As we have also seen, the source material for them is extremely fragmentary and difficult to interpret. This is unfortunate because this field contains implications of considerable importance for our understanding of early Korean culture. However, if the nature of our source material does not allow much in way of detailed conclusions, we may at least examine some general implications. Let us consider, then, both briefly and in general terms, two issues of importance: 1) the relationship between early Korean and early Japanese writing systems; and 2) the nature of the *hunmin chōngūm* in the light of what went before.

Early Korean and Japanese Writing Systems

When we compare early Japanese and Korean writing systems it is the similarities that immediately strike us. *Hyangch'al* has its counterpart in *manyōgana*, the script of the 8th century Japanese poetry collection, the *Manyōshū* (c. 759), while the abbreviated Chinese characters of the native Japanese syllabary (*kana*), which first begin to appear in the 9th century, obviously resemble *kugyōl* characters. Then again, there is the Japanese system of *kanbun kundoku*, the earliest surviving example of which dates to 828 A.D. and which is essentially the same as *kugyōl* as a means of annotating Chinese texts to transform them—in the case of *kanbun*, into Japanese. As we learn more about the nature of Korean influence on Japan during this period, and as more documents come to light, we may be able to fill in the picture further, but for the moment we are simply left with these striking similarities.

It is worth remembering that although the grammars of the Korean and Japanese languages are generally similar their sound systems are not, and so the Korean system would have only general application to Japanese transcription practices. It has been estimated that the Japanese language of the Nara Period consisted of eighty-two distinct syllables and thus could be transcribed phonetically using eighty-two Chinese characters. Of course, *manyōgana* did not limit itself to 82, but it made much greater use of phonetic readings than did *hyangch'al*. While the Korean systems were wedded to the concept of syllabic transcription, complexities were forced upon them, for Korean syllables number many thousands. This incompatibility of the syllable to the Korean sound system provided a powerful impetus to King Sejong to split it into component phonemes, thus marking a fresh point of departure for Korean language transcription practices. The Japanese sound system, on the other hand, was well suited to the syllable, and its writing system today consists of the descendants of Chinese characters borrowed, standardized and abbreviated.

Early Korean Writing Systems and The *Hunmin Chōngūm*

At the time of the invention of the *hunmin chōngūm*, the medium of literate culture in Korea was Classical Chinese with a slight leavening of *idu* and *kugyōl*. It appears that *hyangch'al* had already fallen into disuse. After 1446, and as long as the traditional political order and the education system that buttressed it remained intact, Classical Chinese continued to exercise its near-total monopoly. This monopoly was broken only by the continued use of *idu* in some special areas connected with the activities of low-level government clerks, by the practice of *kugyōl*—now

often using *hunmin chōngūm* symbols as well as simplified Chinese characters—and by the *hunmin chōngūm* itself, in prose called *ōnmun* (“vernacular writing”), used for transcribing Korean language literature, from the *sijo* and *kasa* verse forms to vernacular translations of the Buddhist scriptures and other didactic material.

One often hears that the *hunmin chōngūm* somehow “failed” to have much of an impact, but our assessment of the *hunmin chōngūm* is often conditioned by the fact that today it is a very effective means of mass literacy on its own. Unless we understand Sejong’s activities in their own context, this modern aspect of the *hunmin chōngūm*’s use may lead us to misinterpret his motives.³¹

Literacy in the 15th century meant mastery of Classical Chinese, and it was not the aim of Sejong to alter this state of affairs. Rather, a prime aim of his was to address himself to the shortcomings of the existing systems of Korean language transcription, an aspect of his motivation that emerges via the Preface to the *Hunmin chōngūm* itself, written by Chōng In-ji. Chōng cites four areas where the use of *hunmin chōngūm* would be effective:

- 1) Interpreting the meaning of documents,
- 2) Lawsuit procedure,
- 3) Accurate rendering of the sound of Chinese characters,
- 4) Transcription of Korean songs according to the Chinese scale.

With the exception of 3) it is very apparent that these fields were precisely the fields covered by *idu*, *hyangch'al* and *kugyōl*. “Interpretation of the meaning of documents” was the function of *kugyōl*; the role of *idu* in legal affairs is attested to by the *Taemyōng yuljikhae*, an *idu* translation of the law code of Ming China that was carried out in 1396; and the transcription of Korean songs had been the province of *hyangch'al*.

However, all this adds up to a very limited charter for the *hunmin chōngūm*. No doubt the opposition of the literati played its part in enforcing the limits of this charter, but it is equally evident that Sejong had no revolutionary thoughts in mind in creating the *hunmin chōngūm*, but rather a desire to see things done better and more efficiently. When we measure his creation not against its possibilities but against the specific tasks assigned to it we gain a more accurate appreciation of the reasons for the limited role played by this phonetic script in pre-modern Korea.³²

IV. CONCLUSION

When the ancient Koreans first adopted the Chinese written language and attempted to express their own spoken language with Chinese characters, they came up against a wide variety of problems. The sound system of Chinese—or at least the syllabic expression of that sound system—differed greatly from that of Korean, Chinese grammar could hardly have been more dissimilar to Korean grammar, and the syllable was a singularly awkward unit to try to bend to the intricacies of the Korean sound system.

However, as “writing” was considered synonymous with the use of Chinese characters, efforts were made to apply them to the Korean language, not as an abstract exercise but in order to accomplish specific tasks. The results of these efforts were *idu*, *hyangch'al* and *kugyōl*. Our basis for distinguishing between these three is their differing functions, out of which arose their distinguishing characteristics. Beyond their differing functions they appear to share common principles, and seem to have issued out of a common tradition. It is on the basis of distinct characteristics that we are led to reject the use of “*idu*” as a broad generic term and to apply it instead to the restricted field of prose transcription. Similarly, we apply the term *hyangch'al* to lyric transcription and *kugyōl* to the practice of transcription for the interpretation/translation of Chinese Buddhist and Confucian texts.

The first clear examples of Korean language transcription that have survived occur in *idu* transcriptions dating to the 5th and 6th centuries. These texts use Chinese language vocabulary and even slabs of Chinese grammar along with particles representing Korean language grammatical forms based on direct bilingual identification. We then note references to what must have been a reasonably complex system of transcription attributed to Sōl Ch'ong, a Silla scholar who appears to have been active around the end of the 7th century. Shortly afterwards, in the 750s, we notice for the first time new principles at work in *idu* prose, though they are linked only circumstantially to accounts of Sōl's activities. These principles of phonetic borrowing (*ūmga ch'ayong*) and semantic borrowing (*hun'ga ch'ayong*) marked a definite advance on the previous principles in use, and laid the foundation for the comparatively accurate phonetic transcriptions and precise grammatical forms that are visible only fitfully in *idu* but which are an integral part of the *hyangch'al* (10th century) and *kugyōl* (14th century) texts that we have.

Apart from this evidence of one marked technical advance, we can

reconstruct very little of the history of these early systems. We do not know whether they were well-regarded or ill-regarded by their users, and we can make few judgements about the social significance of their usage, except that they were always quite subordinate to the Chinese written language. The disappearance of *hyangch'al* by the 15th century is a puzzling phenomenon, perhaps best related to changes in the Korean cultural and literary environment than to any technical defects, but *idu* and *kugyŏl* continued to play useful roles well after the invention of the *hunmin chŏngŭm*.

Another profound change in the means by which the Korean language was transcribed was wrought by King Sejong with the invention of the *hunmin chŏngŭm*. Sejong's activities did not take place in a vacuum, however, and a good part of his motivation was to improve the existing systems of transcription. Starting from fresh premises, he accomplished a major technical improvement by splitting the syllable into its component phonemes, thereby enabling simpler, more accurate transcription.

Sejong's achievement was basically technical, however. There is little evidence to suggest that he sought a role for Korean language transcription that was substantially different from that hitherto filled by *idu/hyangch'al/kugyŏl*. Thus it was that Classical Chinese remained the primary written language in traditional Korea, while Korean language transcription continued to play the minor role it had taken from its inception, a role that changed only when the traditional political order and its education system collapsed at the end of the nineteenth century.

NOTES

1. For a text of the Kwanggaet'o stela see *Yuktang Ch'oe Nam-sŏn chŏn-jip* 8 (Seoul, Hyonam-sa, 1973), pp. 138-40. A succinct summary of the earliest references to literacy in Korea may be found in Shim Jae-gi, *Kugyŏl ūi saengsŏng mit pyŏnch'ŏn e tae hayŏ* (The Rise and Transition of Kugyŏl), Hanguk Hakpo 1, 1975.

2. In a detailed consideration of the accuracy of Ancient Chinese and its application to the Japanese script *manyōgana* Lange (*Phonology of Eighth Century Japanese* Tokyo: Sophia University 1973) states: "I... feel that ancient Chinese is fully valid as the standard literary system of pronunciation upon which the Japanese were most likely to base the value of *ongana* (phonetic readings) when writing Japanese." (p. 75) Manyogana, as we shall see, is based on similar principles to *hyangch'al*.

3. The term "idu" first appears as "isō" (吏書—officials' writing) in the *Chewang ungi* (late 13th century). It appears as "idu" in the *Taemyōng yuljikhae*, but the use of various characters for "du" subsequently fixes it as a phonetic reading with a meaning approximating "manner, style" (cf. modern Korean /malt'o/ - "manner of speech"). For the texts of early references to isō/idu, see Kim Kūn-su, *Idu yōn'gu* (A Study of Idu), Asea Yōn'gu (Koryō University) Vol. 4, No. 1, 1961.

4. For a list of early references to *kugyōl*, see Shim, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

5. The Preface to the *Taemyōng yuljikhae* sets out the reason for its compilation as follows: "In the Samhan Period they called the vernacular letters invented by Sōl Ch'ong *Idu*. They are established as a custom, known and practiced. We cannot suddenly change them." The text of the work, however, is Chinese in vocabulary, linked by *idu* particles. (The above passage is carried in Hwang Pae-gang, *Silla hyangga yōn'gu* (A Study of Silla *hyangga*) in *Silla kayo yōn'gu*, Seoul: Chongūm-sa, 1979, p. 37).

6. Choe says: "Although the *idu* of Sōl Ch'ong of Silla is regarded as base, it used Chinese characters that the Chinese use and employed grammatical particles with them so it has not departed from their use. Thus, although clerks and others may want to use it, they must first read many books, know their characters and then use *idu*. Users of *idu* must rely on characters and master them. Thus people who know how to write because of *idu* are many, and indeed it is a help to learning." (Passage in Hwang, *op. cit.*, p. 42.)

7. See Nam P'ung-hyōn, *Hanja ch'ayong p'yogibōp ūi paltal* (The Development of Korean Writing Systems), in *Kungmun hangnon-jip* 7-8 (Dankook University, 1975, p. 17).

8. They include the *Imshin sōgi sōngmyōng*, a stone on which two Hwarang have evidently carved an oath of loyalty; the *Musu ojak pi'myōng*, which records details of some dike repair work carried out near modern-day Taegu; *Namsan shinsōng pi'myōng*, recording fortress repairwork carried out on Namsan at Kyōngju and the *Tanyang Silla Chōksōngbi* which records details of fortress repair work near modern-day Tanyang. From former Koguryō territory comes the *Sōngbyōk sōgangmyōng* which records the visit of a government inspection party. See Nam, *op. cit.*, for an analysis of these inscriptions. For the *Tanyaŋ Silla Chōksōngbi* see Nam P'ung-hyōn, *Tanyang Silla Chōksōngbi ūi ōhakchōgin koch'al* ("A study of the language of the Tanyang Silla Chōksōngbi") Nonmunjip 13 (Dankook University, 1979, pp. 9-23).

9. The *Imshin sōgi sōngmyōng* contains several passages of clearly Korean context and only one single possible *idu* particle. This Korean syntax and lack of additional grammatical particles has led some to label it as a separate system, *sōgich'e* ("oath writing") connoting a rather inchoate form of *idu*. This inscription is the only example of *sōgich'e* and in appearance it seems rather makeshift, all of which tends to diminish the importance of this term. For its text, a Modern Korean translation and commentary see Yi Ki-mun, *Kugōsa kaesōl kaejōngp'an* (An Outline History of the Korean Language, Revised Edition) Seoul: T'ap ch'ulp'ansa, 1972, p. 48.

10. See Nam, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

11. for a translation of the *idu* afterword to one scroll of the sutra see *Korea Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 9 (Sept 1980), pp. 55-6.

12. There is the use of the character 石 (Sino-Korean pron. /chin/, "precious stone, jewel") as something approximating /tol/, the native Korean word for stone. This has been taken as a sign that transcription was no longer limited to the restricted application of Chinese syllables to the Korean sound system, an important step forward on the path to full phonetic transcription.

13. A fourth reference occurs in the *Chewang ungi* (late 13th century) but does not add anything to the other three: "Söl made Official Writing (*iso*) and thereby our native language interpreted all manner of Chinese writing." See Footnote 16) for reference.

14. *Kyunyō-jōn*, Chapter 8.

15. See following footnote.

16. These three quotes are extremely important for an understanding of Söl's activities. For ease of reference the original Chinese is reproduced below. All these quotes with translations into modern Korean and comments may be found in Hwang Pae-kang, *op cit.*, pp. 37-43.

a) *Kyunyō-jōn*:

薛翰林強變 斯文 煩成 尾之所致者歟

b) *Samguk sagi*:

聰生明銳...以方言讀九經 訓導後世 至今學者宗之

c) *Samguk-yusa*:

聰生而 敏 博通經史...以方音通會華夷方俗物名 訓解六經文學 至今海東業明經者 博受不絕

17. For details of these earliest references see Hwang Pae-gang, *op cit.*, p. 48.

18. This and other examples of *kugyōl* technique appear in Nam P'ung-hyōn and Shim Jae-ki, *Kuyak Inwang-gyōng ui kugyōl yōn'gu* (On the *kugyōl* in the Annotated *Inwang-gyong*), Tongyanghak No. 6, 1976, p. 41. A reproduction of the entire document is carried in *Misul charyō* (National Museum of Korea) No. 18 between pp. 22-23.

19. For a full analysis of the document see Shim Jae-gi, *Inwang-gyōng kugyōl e tae hayō* in *Misul Charyo* No. 18, pp. 19-35. Also see Nam and Shim, *op cit.*

20. It is worth noting that the observation on *ūmga ch'ayong* and *hun'ga ch'ayong* preceded the appearance of the *idu* Afterword of the *Hwa-yen Sutra*, whose text was then found to be consonant with the observation. It had initially relied on a short *idu* inscription, the *Kalhang-sa sōkt'apmyōng*. See Nam, *Hanja ch'ayong p'yogibōp ūi paltal*, p. 18.

21. In addition to the *Hwa-yen Sutra* Afterword, material from the Unified Silla Period is limited to three bell inscriptions the *Kalhang-sa* pagoda inscription, four pages from a Silla village tax register and one other short official document which apparently owes its survival to the fact that it was used to wrap a ceremonial gift and then sent to Japan.

22. For details of Koryo *idu* materials and analysis of one of these, the 1281 Songgwang-sa Slave Document, see Nam P'ung-hyōn, *13 segi nobi munsō ūi idu e tae hayō* (On the *idu* in a 13th century slave document), *Nonmunjip* No. 8, (Dankook University 1974, pp. 9-28).

23. *Sejong Sillok* Vol. 103; 21a. *Sejong* responds to Ch'ong Man-ri's defense of *idu* as follows: "Wasn't it the main purpose of *idu* to benefit the people? Isn't the idea of vernacular writing the same? Do you think that only Söl Ch'ong had the right idea?"

24. See Hwang Pae-gang, *op cit.*, p. 17, for text and commentary.

25. *Kyunyō-jōn*, Ch. 7. For a reprint of the original text see the Minjok munhwa chujinhui edition of the *Samguk yusa* (Seoul, Kyōngin munhwa-sa, 1973) where it is carried as an appendix.

26. *Kyunyō-jōn*, Ch. 8.

27. See footnote 25 for details of this text.

28. The landmark work of *hyangch'al* interpretation is Yang Chu-dong, *Koga yōn'gu* (A study of ancient songs) Seoul, Ilchi-gak, 1965 (revised edition). His interpretations have provided the basis for much of the work done since then, which is of variable quality. The above interpretations are based on Chōng Yōn-ch'an, *Hyang-ga haedok ilban*, in *Inmun*

yŏn'gu nonjip 4 (Sŏgang University), 1972. Peter H. Lee's "The Saenaenoraē—Studies in Old Korean Poetry" (Rome, 1958) appears to be based on Yang's earlier work.

29. See Hwang Pae-gang, *op cit.*, p. 30.

30. In Japan a similar process of rediscovery and analysis of early inscriptions has revealed evidence of analogous practices in name transcription, cases of Japanized syntax in what were previously thought to be pure Chinese texts and, most strikingly, the use of the staple Korean *idu* particles 之 in the Ono Yasumaro tomb inscription (723 AD) and 中 in the Inariyama Tumulus Sword Inscription (est 471 AD). For details of the latter see Murayama & Miller, *The Inariyama Tumulus Sword Inscription*, *Journal of Japanese Studies* Volume 5, Number 2, summer 1979, pp 405-438.

31. A ready illustration of this tendency in English is Kang Man-gil, "The Historical Significance of the Invention of Hangŭl," *Korea Journal* Vol. 17. No. 10 (October 1977) pp. 47-54.

32. This section is based largely on Nam P'ung-hyŏn, *Hunmin chŏngŭm kwa ch'aja p'yogibop kwa ūi kwan'gye* (The Relationship of the *Hunmin chŏngŭm* to Early Korean Writing Systems) *Kukmun hangnon-jip* No. 9 (Dankook University 1978).

Musical Aspects of the Modern Korean Art Song

by Dorothy C. Underwood

MUSICAL ASPECTS OF THE MODERN KOREAN ART SONG

In Korean, the word *kagok* (가곡) has two distinct meanings. The first is the so-called "lyric song", a highly conventional musical work performed by a singer accompanied by 8 musical instruments, the words sung being *sijo* (시조). This musical form was developed by the aristocratic classes during the Yi dynasty. There are 41 extant *kagok*, 26 for the male voice, and 15 for the female. As a genuine example of *kugak* (국악), or National Music, it is not often heard today, but some people still think of this conventional musical form when the word *kagok* is used.

The more usual meaning of *kagok* in contemporary usage is that of the Korean Art Song. An Art Song may be defined as a short composition, the setting of a poem for voice with piano accompaniment in a lyrical style. The words used for the song are important, and the way in which they are approached by the composer is equally important. Each country has its own particular form of Art Song, developed over the years according to the musical taste and background of its people. The particular poetic forms of that nation undoubtedly play a part in the development of the genre. However, for the purposes of this study, only the musical aspects of the *kagok* are dealt with.

In the sense that the *kagok* is a setting of a Korean poem by a Korean composer, for Korean people, and sung almost exclusively by Koreans, the *kagok* is a kind of national music. Nevertheless, in Korean musical thought, this *kagok* form is not considered to be *kugak*. The means of composition are Western—the musical notation is Western, key schemes, marks of expression, rhythmic notation and so forth are all Western and, although there are some notable exceptions to this, in the main the vocal forms used are also Western. For this reason, this study has been approached from the point of view of Western music, and the harmonic, melodic, rhythmic and form elements of these modern Korean art songs have been analyzed from this perspective.

To present-day Koreans, the *kagok* occupies a place of importance difficult for foreign observers to assess, either emotionally or intellectually.

This particular musical style is heard everywhere, on radio, television, in concert, and is studied by every voice student in the country. Songs are arranged for every type of chorus, and the many "Evening of Korean Art Song" programs held in the nation's concert halls continue to undiminished applause. Yet this style of music has a short history, being an offshoot of compositional endeavor in the present century.

The history of Western music in Korea is rather sketchy. Although there was an account in *hanmun*(한문) available in Korea—although how widely it was known is unsure—of the basic Western musical notation principles as early as 1830, from the viewpoint of actual effectiveness Western music was introduced by missionaries at the end of the 19th century. This was not by the introduction of symphonies, sonatas and operas, but by the infinitely simpler means of the hymnbook. Missionaries equipped to do so taught the principles of harmony as well as how to sing by the hymnbook available. Even though practical music was being taught in such schools as Ewha and Paejae, and the standard of performance gradually developed in the early years of the 20th century, new styles of composition were not attempted until later. From about 1913, some books of Korean songs were published, apparently folk songs notated in Western style.

The first Korean Art Song to be written was in 1920. The composer, Hong Nan-Pa (홍난파), was a music student in Japan at the time. The song was *Pongsunga* ("Balsam"), which became widely known by 1942, when its performance was banned by the Japanese police, once they realized its patriotic overtones and the emotional response it engendered in audiences everywhere. It is here appended as an important musical example, one which has been much emulated. It will be noted that it consists of only 12 bars, has no piano introduction, interlude or postlude, is strophic in form, with 3 verses, and has a very simple accompaniment.

There must be several hundreds, if not thousands of Korean Art Songs, many of them published. The background for this present study was provided by a two-volume publication called, in English, *200 Best Korean Lyric Songs* (Saegwang Publishing Co., 1972). The first thing to note was the particular form in which they were composed. Most short songs in any language generally fall into either of two categories, namely *Strophic Form*, where only the words change for each verse, the music of both melody and accompaniment being the same throughout, or *Through-Composed Form*, a more developed vocal form, where the music reflects the poetic changes of the text throughout, and there are no repetitions of the music by conventional signs—although it is possible,

Ex. 1 Hong Nan-Pa: "Pongsunga"

봉숭아

김형준 작사
홍난파 작곡

p

1. 울밀에 선 - 봉숭아 야 - 네모양 이 - 처량하
 2. 어연간에 - 여름가고 - 가을바람 - 솔솔불
 3. 북풍한 설 - 찬바람에 - 네형체가 - 없어져

p

mf *p*

다 - 길고 긴 날 - 여름철에 - 아름답게
 어 - 아름다운 - 꽃송이 - 모질게
 도 - 평화로 운 - 꿈을 꾸 - 는 너의 혼

mf *p*

게 - 꽃 필 적 에 - 어여쁜 신 - 아가씨
 도 - 침노하 니 - 낙화로 다 - 늙어졌
 은 - 에 있으 니 - 화창스 런 - 봄바람

ppp

들 - 너를반 겨 - 놀았도 다 -
 다 - 네모양 이 - 처량하 다 -
 에 - 환생키 를 - 바라노 라 -

ppp

naturally, for some lines or phrases in the body of the song to be repeated. (There is a third category, which, for want of a better title, is called *Mixed Form*, wherein usually two verses are so repeated as in Strophic Form, but with a distinctly different ending to the song. There are many such examples among representative song composers of the Romantic era.)

As these Korean songs have all been composed during the present century, it may have been supposed that the simpler, less-developed Strophic Form would have been employed sparingly, but the results of the study showed that, although the majority of the songs are Through-Composed, there are many which are not. (See Table 1)

Table 1: *Song Form*

<i>Form</i>	<i>No. of Songs</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Strophic	69	34.5
Through—composed	126	63.0
Mixed	5	2.5
	200	100

In most cases of songs which are in Strophic Form, the song is repeated after the final notes of the piano postlude (if there is one—otherwise the closing notes of the melody itself) right back to the first note of the piano introduction, although in some cases a sign is used in order to cut out part of the introduction. The constant repetition of all sections of the song in so many of the more popular examples can be somewhat wearisome, in the opinion of the writer.

Of the 200 songs under discussion, 43 of them reflect Korean National Music influence, 18 of them displaying Korean rhythmic characteristics, and 25 of them utilizing the five-tone (Pentatonic) scale, which is often employed in oriental music. These songs are usually sectionalized, with changes of rhythm and accent marking the sections (as, for example, in *kayagum* solos). Thus, all of these 43 songs are in the Through-Composed Form category. There are also numbers of Korean Art Songs written by contemporary composers in which modern compositional techniques are employed, but the more successful examples among these are those which have consciously tried to incorporate Korean musical idioms.

Closely related to the form of these songs is their respective length. The shortest of these 200 songs is only 12 measures, being the above-

mentioned "Pongsunga". The longest song consists of 105 measures, and is the only song amongst the 200 of more than 100 measures. Table 2 reveals that 177 out of the 200 songs are of 60 measures or less. Thus we discover that these Korean songs are, in the main, very short.

Table 2: Length of Song

Measures	No. of Songs	Percentage
Under 21	32	16.0
21-30	44	22.0
31-40	43	21.5
41-50	28	14.0
51-60	30	15.0
61-70	8	4.0
71-80	9	4.5
81-90	3	1.5
81-90	3	1.5
Over 90	200	100

In listening to a song, the most prominent aspect is the melody. As the most important part of the song to the performer, also, and that component which is nearest to the heart of the poem, it deserves special study. In teaching many songs to Korean students of voice, it becomes apparent that the opening phrases of some of the better-known ones are somewhat similar in construction. Take, for instance, the opening of such famous songs as Kim Dong-jin's "Susonwha" (수선화 — "Daffodils"), Nah Un-yong's "Tal pahm" (달밤 — "Moonlit Night") and Kim Sun-Ae's "Keudae isseume" (그대 있음에 "In your presence"), and it will be seen that the pattern of the first three notes is identical. Among the 200 songs under discussion, no fewer than 31, or 15.5% of the whole, begin with this three-note phrase of Mi-Fah-Mi, or Soh-Lah-Soh, in the Tonic Sol Fa notation. Eighteen songs start with a Mi-Re-Doh progression.

Melodic analysis was undertaken in four different ways. These were as follows:- 1) Direction of melody: a) direction up, down, or static (repeated notes) and b) method, whether by leap or by step, or by repeated notes; 2) End of melodic progression, i.e. the final two notes of the melody; 3) Melodic Range, from highest note to lowest note of the song; and 4) Phrasing of the song, as to whether the phrases are regular ones, of e.g. two or four measures, or varied ones. The results of these analyses may be seen in the following tables.

It will be noted from Table 3 that there is considerable variation in the beginning of the songs, which is only to be expected. However, results show that more than twice as many songs begin with downward motion than with upward, and that a large number of the songs begin with repeated notes, varying from three to seven in number. Also, conjunct (step-wise) motion is favored slightly over a disjunct figure at the beginning of a song.

Table 3: *Direction of Melody*

a) <i>Direction</i>	<i>No. of songs</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
UP	115	57.5
DOWN	51	25.5
STATIC	34	17.0
	200	100
b) <i>Method</i>		
BY LEAP	76	38.0
BY STEP	90	45.0
STATIC	34	17.0
	200	100

A very small number of these songs begin on the Tonic note, or Doh of the scale, only 13 in number. The greatest number begin on Soh (81—40.5%) and the next greatest number on Mi (79—39.5%).

Later in this study, some emphasis will be given to harmonic progressions in Korean songs. Related to the harmonic structure is the final cadential treatment. It would probably be safe to say that in the majority of Western songs, if the melody ends on the Tonic, *Doh*, it may be approached through the Leading Tone, or *Te*. The function of the Leading Tone, as the name implies, is to progress to the Tonic, or lead to it. This would be the case if the melody was rising at the final cadence. However, in Korean songs, this is not used as often as might be expected in a musical form employing Western compositional techniques. Table 4 gives the final melodic cadence of two notes, where it may be seen that some 26 songs out of the 200 under review do, in fact, end with "Te-Doh", but here five of the twenty-six songs do not use the sharpened 7th tone, i.e. with a semi-tone interval between the final two notes, which is the usual Western progression, but rather with a full tone between the Leading Tone and the Tonic. This is one of many ways employed by Korean composers to avoid the Te-Doh progression, giving these cadential progressions a flavor which is perceived as modal or 'Slavic' in relation to

the Occidental major-minor scales of the 18th and 19th centuries. Some of these special techniques may be seen in some of the musical examples included following Table 4:-

Table 4: Melody's Final Cadence

Progression	No. of Songs	Percentage
7th degree to Tonic (Te-Doh)	26	13
2nd degree to Tonic (Re-Doh)	62	31
5th degree to Tonic (Soh-Doh)	20	10
3rd degree to Tonic (Mi-Doh)	18	9
Others	74	37
	200	100

Saying that Korean composers avoid the progression of Leading Tone to Tonic in the melodies of these songs is not to suggest that *Te*, the Leading Tone, is never used. It is in fact used freely in downward scales. (See Musical Example 2)

Ex. 2 Cho Du-nam "Ddo han songi naeu moran"

The musical score for Ex. 2 consists of a vocal line and a piano accompaniment. The vocal line is written in a single staff with a treble clef and a key signature of two flats (Bb major). It begins with a forte (*f*) dynamic and ends with a piano (*p*) dynamic. The lyrics are: 또 한송이의 또 한송이의 나 - 의 - 모 - 란. The piano accompaniment is written in two staves (treble and bass clefs) and also begins with a forte (*f*) dynamic and ends with a piano (*p*) dynamic. The melody in the piano accompaniment follows the vocal line, providing harmonic support.

In the above musical example, it will be seen that in the second measure the melody descends from *Doh*, the Eb, down to *Mi*, the G which is the first note of the third measure, utilizing each note in between, including the 7th, or *Te*. In the following musical example (Ex. 3), it will be noted that the melody drops (in the 2nd measure of the example) to D, the Leading Tone in the key of Eb major, but instead of rising a semi-tone, the Tonic, or Eb, is found in the bass line of the accompaniment, the first note of the 3rd measure, the melody of the song at the same time drops to the Bb, or *Soh*.

Ex. 3 Im Won-sik "Ahmudoh moreurago"

샘 물 이 길 래 아 무 도 모 르 라 고

Table 4 revealed that more songs ended with a downward step movement from *Re* to *Doh* than any other single progression. Another popular variation is *Re-Soh-Doh*, and such a leaping progression at the end of a melody may be seen as a characteristic of these songs. Another favorite form is to leap from *Te* down to *Soh* and then up to *Doh*, as can be seen in the final two measures of Musical Example 4.

Ex. 4: Lee Ho-Sop "Kidarim"

피 는 꽃 이여 행 여 나 오 - 날 은 뱀 어 지 러 나
여 는 창 이여 행 여 나 오 - 날 은 뱀 러 지 러 나

In order for a song to be singable, the range of its notes, from highest to lowest, must lie within a compass of two octaves or less, and in fact, in any song, the range is considerably less than this. The results of the analysis of the range of the 200 Korean songs may be found in Table 5. We see here that the range varies from 6 full tones to 16 full tones (or two octaves) but that there is only one representative song in each of these two categories. 80.5% of the songs lie between 9 and 12 tones, and the average is 11 tones.

Table 5: Melodic Range of Songs

Tones	No. of Songs	Percent
6	1	0.5
6½	0	0
7	0	0
7½	0	0
8	6	3.0
8½	2	1.0
9	16	8.0
9½	20	10.0
10	18	9.0
10½	6	3.0
11	57	28.5
11½	7	3.5
12	37	18.5
12½	10	5.0
13	13	6.5
13½	1	0.5
14	0	0
14½	0	0
15	3	1.5
15½	1	0.5
16	1	0.5
	100	100.0

The phrasing of the melody of Korean Art Songs is also a noticeable characteristic. Rather than following the flow of the poetic line, the melody is divided most often into completely regular phrases, even rigid at times, of either two or four measures each. Although it is not the intention of this study to deal with the poetry and its musical setting, it does seem as if the poem is manipulated to fit a pre-determined rhythmic pattern, rather than the music following the rhythmic sense of the poem which forms its basis. Two musical examples may suffice to show the characteristic phrasing of most of these songs. (See Ex. 5, Ex. 6) It is true that, even within such a rigid framework, one or two phrases may branch out into something a little different, but the overall effect is of rhythmic impulses held in check by tight phrasing.

Ex. 5: Lee Su-In "Keurium"

구름가네구름가 - 네 강을건너구름가 - 네
그리움에날개펴 - 고 산넘어로구름가네

The musical score for Ex. 5 consists of two systems. Each system includes a vocal line in treble clef with lyrics in Korean, and a piano accompaniment in grand staff (treble and bass clefs). The key signature has two flats (B-flat and E-flat), and the time signature is 4/4. The first system covers the first two lines of lyrics, and the second system covers the next two lines. The piano accompaniment features a steady eighth-note pattern in the right hand and a more active bass line in the left hand.

Ex. 6: Cho Du-Nam "Ddo han songi naeu moran"

mf
모란꽃피는 유월이오면
mf
또한송이의꽃 나의모란

The musical score for Ex. 6 consists of two systems. Each system includes a vocal line in treble clef with lyrics in Korean, and a piano accompaniment in grand staff (treble and bass clefs). The key signature has two flats (B-flat and E-flat), and the time signature is 4/4. The first system covers the first two lines of lyrics, and the second system covers the next two lines. The piano accompaniment features a steady eighth-note pattern in the right hand and a more active bass line in the left hand. The dynamic marking *mf* (mezzo-forte) is indicated at the beginning of each system.

The above score gives us an example of 2-measure phrases, each one ending with one note longer than any of the notes which precede it.

The above is also an example of regular phrasing, this song being in the main even more rigid, in that one measure of melodic notes which move are followed by a second measure of only one note, in each case a dotted half-note followed by a quarter-note rest.

While considering the melodic-rhythmic relationship in phrasing it is interesting to note that numbers of these Art Songs are built up, not on the repetitious two- or four-measure phrase system, but utilizing a slightly more developed, yet still somewhat rigid scheme, that of a two-measure plus a two-measure phrase, four measures all told, this structure then being repeated.

The Tonality of these songs was the next consideration. As can be seen by Table 6, Korean composers prefer major tonality to minor tonality. Of the 200 songs, fifteen were too difficult to analyze, as the key signature does not necessarily relate to the actual key scheme of the song. This is especially so in the case of those songs which are more Korean in nature; that is, reflecting Korean national musical idioms. This would indicate that the key signature is merely a convenience, in order to have the song sung at that pitch, while not following conventional musical patterns as to scale, tonality, and chord progression. The fact that the songs were difficult, or, as in the case of three of them, impossible to analyze regarding key does not mean that they are atonal, or polytonal, in character, or follow any other contemporary Western musical concept. The matter of analyzing tonality was further complicated by the fact that some composers use the natural minor scale, which does not give the same feeling for tonality as either the harmonic or melodic minor scales do, and also by the fact that 34 of the songs, or 17%, do not begin with the Tonic tone in the melody, or the accompaniment. A further consideration is that contemporary Korean composers of Art Songs consistently employ chords containing notes which are foreign to them, added tones which are not related to the scale represented by the key of the composition.

Table 6: Tonality

	<i>No. of Songs</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Major tonality	129	64.5
Minor tonality	68	34.0
Insecure	3	1.5
	200	100

The most popular keys used for the songs are all major ones, 25 of them being in the key of G major, 24 of them in F major, and 23 of them in E flat major, making 36% of the total number of songs.

The tempo of these Art Songs is another interesting matter. In Western songs we are used to a great variety of tempi, and the songs of any one composer can be seen to vary in this one area alone. Taken individually, the same can be said of Korean songs. Some of them use the traditional Italian tempo indications, some of them are written in the Korean language, some are a mixture of the two languages, and yet others use a quarter-note or eighth-note sign and a number indicating the metronome speed. Some 10 songs have no tempo indication, but were apparently written to be performed at a moderate speed. As there are so many different tempo indications, they were divided into four different groups, as follows:-

Group 1: Adagio, Larghetto, Largo, Lento, Molto lento,
Poco adagio

Group 2: Adagietto, Andante, Andante con moto, Andantino,
Elegante, Espressivo

Group 3: Allegretto, Grazioso, Moderato, Poco allegretto

Group 4: Allegro, Allegro ma non troppo, Presto, Vivace

As can be seen from the above, not all these indications are strictly related to tempo. Some suggest style of rendition. When there was no other indication, these terms were taken as indicative only of tempo. The results of the study on indicated tempo for performance are found in Table 7. It will be seen that 60% of the songs are intended to be sung at a slow or fairly slow tempo, and only twelve of them are intended to be sung at a rapid tempo. In most cases, the tempo of the song remains constant from beginning to end, only seventeen songs indicating any tempo change at all, although some of these 17 songs have several tempo changes.

Table 7: *Tempo*

<i>General Tempo</i>	<i>No. of Songs</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Group I (Slow)	18	9
Group II (Fairly Slow)	102	51
Group III (Moderate)	68	34
Group IV (Fairly Fast/Fast)	12	6
	200	100

Rhythm is another important consideration in any song. In these 200 songs, Duple Time (two principal beats per measure) is preferred over

Triple Time, and Simple Time (rhythm indicated in whole beats, whether they are half-notes, quarter-notes or eighth-notes) preferred to Compound Time (subdivided or dotted-note rhythm). Only one song is in 5/4 time, and one varies between Simple and Compound Duple Time. The time signature of 56 of the songs changes several times, or constantly, throughout the piece. Fifty songs begin with an anacrusis, from the final weak beat of a preceding measure.

Whether Duple or Triple time is used, the rhythmic pattern employed at the beginning of a song is often used many times throughout its length. The opening rhythm of 34 of these songs which are under review is repeated after the initial four measures or so. The repetition of a rhythmic pattern in this case infers more than a simple reference to an initial rhythmic figure. The feeling engendered in the listener at times is that of being submitted, willy-nilly, to mechanicalism. This is particularly so in the case of a longer song with oft-repeated rhythmic figuration, or when the accompaniment merely follows the melody of the song. The following musical example, while not unpleasing, is a case in point. Following a two-measure introduction, the song consists of 12 measures, comprising six two-measure phrases. While the second verse requires an adaptation in two of the measures of a half-note to two quarter-notes, the rhythm is of one half-note followed by two quarter-notes in the first of the two measures, and four eighth-notes followed by a half-note in the second. There is only one exception. In the penultimate measure the rhythm is changed to a dotted quarter-note followed by an eighth-note, and then the two quarter-notes. Only the first eight measures are reproduced here, but these are sufficient to show the reiterated rhythmic pattern. In addition, it will be noted that the accompanying figure is an unyielding one of quarter-note chords played by the left hand, the pattern being borrowed from the short introduction. This does not cease until the final half-note chord of the 3rd and 4th beats of the last measure. There is no independent closing phrase or phrases for the piano accompaniment.

The piano introduction of the Korean Art Songs is, more often than not, closely related to the opening notes to be sung by the singer. The two most often employed concepts of what an introduction should be are firstly, the playing of the opening phrase, usually four measures, of the song, and secondly, the playing of the first two measures or so of the melody, followed by the closing phrase, or part thereof. In the first of these two categories are 45 songs, and in the second, 53 songs, a total of 98, or just under 50%, an astonishingly high proportion. Thirteen of these 200 songs have no introduction, and the remainder introduce the

Ex. 7: Hong Nan-Pa "Keumgang eh salorirahtda"

금강에 살이 리랏다
이몸이 스러진뒤에

금강에 살어 리랏다
혼이 정녕 있-을진대

운무더리-고
혼이 나마 길이 길-이

song in some other way. This kind of introduction to the song in the piano accompaniment helps to reinforce the essential simplicity of the form to the ear of the listener.

The piano accompaniment of any Art Song must be seen as being an important part of the genre. However, comparatively speaking, Korean Art Songs are not noted for the independence of the writing for the piano. A high proportion of the songs under review show little or no writing for the piano part independent of the vocal melody. Only 31 of these songs, or 15.5%, have completely independent accompaniments. 68 of them (34%) merely have the melody played in either the right or left hand part or the piano, perhaps an octave higher if played by the right hand, or perhaps doubled at the octave. The remaining 101 songs (50.5%) are a mixture, in most cases doubling the vocal melody at least 50% of the time. In short, the accompaniment of the Korean Art Song is not musically interesting. Apart from this consideration of independence of the accompaniment, an important aspect of the accompaniment in this genre is that of the accompanying figures employed. In analyzing the

piano accompaniments of these songs, it was discovered that no fewer than 115 of them, or 57.5%, fell into one of seven categories employing very simple techniques. (These seven different accompanying methods are not employed for the songs which can be seen as products of National Music style). So prevalent are these types of accompaniment that they seem to have become fixed in the musical vocabulary of the genre. They are as follows:-

- 1) For want of a better term, the "oom-pah-pah" or basic chording style, used for 20 songs;
- 2) The melody of the song is played by the left hand, with simple chords in the right hand (6 songs);
- 3) The left hand plays bare octaves, with some simple figure, such as a triplet figure, in the right hand (18 songs);
- 4) The right hand plays the melody of the song, with the singer, and the left hand a simple bass line (13 songs);
- 5) The right hand plays chords which include the melody of the song, while the left hand plays some simple figure, such as triplets (46 songs);
- 6) The left hand plays the melody of the song, while the right hand plays some kind of harmonic accompaniment (5 songs);
- 7) The right hand plays some kind of simple melody to harmonize with the vocal line (contrapuntal technique), while the left hand plays some other simple figure (7 songs).

Thus we can see that a very small number of these Art Songs show an adventurous approach to the composition of the piano accompaniment.

There are certain devices utilized in the piano part much loved by Korean composers. These include isolated trills, with no apparent connection to the poem, or to either musical or extramusical stimuli; tremulants, particularly used in widely-spaced chords, often appearing unheralded; triplet passages, especially in chordal form; rolled chords; and fermate, or holding notes. These seem to be a special musical language employed by the composers of these Korean songs. Not all of them are employed in each song, but one or other of these musical devices may be expected to appear in each song. When this is not so, it is an exception.

The above example may also serve as an example of the accompanying style, number 4, as outlined above. It appears more complicated than

Ex. 8: Lee Su-In "Ihm ae malssum"

는 가 면 서 함 께 가 자 하 던 말 - 씬 은 살 아
은 당 신 을 아 주 잊 던 말 씬 이 - 지 만 죽 어

서 도 살 을 맞 는 표 적 - 이 의 다
못 - 잊 을 말 씬 - 이 의 다

it is. The right hand merely plays the melody which is sung by the singer, while the left hand plays octave chords, filled in by triplet figures, which, after the first measure in this example, progress to reiterated triplet chords. The writer sees the use of triplets as the predominating figure used in these Art Song accompaniments.

The study of this representative body of Korean Art Songs, two hundred of the best known and best loved of them, reveals some interesting points, chief among which is the essential simplicity, even artlessness, of the genre. In the main they are unsophisticated and, from the perspective of pure music, not highly developed as yet. Whether the form can develop is for the future to decide. There are indications that it has become an in-grown form, in that the very characteristics which were introduced by Hong Nan-Pa 60 years ago are still being utilized today, with little modification or development.

Nevertheless, the Korean Art Song is an important part of contemporary Korean life. It speaks to the hearts of the people, and therefore must be treated seriously. In listening to the manner of performance by Korean singers, one realizes that the most important aspect of performance is the sentiment which is expressed. Presumably the emotion is engendered by the poem as it is set to music by the composer. Thus, it would seem that some future study of the relationship of poetry to music in these Art Songs would be an important contribution to the understanding of this particular musical form.

APPENDIX

Songs and composers contained in *200 Best Korean Lyric Songs* (Saegwang Publishing Co., 1972) alphabetically by composer (in Hangul)

구두희 (Koo Doo-Hwe)	Saraengi wah Sseumpagwhi (사랑이와 썸바귀) Saoowol (사우월)
금수현 (Keum Su-Hyon)	Kogoong Choosaek (소궁추색) Kooreum (구름) Keuneh (그네) Wanwhasam (완화삼) Pahrangsae (파랑새)
김규환 (Kim Kyu-Whan)	Keum chandi (금잔디) Nimi oshineunji (님이 오시는지) San wiyea (산위에) Yehtgeum (옛꿈)
김달성 (Kim Dal-Song)	Tongbaekggoh (동백꽃) Phyonphyonwashim (편편화심)
김대현 (Kim Dae-Hyon)	Teul kookwha (들국화) Chajangga (자장가)
김동진 (Kim Dong-Jin)	Kagohpha (가고파) Nae maeum (내마음) Pohmi ohmyon (봄이오면) Som saekshi (섬색시) Soosonwha (수선화) Cho kooreum heullokaneungoh (저구름 흘러가는곳) Jindahlaeggoh (진달래꽃) Thangeumdae (탄금대)
김로현 (Kim Ro-Hyon)	Kohdae (그대) Keudae Changpakkae (그대 창밖에) Sanwiae ohlla (산위에 올라)

- Obuae nohrae (어부의 노래)
Phul ddahgi (풀따기)
- 김봉천 (Kim Pong-Chon) Ggoht parahm (꽃바람)
Aena (애나)
- 김성태 (Kim Song-Tae) Kashi tombool (가시덤불)
Ggoom (꿈)
Tohngshimchoh (동심초)
Sachin (사친)
Sanyoowha (산유화)
Yibyolae nohrae (이별의 노래)
Han sohngi hin paekhapwha (한송이 흰 백합화)
- 김세형 (Kim Seh-Hyong) Mool kitneun chonyo (물기는 처녀)
Pahm (밤)
Ohkjo (옥저)
- 김순애 (Kim Soon-Ae) Keudae isseumeh (그대 있음에)
Nehip clover (네잎클로버)
Moolleh (물레)
- 김순애 (Kim Soon-Ae) Sawolae nohrae (사월의 노래)
Sohngpyol (송별)
Jindahllae (진달래)
- 김연준 (Kim Yon-Joon) Moogohk (무곡)
Pigah (비가)
Ihm tooshigoh kaneun kileh (임두시고 가는길에)
- 김용호 (Kim Yong-Ho) Kohsa (고사)
Nagyop (낙엽)
San pideulgi (산비둘기)
- 김원호 (Kim Won-Ho) Moolbahnga (물방아)
Ondokehso (언덕에서)
Phul ddahgi (풀따기)
- 김중석 (Kim Choong-Sok) Kidoh (기도)
- 김진균 (Kim Jin-Kyoon) Keurioom (그리움)
Keum chandi (금잔디)
Ddoh han songiae na ae mohran
(또 한송이의 나의 모란)
Mohtphineun ggohcheun (못피는 꽃은)
Myohjisohng (묘지송)
Soshi (서시)
Heullogan kyejol (흘러간 계절)
- 김형주 (Kim Hyong-Ju) Koh hyang (고향)
Mahm Khyongghineun nahl (맘 경기는날)
Paennorae (뱃노래)
Sarang (사랑)
Yehjonehn micho mohlassoyoh

- (예전엔 미쳐 몰랐어요)
Chotchima (첫 치마)
- 나운영 (Na Oon-Yong) Karyona (가려나)
Tahlbahlm (달밤)
Tahngnagwi (당나귀)
Pyolgwa saeehgeh (별과 새에게)
Ah! kaeulinga (아! 가을인가)
- 나인용 (Na In-Yohng) Keudae nae maeumae changgaeh sosso
(그대 내마음의 창가에 서서)
- 박찬석 (Pahk Chan-Sok) Nagyop (낙엽)
Namchohn (남촌)
Paetnohrae (뱃노래)
Wiryongga (위령가)
Hoonpoong (훈풍)
- 박중후 (Pahk Choong-Hoo) Ihmehgeh (임에게)
- 박태준 (Pahk Tae-Joon) Keu yi saenggahk (그이생각)
Tohngmoo saenggahk (동무생각)
Pohm param (봄바람)
Sahn kil (산길)
Jip saenggahk (집생각)
Chahmdae paht (참대밭)
- 박태현 (Pahk Tae-Hyon) Pukhaengkil ohbaekni (북행길 오백리)
Choongjolga (충절가)
- 박관길 (Pahk Phan-Kil) Toraji ggoht (도라지꽃)
San noheul (산노을)
- 백병동 (Paik Pyong-Dong) Kanggangsullae (강강술래)
Nameuro Changeul naegehssso (남으로 창을 내겠소)
- 송재철 (Song Jae-Chol) Teullyok (들녁)
Chongmilpaht (청밀밭)
- 신기복 (Shin Kwi-Pok) Olgool (얼굴)
오동일 (Oh Dong-II) Kangi pullimyon (강이 풀리면)
Keudaereul pohnaemyo (그대를 보내며)
Nae maum chokshiri (내마음 적시리)
Mushimchon (무심천)
Sanae ondokae (산에 언덕에)
Ohlpohmdo yeago pohmyon) (올봄도 예이고보면)
- 유신 (Yoo Shin) Maewha (매화)
Mohrani phiggajineun (모란이 피기까지는)
Pahdah (바다)
Sarangeun (사랑은)
- 윤양석 (Yoon Yang-Sok) Ondogae nuwo (언덕에 누워)
Yon (연)
Yong (영)

- 윤용하 (Yoon Yong-Ha) Kohdohk (고독)
Naneunya warohwo (나는야 외로워)
Torajiggoht (도라지꽃)
Pohri paht (포리팔)
Hangahwitdahl (한가위달)
- 윤이상 (Yoon Yi-Sang) Kohpoong euisahng (고풍의상)
Tahl moori (달무리)
- 이상근 (Lee Sang-Geun) Manileh keudae (만일에 그대)
Ondogaeso (언덕에서)
Haegohk (해곡)
- 이수인 (Lee Su-Ihn) Kohhyangae nohrae (고향의 노래)
Keureul ggoomggoon pahm (그를 꿈꾼발)
Keurioom (그리움)
Pyol (별)
Poojae (부재)
Sokkuram (석굴암)
Ihmae malsseum (임의 말씀)
- 이호섭 (Lee Ho-Sop) Kookwha yopesho (국화 옆에서)
Kidarim (기다림)
Namuiip hana (나뭇잎 하나)
Noon ohneun pameh (눈오는 밤에)
Yeanaleun kagohopsadoh (옛날은 가고 없어도)
Ooreum (울음)
Phiri (피리)
- 이흥렬 (Lee Heung-Nyol) Kohhyang keuriwo (고향그리워)
Ggohtkooreum sohgeh (꽃구름속에)
Noonnaerineun pam (눈내리는밤)
Pooggeuorum (부끄러움)
Ahga (아가)
Omoniae maum (어머니의 마음)
Ookjamwha (옥잠화)
Cosmosreul nohraeham (코스모스를 노래함)
- 임우상 (Ihm Oo-Sang) Kangmuri heulloganda (강물이 흘러간다)
Hangookae dahl (한국의 달)
- 임원식 (Ihm Won-sik) Amudoh mohreurahgoh (아무도 모르라고)
- 장일남 (Chang Il-Nam) Kidarineun maum (기다리는 마음)
Pimohk (비목)
Sorineun mareun pulipeh naerigoh
(서리는 마른 풀잎에 내리고)
- 정대범 (Chong Dae-Bom) Kaneun kil (가는길)
- 정세문 (Chong Sae-Mun) Tak sohri (닭소리)
Teul kookwha (들국화)
Pohri paht kil (보리밭길)

- Yongwonhan chuok (영원한 추억)
Yeatiyagi (옛이야기)
- 정원상 (Chong Won-Sang) Moolmangchoh (물망초)
- 정윤주 (Chong Yoon-Ju) Songnyu (석류)
- 정희갑 (Chong Hwe-Gap) Monhooil (먼 후일)
- 조 념 (Cho Nyom) Pada agineh (바다 아기네)
Pohri phiri (보리피리)
Chal kara (잘가라)
Haebyonhso pureneun pahdohae nohrae
(해변에서 부르는 파도의 노래)
- 조두남 (Cho Du-Nam) Keurioom (그리움)
Ddho han sohngiae nae mohran
(또 한송이의 나의모란)
Paennorae (벚노래)
Poonsoo (분수)
San (산)
Sanchohn (산촌)
Saetahryong (새타령)
Songooja (선구자)
- 채동선 (Chae Dong-Son) Kahlmaegi (갈매기)
Keuriwo (그리워)
Saebiyokbyoleul itgoh (새벽별을 잇고)
- 최영섭 (Choi Yong-Sop) Keurioon keumgangsang (그리운 금강산)
Maeul (마을)
Sarangae nalgae (사랑의 날개)
Chuok (추억)
- 하대응 (Ha Dae-Eung) Mohtijo (못잊어)
San (산)
- 한성석 (Han Song-Sok) Ohneul (오늘)
Haedangwha (해당화)
- 한태근 (Han Tae-Geun) Keum chandi (금잔디)
Yibyol (이별)
- 허방자 (Ho Pang-Ja) Loreul wihayo (너를 위하여)
- 현제명 (Hyon Jae-Myong) Keu Jip ap (그집앞)
Namool khaeneun chonyo (나물캐는 처녀)
Nina (니나)
Sandeul parahm (산들바람)
Ora (오라)
Chonyok pyol (저녁별)
Himangae nararo (희망의 나라로)
- 홍난파 (Hong Nan-Pa) Keurioom (그리움)
Keumgangeh sarorirahta (금강에 살으리랏다)

- Pohm chonyo (봄처녀)
 Pongsoonga (봉숭아)
 Sagohngae nara (사공의 노래)
 Sarang (사랑)
 Songbulsae pahm (성불사의 밤)
 Yeatongsaneh ohlla (옛동산에 올라)
 Jangansa (장안사)
 황철익 (Hwang Chol Ik) Sarangeun yongwoniora (사랑은 영원이어라)
 Hermonae isuri naerim katara
 (헬몬의 이슬이 내림 같아라)

Early American Contacts with Korea

by Harold F. Cook

Substantial American contact with Korea began in the autumn of 1945 in the wake of Japan's surrender. The Korean War added a tremendous new dimension. Misunderstanding and misinterpretation remain, but Korea today is no longer an unknown quantity to the United States and to the American people. It was not always this way, however, and the story which I would like to tell in this article is how the United States first came into contact with Korea. To me, it is a very interesting chapter of both American and Korean history, and one well worth the telling. Above all, it is a story of people. In the limited amount of space available, my presentation will be accurate, indeed apodictic, but not necessarily complete.

One very important dimension, which is totally absent from my consideration, was the domestic political situation in the United States during the time frame under review in this article. As I am sure the reader is aware, however, American people throughout the nineteenth century were normally far more interested in their own domestic affairs than in foreign affairs. There was so little concern with diplomacy that the *New York Sun* could, and did, editorialize as late as February 1889, for example: "The diplomatic service has outgrown its usefulness. It is a costly humbug and sham. It is a nurse of snobs. It spoils a few Americans every year and does no good to anybody. Instead of making diplomats, Congress should wipe out the whole service."

Viewed from another angle, the worm-eaten condition of the United States Navy reflected an almost incredible indifference to the outside world. The whole decrepit fleet in the 1870s, for example, reminded discerning, and concerned, contemporary naval observers of the dragons that the Chinese painted on their forts to frighten away the enemy. Not until 1883, and in the face of much apathy and opposition, did Congress appropriate funds for four modern steel ships, the beginning of the new navy that was to cover itself with glory in the Spanish-American War.

All of this, and much more, is tremendously germane to what I will attempt to cover in this article but, perforce, must be put aside. What follows, therefore, is but an introduction; a limited, but hopefully lucid, view of early American contacts with Korea.

Early American interest in Korea stemmed from a desire to expand American trade in the Far East. Edmund Roberts, a special representative of the United States, returned from his explorations in this area in May 1834 to report to the secretary of state that one advantage in opening trade with Japan was the possibility that it could lead to trade with Korea. Eleven years later, in February 1845, Congressman Zodoc Pratt introduced in the House of Representatives a resolution calling for a mission to both countries to open them to trade. In part, Pratt said: "(T)he American People will be able to rejoice in the knowledge that the 'star spangled banner' is recognized as ample passport and protection for all who, of our enterprising countrymen, may be engaged in extending American commerce." The resolution, however, failed to pass.

American attention again was directed toward Korea after the Civil War. In June of 1866 an American trading schooner, the "Surprise," was wrecked off the western coast of present-day north Korea. Captain McCaslin and his crew were supplied by the local authorities with necessary comforts and were transported on horseback to the northwestern frontier, where they were delivered to some Chinese officials.

In late August of the same year, another American trading schooner, the "General Sherman," entered the mouth of the Taedong river with a cargo of cloth, glass, tin plate, and other goods likely to prove saleable in Korea. Three Americans were on board, namely, Messrs. Preston, the owner; Page, the captain; and Wilson, the mate. The magistrate of the area dispatched a letter to the captain of the vessel asking why he had come. When the answer came that the vessel intended to enter into trade with the Koreans, the magistrate replied that this was impossible and asked the captain to go away.

Nevertheless, the "General Sherman" continued to proceed up the Taedong river. Heavy summer rains had raised the water level, and the vessel was able to reach a point upstream just below P'yōngyang, the capital of present-day north Korea. When the river suddenly fell, however, the ship became grounded on a sandbar. Further negotiations were unsuccessful, and the crew of the "General Sherman" began to fire at the Koreans along the shore and in small boats nearby. The Koreans, in turn, prepared rafts loaded with brushwood, set them afire, and floated them down the river toward the "General Sherman." The vessel was soon in flames, and all aboard, attempting to escape, jumped into the water. As they came ashore, they were killed to the last man.

In the other half of this now-divided peninsula, the "General Sherman" incident is cited today as the first example of both imperialist American aggression against the country as well as the genesis of the uncountable patriotic actions of the direct-line ancestors of the incumbent ruler in the north. The latter's official biography, for example, includes this entry:

His great-grandfather, Kim Ŭng-u, was an ardent patriot. When the U.S. pirate ship "General Sherman," dispatched by the U.S. aggressors, invaded Korea along the Taedong River in August 1866, burning with patriotism, he fought fearlessly in the van of the masses and led them in the task of stretching ropes across the river to block the advance of the pirate ship.

Early the following year, i.e., 1867, Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt of the United States Navy sailed along the Korean coast in the vicinity of the mouth of the Taedong river in an attempt to learn the fate of the "General Sherman." He met with no success. A second United States Navy vessel fared no better a year later. In the summer of 1868 the American secretary of state authorized his nephew, the consul general at Shanghai, to proceed to Korea to negotiate a commercial treaty. For one or more reasons, however, no action was taken.

In April of 1870, Frederick F. Low, the American minister to China, was instructed by the secretary of state to go to Korea and to negotiate a commercial treaty as well as a shipwreck convention. It was over a year later, nevertheless, in May of 1871, before Low reached the mouth of the Han river just below Kanghwa island. With him were Rear Admiral John Rodgers, a fleet of five steamships, and a complement of 1,200 men.

The Koreans refused to negotiate and, after several days, fired on a surveying party which had proceeded up the Han river. The Americans retaliated. They made short work of silencing the shore batteries and landed troops on Kanghwa who attacked the fortifications and routed the garrison. Minister Low could get the Koreans neither to negotiate nor to apologize, however, and the Americans were finally forced to withdraw. In his official report, Admiral Rodgers dramatically described certain aspects of this futile attempt at "gunboat diplomacy" in the following words:

On the 1st inst. while the Monocacy, Palos and four steam launches were engaged in surveying, they were suddenly assailed by a storm of missiles from masked batteries on the shore.

The Korean Government having failed to make any apology for this murderous attack, on the 10th inst. an expedition was dispatched to punish the enemy. The operations of the 10th and 11th insts. Which resulted in the capture of five smaller forts, culminated on the 11th in taking, by assault, the enemy's stronghold, located in a most formidable position, at a very dangerous part of the river, and desperately defended. Two hundred and forty-three of the enemy's dead were counted within and around these works, and fifty flags were taken. The works were formidable not only from the natural features of the land, from shoals and violent durrents in the river, but were rendered so by hundreds of weapons, of various kinds, placed by the enemy for their defense. The gallant band which encountered and overcame the perils of navigation, which fought its way, against vastly superior forces, through mud and marsh, over precipitous hills and across difficult ravines, and finally stormed and captured the enemy's stronghold, is worthy of all praise.

To one and all the Commander in Chief expresses his thanks, and the pride he feels in commanding such a body of officers and men.

Among the honored dead whose loss we deplore, is Lieutenant Hugh W. McKee, who, gallantly leading his men to the assault, fell mortally wounded in the center of the citadel which he was the first to scale.

In February of 1876, Japan succeeded in signing a treaty with Korea and in opening that country to trade. The tactics used by the Japanese were not unlike those employed by American Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry in opening Japan a little over two decades earlier. Japan's accomplishment in Korea stimulated the interest of the United States and other Western nations to follow suit.

In April of 1878, Senator A. A. Sargent of California introduced a joint resolution authorizing the president to appoint a commission to negotiate a treaty with Korea "with the aid of the friendly offices of Japan." The resolution, however, was never adopted.

In December of the same year, nevertheless, Commodore Shufeldt, who had first visited the west coast of Korea a decade earlier, sailed from Hampton Roads on a commercial and diplomatic mission to several countries which brought him to Far Eastern waters in the spring of 1880.

In part, Shufeldt was instructed to visit "some port of the Corea with the endeavor to reopen by peaceful measures negotiations with that government" and, in all events, to pursue "a moderate and conciliatory course." John A. Bingham, the American minister at Tokyo, was directed to solicit Japan's good offices to facilitate Shufeldt's mission.

Commodore Shufeldt arrived at Nagasaki, Japan in April. Minister Bingham, however, informed him that the Japanese government declined to commend his mission to the favorable consideration of Korea on the grounds that this "might give rise to some complications whereby the execution of our treaty with that country might be somewhat prevented." The Japanese did assist Shufeldt, however, by sending his letter to the Korean king via the Japanese minister in Seoul, Hanabusa Yoshimoto. The Koreans, on the other hand, returned the letter unopened because, among other things, it was "improperly addressed."

In the meantime, however, the Chinese consul at Nagasaki gave Shufeldt an "official invitation, but confidential" from the great Chinese statesman Li Hung-chang to come to Tientsin "to discuss matters." The two men met on August 26, 1880 and talked for three hours. Shufeldt reported:

After a prolonged discussion, in which the strategic position of the peninsula of Korea with reference to Russia, China and Japan was pointed out, His Excellency told me that I might say to my government that he would use his influence with the government of Corea to accede to the friendly request made by me in behalf of the government of the United States to open negotiations with a view to such a treaty as before mentioned.

* * * * *

If any means can now be found to get beyond the barred gates and to reach the central government, I am convinced that Corea could be made to understand not only the policy of a treaty with the United States, but its absolute necessity as a matter of protection against the aggression of surrounding powers. Corea would in fact be the battlefield of any war between China and Russia or Japan in whichever way these nations might confront each other.

How prophetic!

Shufeldt returned to the United States in the autumn of 1880 for consultations. The following summer, however, he was back in the Far

East with his daughter as his secretary and with the official title of attache to the American legation at Peking. His principal assignment, however, was to conclude a treaty with Korea.

After several months of fruitless waiting, Shufeldt finally was able to begin negotiations with Li Hung-chang in March of 1882. They exchanged treaty drafts, and Li promised that if an envoy did not come from Korea within thirty days, he would send a Chinese official to Korea with Shufeldt.

Another month dragged on, a third treaty draft emerged, and difficulties narrowed down to the form of acknowledgement of the existence of the traditional tributary relations between China and Korea. At last all was ready.

Commodore Shufeldt left Chefoo, China on the U.S. Navy corvette "Swatara" (1,900 tons; 8 guns) and anchored off Chemulp'o, Korea on May 12. He was preceded by four days by two Chinese officials and three Chinese gunboats. A Japanese man-of-war was also in port when Shufeldt arrived, Minister Hanabusa having just returned from Tokyo. Meetings of the Korean Chinese, and American officials were held on May 14 and 20, and the "Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Corea or Chosen" was signed at Chemulp'o on May 22, 1882. Commodore Shufeldt made the following memorandum:

At 9:30 a.m. Commodore Shufeldt, accompanied by Commander P.H. Cooper [and than he goes on to name the officers who accompanied him], and preceded by the marine guard of the U.S.S. Swatara....left the ship and proceeded to the place previously selected for the signing of the treaty between the United States and Corea, which was on the mainland near the town of Chemulp'o and in full view of the ship at anchor.... He proceeded at once to the tent which had been put up by the Korean authorities, finding there two commissioners on the part of Chosen.... After a little preliminary conversation, the six copies of the treaty, three in English and three in Chinese, were sealed and signed by Commodore Shufeldt on the part of the United States, and by the two commissioners already named on the part of Chosen. As soon as the signing was completed, at a signal from the shore, the Swatara fired a salute of 21 guns in honor of the King of Chosen. Commodore Shufeldt and party then returned on board the Swatara.

The treaty itself was an interesting document, containing fourteen

articles. Article I, e.g., stated:

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States and the King of Chosen and the citizens and subjects of their respective Governments. If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.

This Article I, by the way, was the rock on which Korean-American relations foundered a quarter of a century later when Japan annexed Korea. At that time, Korea chose to interpret it literally, and the United States did not. But this was after the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars. America got the Philippines; Japan got Korea.

Extraterritoriality was included in the 1882 treaty with the provision that it would be abandoned when the "statutes and judicial procedures" of Korea conformed "to the laws and course of justice in the United States." Other articles provided for the exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives, protection of navigation and United States citizens, trade, and most-favored-nation treatment.

In a separate letter from the Korean king to the American president, the former declared:

Korea is a dependency of China, but the management of her governmental affairs, home and foreign, have always been vested in the Sovereign.... In the matter of Korea being a dependency of China any questions that may arise between them in consequence of such dependency, the United States shall in no way interfere.

The United States—Korea treaty, the first such instrument which Korea signed with a Western power, was ratified at Washington in February 1883, and Lucius H. Foote was appointed the first American minister to the Korean court. Foote was born in New York state in 1826, the son of a Congregational minister. He attended Knox College and Western Reserve but graduated from neither, being of a restless temperament and unable to confine himself to the routine of school work. In 1853 he went to California where he studied law, was admitted to the bar, and served a four-year term as a municipal judge in Sacramento. His subsequent posts included that of collector of the port of Sacramento, adjutant-general of the state of California, and delegate to the 1876 Republican national convention. From 1879 to 1882, Foote served as American consul at Valparaiso, Chile. He was on the verge of assuming another diplomatic

post in Colombia when he received the nomination as first American minister to Korea.

Minister Foote, his wife, and their party left San Francisco at the end of March 1883 enroute to Korea. The secretary of state, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, instructed him as follows:

Briefly then your mission is:

1. To exchange the ratifications of the Treaty....
2. To cultivate friendly relations with the Government and people of Corea, to allay jealousy and convince them of the amicable sentiments of the United States.
3. To report fully as to the relations of Corea, China, and Japan that appropriate steps may be taken to secure for our citizens the privileges granted to the Chinese in [their] Commercial Regulations.
4. To inform this Department fully as to all matters of political importance or of interest to those engaged in commerce; and you will from time to time send here for publication any information which may promote trade between the United States and Corea.

The present being the first mission established by this Government with that of Chosen, there is, of course, no precedent to guide you concerning your diplomatic correspondence, and your own judgement and discretion must therefore be relied upon in the premises. Your former Consular experience will no doubt materially assist you in the discharge of these new and important duties. Special instructions upon important subjects between the two governments, will be sent to you, from time to time as occasion may require.

On the day on which he sailed from San Francisco, Foote replied to the secretary of state: "In the hurry of my departure I have scarcely read this letter of instructions...."

Foote spent two weeks in Japan enroute to Korea. He conferred with American Minister Bingham in Tokyo, had an audience with the Japanese emperor, and obtained such provisions as would be needed during his residence at Seoul. Upon the personal recommendation of Minister Bingham, he also engaged two interpreters, one a Japanese and the other a Korean. The former was Saitō Shūichirō, at the time private secretary to the Japanese foreign minister, Inoue Kaoru. He later earned a doctorate of law and became senior secretary in the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. The latter was the famous Yun Ch'i-ho, who needs no

introduction to anyone at all acquainted with modern Korean history. In the words of Dr. L. George Paik, in his classic *History of Protestant Missions in Korea*: "There has not yet been among the Korean people a Christian leader the equal of Yun Ch'i-ho."

The English language press in Japan, controlled by British interests and critical from the start of America's Korea policy, made these uncomplimentary remarks:

As to General Foote, from the forlorn sort of way in which he has been sent out by his Government, without interpreters, and himself without any practical knowledge of the peoples of the East, it is not to be wondered at, that by the aid of Mr. Bingham, he should have dropped into the hands of the the Japanese, who of course are only too happy in furnishing General Foote with interpreters, to have the opportunity of learning from them whatever passes between the U.S. Envoy and the Korean authorities, and to act accordingly.... Great Britain and Germany have decided to postpone the ratifications of their treaties until the end of the year. This is a wise move. America's action was precipitate and will only embarrass negotiations. The Korean Government is ignorant, greedy, and poverty stricken.... Its officials are anxious for foreign trade.... but it requires both time and argument to make them understand the best course to be taken.

Minister Foote and his party sailed from Nagasaki for Chemulp'o on May 8, 1883 on the U.S. Navy gunboat "Monocacy" (1,370 tons; 6 guns), one of the five ships which had taken part in the engagement at Kanghwa island twelve years earlier. Of Civil War vintage, the "Monocacy" was one of the navy's last side-wheeler paddle steamers. Of his overland journey from the port to Seoul, via sedan chairs, ponies, and pack animals, Foote commented:

The women fled at our approach, but the men and children remained to gaze at us, manifesting much curiosity but no animosity.... Long before we reached the gates of the city proper, we were passing through narrow, filthy streets, and after entering the city the same conditions seemed to prevail.

The ratified copies of the Korean-American treaty were exchanged at the newly-established Korean foreign office in Seoul on May 19, and Foote was received by the King in royal audience on the 20th, the first accredited:

[The King sent for us in his own carriage], the first and only one in Corea. It is a handsome coupe with a darkbrown body. The upholstery is in heavy green silk brocade, with gold braid trimmings. It was drawn upon this occasion by a span of spirited black ponies in handsome harness; the coachman and footman are Japanese, the Coreans not yet having learned the art of driving. The entire establishment came from Japan. . . . The King [himself] is a man of short stature with a pleasant face and polished manners. . . . His bearing was dignified throughout.

After returning briefly to Chemulp'o to get his baggage and his wife. Foote took up residence in Seoul and opened the American legation there in June. The legation property in Chong-dong, behind the Toksu palace, continues to this day as the site of the residence of the American ambassador. It was apparently the first property in Korea sold to a Westerner and was also one of the very few properties at that time or since which was sold to Westerners but which retained its essentially Korean character. Although the original building was demolished in the mid-1970s, its replacement was designed and constructed in Korean style. Ambassador and Mrs. Richard Sneider were its first occupants, in May 1976.

At the time it was torn down, the original building had been in the possession of the United States government for a longer period of time than any other ambassador's residence owned by the United States anywhere in the world. Minister Foote paid \$2,200 for his original residence. Its modern replacement reportedly cost \$502,000.

Minister Foote's earliest impressions of Korean affairs are contained in extracts from two reports which he wrote not long after taking up residence at Seoul. The first:

In a former dispatch I expressed the opinion that the Government of Seoul although absolute in its character, had little real strength. Since arriving here this opinion is rather confirmed than otherwise. . . . The common people barely exist by the results of their labor, and any exhibition of wealth is made an excuse for unjust exactions.

and the second:

I find myself and family in the midst of a people, whose ways and customs are totally different from our own, and to whom I am an object of curiosity. . . . Although the Government is well disposed there is a large party opposed

to what they consider foreign innovations. . . . Whether the Government is strong enough to control this element is a matter which I am not prepared to discuss. The presence of an American man-of-war would be most acceptable and would have a good moral effect upon these peculiar people.

A year later, in early June 1884, Minister Foote's legation staff was augmented by a young U.S. Navy Ensign, George C. Foulk. Foulk was a remarkable character. Born in the state of Pennsylvania in 1856, he graduated third in a class of 42 at the Naval Academy in 1876. He immediately went on the Asiatic station, where he served during two tours and where he attracted the favorable attention of his commanding officers by reason of his studious habits and his knowledge and execution of his duties. He learned the Japanese language and, if we can believe the record, at least acquainted himself with Russian, French, three dialects of Chinese, Persian, Hindustani, and Sanskrit. In the summer of 1880 he made an overland trip from Kobe to Yokohama along the Nakasendō. In the summer of 1882 he briefly visited both Pusan and Wōnsan in the course of a trip which took him from Japan across Siberia by stagecoach and river boat, through Europe by train, and back to the United States via the Atlantic ocean. He wrote detailed accounts of both his 1880 and 1882 adventures, the latter of which was published.

Foulk was in Washington, serving in the naval library, at the time that Min Yōng-ik and the first Korean embassy reached that city in September 1883. He volunteered to escort the group while it was in the United States and subsequently was ordered to return to Korea with them. In the course of his assignment, Foulk learned the Korean language, probably the first American ever to do so.

In the December 1884 incident at Seoul, the background of which I have traced in my book on Kim Ok-kyun, Foulk's house was vandalized and all his personal property stolen or destroyed. A partial listing of his loss helps to give us some better idea of the man and his character: 100 Manila cigars and 1 bronze cigar holder; 1 compass and 1 pedometer; 1 Korean wind bell and 30 Korean fans; 1 ancient Japanese tea caddy and 4 rare Japanese lacquer bowls; 1 extra large tiger skin and 2 small tiger skins; 1 specimen fossil shell; 1 inflatable rubber bath tub; and one copy each of the following books: Korean-Manchu, Japanese telephone directory, Russian dictionary, French dictionary, Aston's Japanese Grammar, Shanghai Chinese, Arabic (Persian), Sanscrit, Hindustani Phrase Book, Canton Chinese, Mandarin Chinese, Clips from a German Workshop, Origin of Nations, Dawn of History, Manual of Buddhism,

Handbook of Rome, Handbook of Westminster Abbey, Last Days of Pompeii, Nautical Almanac, Photography Textbook, Rein's Japan, Huc's China, Korea: The Hermit Nation, Cookbook, Yokohama Japanese, Japanese Etiquette, Grammarie Coreene, Korean Geographic Names, Upton's Infantry Tactics, and one complete set of charts of Korean coasts and harbors. No ordinary individual, this erstwhile farm boy from Marietta, Pennsylvania!

When Minister Foote resigned and left Korea in early January 1885, Foulk succeeded him at the American legation as *chargé d'affaires*. He continued to serve there under various titles until he left Korea in June 1887.

The first American to be offered employment as an adviser by the Korean government apparently was Gustavus Goward. Goward was born in Boston in 1845, graduated from Harvard with the class of 1869, and dropped out of Harvard Law School in 1872. This latter event didn't seem to tarnish his reputation, however, for when he began service with the Department of State in 1877 he had supporting letters of recommendation from two ex-presidents of Harvard, Thomas Hill and A. P. Peabody.

Goward exchanged treaty ratifications at Samoa, took possession of the harbor at Pago Pago for the United States, and in recognition of his service was offered, but declined, the premiership of the islands. Thereafter, he traveled extensively in Latin America on various special assignments.

By the spring of 1883, Goward was on his way to Tokyo to take up a new appointment as secretary of legation, although he advised the secretary of state: "If possible, I should much prefer to go to Persia as Consul General." With him, Goward carried the recently ratified United States treaty with Korea.

In his own words, it was not the Tokyo appointment which motivated Goward to set out from San Francisco for Yokohama on March 6, 1883:

This appointment might have taken me, as I have been led to suppose, to Corea, had I not been relieved by Minister Foote's arrival in Japan. . . . It is certainly well known in the Department [of State] that the prospect of taking the Treaty to Corea was the inducing motive which led me to Japan. . . .

Scarcely two weeks after Goward arrived in Tokyo, Minister Foote passed through on his way to Seoul and picked up the ratification copy of

the Korean treaty. There matters might have stood, as far as Goward and Korea were concerned, had it not been for Kim Ok-kyun's arrival in Tokyo a few weeks later. For Kim, one of the pioneer advocates of enlightenment and reform in late nineteenth century Korea, this was his third visit to the Japanese capital in a little over a year. The principal object of his visit was to borrow money.

Goward had wanted to go to Korea with the ratified treaty. He failed. Then Kim Ok-kyun came to Tokyo with plans for modernization and reform; plans which required a foreign loan. Goward apparently listened with great interest. He decided that here was his second chance. Only a week after Kim's arrival in Tokyo, and scarcely three months after his own assumption of duties at the American legation, Goward wrote directly to the American secretary of state requesting sixty days' leave of absence. His request was approved.

Goward started his leave on September 26, 1883 and returned to duty on December 6. In the interim he made "an extended tour of the coasts and parts of the interior" of Korea and "spent three weeks in Seoul." He was present in the Korean capital during the course of the negotiations of the second British and German treaties with Korea. In Goward's own words:

While at Seoul I was tendered unsolicited the highest position ever offered to a foreigner by the Korean government. [I declined, however,] because I considered it my duty not to entertain the proposition while holding my present employment, although strongly urged to accept. . . . Even today in Tokio, the Korean representatives are constantly coming for advice and look to America for instruction and support. My last communication from Corea reads "His Majesty has again manifested anxiety as to the American appointments and hopes to hear soon." At this time, the influence of an American, versed in politics, in that high position would be of greatest benefit to the U.S. Government.

Minister Foote, in commenting on a royal audience which took place just days before Goward's arrival in Seoul in October, wrote that the Korean king had told him:

I desire the services of an American gentleman; one who can write the Mandarin language of China; to act in an advisory capacity in my Office of Foreign Affairs. . . . I will give to him the second rank in that office.

It is quite reasonable to conclude that Foote and Goward are reporting here in an identical context. Goward, however, had no familiarity with the "Mandarin language of China." This fact alone possibly would have disqualified him. More than this, however, Goward apparently had already lost interest in Korea. After a trip to Seoul, he seems to have come to the conclusion that neither Kim Ok-kyun nor Korea was quite what he had been led to expect. In any event, Goward wrote again to the secretary of state in April 1884:

The Representative of the Corean Government here in Tokio . . . desired to take back with him my decision as to entering the Corean service. . . . Personally I am not anxious to exile myself to barren Corea and do service under a foreign flag. . . .

And so, although he ultimately chose not to serve, Goward merits the somewhat dubious distinction of heading the long parade of greats and not-so-greats who, over these many years, have offered American advice to Korea.

With the exchange of treaty ratifications and the opening of the U.S. legation in Seoul, it was but natural for American merchants to want to come to Korea in order to have a firsthand look at trading potentialities. As far as can be determined, Captain George B. Mott, originally from New York, was the first American merchant to visit Korea after the exchange of treaty ratifications. With a quantity of stores for trading purposes, Mott left Nagasaki on a small Japanese schooner sometime in June 1883. He was in Korea only a few days, however, when he suddenly took sick and died at Chemulp'o on July 10. His is the first recorded burial in the Inch'ŏn Foreigners' Cemetery.

The first American merchant to reside in Korea seems to have been Captain Charles H. Cooper, who also came originally from New York. In September 1883, American Minister Foote requested his Japanese counterpart, Takezoe Shinichirō, to permit an American merchant to reside in the Japanese settlement at Chemulp'o inasmuch as there still was no general foreign settlement at that port. The Japanese minister gave his consent and instructed his consul at Chemulp'o, Kobayashi Hataichi, to extend all necessary courtesies. At practically the same time, American Minister Bingham in Tokyo issued Cooper a new passport to facilitate his travel to Korea.

Reminiscing fifty years later, Hisamizu Saburō, one of the original group of Japanese who opened the consulate in 1883, and who subsequently became mayor of Inch'ŏn in the colonial period after 1910,

recalled Captain Cooper in these uncomplimentary terms:

One American came in December 1883. He lived in a shabby building in front of the gate of the Chinese government office. While living like a beggar, he sold canned goods and Western liquor which he obtained from Nagasaki. He was the first foreign merchant at Inch'ōn [i.e., Chemulp'o].

Cooper engaged in business at Chemulp'o as the proprietor of a general store, forwarding agent, and auctioneer for the next six years. In June 1884, Minister Foote concluded an agreement with Cooper for the construction of a house, 48 feet long by 42 feet wide, on a lot measuring 164 feet by 164 feet, reserved for the American consulate. Rent was set at \$40 per month. The intention was to hold the lot and building for future use as a consulate.

Cooper died on December 13, 1889 and, like Mott, was buried in the Inch'ōn Foreigners' Cemetery. The United States, by the way, never did open a consulate at Chemulp'o.

American Trading Company, originally founded under another name at New York in 1857 and at one time the largest general American trading house in the Orient, took an early interest in Korea. The aforementioned Kim Ok-kyun became acquainted with American Trading Company in Yokohama and personally brought its first representative to Korea in May 1884. The man was Walter D. Townsend, a young American who was born in Boston in 1856, who had arrived in Japan in late December 1878 to work for the company in Yokohama, and who had moved to Kobe in the latter half of 1880 to open its branch there.

Townsend spent the first few months in Korea getting acquainted. Doubtless he met more than once with Captain Cooper at Chemulp'o. By October, he had made a trip into the interior in order to buy a quantity of rice for resale at that port. Townsend ran into trouble with the local Korean authorities, however, with the result that Minister Foote wrote the following letter on his behalf to the Korean foreign office:

Two junk loads of rice, in which Mr. W. D. Townsend, a citizen of the United States, has one half interest, are detained at Yong Ho, by order of the Governor or Magistrate of the District. This rice was bought in the district of Kim Joi [Kimje] by Choe Han Yo [Ch'oe Han-yō] and Choe Sa Haeung [Ch'oe Sa-hyōng], the Agents of Mr. Townsend and others, and was intended for shipment to Chemulpo.

By Treaty stipulations, citizens of the United States have

the right to purchase produce in the interior of Corea, and to have it transported to the open ports, without being subject to the payment of any tax, excise or transit duty whatsoever. . . . I could therefore ask Your Excellency to direct the Governor or Magistrate by whose order these junks are being detained to release the same, that they may proceed on their way to Chemulpo.

This letter was written by Minister Foote on November 27, 1884. Before the matter could be resolved, however, the previously cited December 4th incident occurred at Seoul, and final disposition of Townsend's rice problem became lost in the pages of history.

As mentioned earlier with regard to Ensign Foulk, Townsend too was in Seoul at the time of the December 1884 incident. A Japanese employee of the newly established Korean postal service, Sugano Kōichi, wrote an eyewitness account of the incident which included the following colorful reference to Townsend:

Townsend, his Japanese wife, and child lived near the Japanese legation. Since the disturbance on the night of the 4th, they had been staying at the legation. Townsend had a long sword stuck in a sash around his waist, and he carried a rifle. He was guarding the Japanese legation with some Japanese soldiers. On the morning of December 7, he decided to go the American legation. Therefore, accompanied by a Japanese who spoke Korean well, he and his family went to the American legation.

Among the articles pillaged from Townsend's house at the time of the incident were the following. In the case of Foulk, the partial listing helped us to know more about the character of the man himself. In the case of Townsend, on the other hand, we can get some idea of the contents of the home of a Western foreigner in Seoul in this period of early contact: 2 bags of flour; 1½ bags of potatoes; 3 bags of beans; 2 bags of turnips; 24 pints of beer; 3½ bottles of brandy; 3 dozen cans of milk; 2 dozen cans of vegetables; 4 bottles of raisins; 6 tins of jam; 4 tins of butter; 6 cups and saucers; 12 dinner plates; 6 dessert plates; 6 soup bowls; 24 forks, knives, and spoons; 6 glass tumblers; 6 Sherry glasses; 6 Claret glasses; 3 pairs of window curtains; 6 bed sheets; 2 pillows; 6 pillow cases; 5 blankets; 12 towels; 1 rug; 2 umbrellas; 1 revolver; 160 cartridges; 2 lamps; 1 lot of medicine; 1 overcoat; 4 suits of clothes; 3 shirts; 2 pairs of underpants; 1 pair of boots; 12 linen handkerchiefs; 2 dozen cotton socks; 1 horse; and 1 saddle and bridle.

Concerning Townsend, U.S. Navy Ensign George C. Foulk, in his capacity as chargé d'affaires at the American legation, reported to the secretary of state in mid-1885:

Mr. W. D. Townsend, Agent for the American Trading Company of Yokohama makes frequent visits to Korea and has executed considerable commission business for the Korean government, such as importing stock animals of the several kinds from America for the Korean government farm, table-ware, furniture, etc. for the Palace, arms and ammunition etc. The business transacted by this company to date will probably foot up to \$175,000 paid up in full.

On behalf of American Trading Company, Townsend also contracted for the purchase of timber from Ullūng Island off Korea's east coast. He subsequently discovered, however, that the Koreans had sold the same rights to both Japanese and British interests. Townsend also gets credit for introducing to Korea the horse and dray, a water pumping windmill, and a mechanized rice cleaning mill.

Moving ahead just a bit, in March 1896 the American Trading Company signed an agreement with the Korean government for the right to construct the country's first railroad, the line between Chemulp'o and Seoul. Ground was broken at a point about two-thirds of a mile from the waterfront of downtown Chemulp'o on March 22, 1897 with Townsend supervising a group of "fifty picked coolies" equipped with American wheelbarrows, shovels, and pickaxes.

"Oil for the lamps of China" is an expression well-known to many, but few are those who are aware that it was Townsend, as agent for Standard Oil Company of New York and the Rochester Lamp Company, who pioneered, and profited by, the import of "oil for the lamps of Korea," marketing not only the oil but also the lamps in which to burn it.

Walter D. Townsend stayed on in Korea for thirty-four years, longer than any other of the first-generation pioneers, and died at Chemulp'o on March 10, 1918. Like Mott and Cooper before him, he too was buried in the Inch'ōn Foreigners' Cemetery.

American Trading Company Korea, Ltd., which has its offices in Seoul today is the same company which Townsend first introduced to Korea a century years ago.

The first Protestant missionary to take up residence in Korea was also an American, Dr. Horace N. Allen. Born in Ohio in 1858, Allen attended Ohio Wesleyan and earned his medical degree in 1883. He went to China in the same year as a missionary for the Presbyterian Board of

Foreign Missions. By September 1884, however, he was at Seoul, and since missionaries were not yet allowed to work openly in the country, he was passed off to the Koreans as the physician to the American legation. Minister Foote, in fact, helped Allen to secure property adjacent to the American legation grounds.

Allen's earliest impressions of Korea, as reflected in his diary and in his correspondence, were not favorable. With reference to Walter D. Townsend, for example, the man whom I introduced to you just a moment ago, Allen had this to say:

I am staying at a new Korean hotel . . . \$1.50 per day and you get nothing to eat unless you furnish it [yourself]. . . . I sleep on a board with my shoes for a pillow. . . . The nights are very cold. . . . W. D. Townsend with his Japanese mistress is also here. He represents the American Trading Co. . . . The morals of the men up here are shocking. All keep mistresses nearly.

With reference to the Koreans, Allen had this to say:

The Koreans squeeze most unmercifully, and for one who does not speak their language it is very uphill work. . . . We cannot use these people as servants yet as they are not educated. . . . [and] are so dirty, lazy and such downright thieves withall, that they can never amount to much. Please send a man out in the spring. These Koreans will carry us away if you don't. They have already stolen stones from the floors and tiles from the roofs. I tried a Korean watchman and found him a fraud. . . . [Minister] Foote showed me I could not trust them and I got a Chinaman to watch the premises at \$10.00 a month—mission expense.

In fairness to Townsend, I might add, Allen wrote in the following fashion twenty years later in 1904, when both men were still here:

He [i.e., Townsend] is a very highly respected man here and good in all things. Stands in Korean circles much as does his brother in Boston circles. . . . [His mother], (o)ld Mrs. Townsend, is the bluest of New England blood. . . . He is the most conservative man out here. . . . His business is flourishing well. . . .

In fairness, or rather unfairness, to the Koreans, I might further add, Allen never completely changed his mind. Again, writing nearly twenty years later in early 1903, and again in early 1904, he had this to say:

The Koreans do get on ones nerves horribly. I wish often

that I could get away where I would never see a Korean. . . .

It has been disgusting for a long time trying to do anything with such an excuse for a government. The people cannot govern themselves. Let Japan have Korea outright if she can get it.

And that's the way it all began: Rodgers, McKee, Shufeldt, Foote, Foulk, Mott, Cooper, Townsend, Allen . . . and many others whom space does not permit me to mention. They were the pioneers, each in his own way, and theirs are the names to which history has accorded a special place. It has been my pleasure, in this brief article, to introduce them to the reader.

But now, by way of brief epilogue. . . .

The first Western nation to come to Seoul with accredited diplomatic representation, the United States, also was the first to haul down the flag and leave, immediately after Japan forced a protectorate treaty on Korea on November 17, 1905; that is, just five years before formal annexation. The last American minister to the Yi court, Edwin V. Morgan, cabled the secretary of state ten days later:

I have informed Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs that in compliance with your instructions I have today placed the property and archives of this legation in the hands of the United States Consul General at Seoul and am about to withdraw from Korea.

Terse and lacking in emotion, is it not? But read now the poetical effusion of the "poet laureate" of the United States Marine guard, which was withdrawn from the Seoul legation at this same time. The more discerning reader will probably regard this anonymous author as a poetaster, rather than a poet laureate. But, if you are at all familiar with the history of this part of the world, it cannot fail to bring to mind all sorts of images.

Remember, if you will, the time element here is the autumn of 1905. The Spanish-American War was an affair then seven years past. The Portsmouth Conference had just brought an end to the very costly (to both sides) Russo-Japanese War. A few months earlier, President Theodore Roosevelt had instructed his secretary of war, William Howard Taft, who was enroute to the Philippines, to reach what might correctly be termed a "balance of power" understanding with Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Taro. In Tokyo, Taft informed Katsura that the United States would not interfere if Japanese troops established "suzerainty over Korea to the extent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign treaties

without the consent of Japan.” In return, he sought Katsura’s assurances that Japan “did not have any aggressive designs upon the Philippines.” These mutual assurances were incorporated into the remarkable “Agreed Memorandum” of July 29, 1905, generally referred to as the Taft-Katsura Agreement. Even the American minister in Tokyo at the time, Lloyd C. Griscom, had no knowledge of this agreement.

But, now the departing Marine’s poem:

Our ship is in the harbour, so we’d better say “goodbye.”
 To say we’re pleased to leave, would be to tell a lie.
 But now that we have got to go, we ain’t a-goin’ to cry.
 And we sail for Manila in the morning.

The “Yellow legs” are happy, to know we’re going away.
 The Koreans are at their mercy, and don’t have a say.
 They sit and dream and fan themselves, and to their Buddha
 pray.

But we’ll be on the briny in the morning.

For the Japanese damsels, I have a word to say,
 With their pin toes, and their pink cheeks,
 They’re all right in their way.

But the maidens in Manila, beat them holler any day.
 And we’re going for to meet them in the morning.

We’ve seen the whole of Seoul, and whilst seeing used some
 paint.

But you must likewise remember, a marine is not a Saint.
 But he’s always there when wanted, and never does a faint.
 And he goes upon the troopship in the morning.

This is the last farewell, this stab twixt prose and rhyme.
 I’ve been hitting up the sake, and am handicapped for time.
 The American Guard is sailing, they’ve blown in their last
 dime.

And are pulling out at high tide, in the morning.

So goodbye to the white folks, that wish for us the best.
 It matters not what others think, they can go back and rest.
 If ever you need men out here, we’ll come and stand the test.
 But we’re sailing for Manila in the morning.

Korea *did* “need men out here” again . . . and not just the American Marines, but also the Army and Navy and Air Force. They *did* come back

"and stand the test" . . . and still are here today. And, although I've never been to Manila, I had a year and a half in Yokohama behind me when I too came in those hot, hectic days of early July 1950 . . . and have had Korea on my mind and in my heart ever since.

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CONSTITUTION
OF THE
KOREA BRANCH
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

NAME AND OBJECT

- Art. I The Name of the Society shall be **THE KOREA BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY**.
- Art. II The Object of the Branch shall be to stimulate interest in, and promote study and dissemination of knowledge about, the Arts, History, Literature and Customs of Korea and the neighboring countries.

MEMBERSHIP, FEES AND DUES

- Art. III The Branch shall consist of Honorary, Life, Ordinary and Associate members.
- Art. IV **Honorary Members** shall be admitted on special grounds to be determined in each case by the Council. They shall not be resident in Korea and they shall not be required to pay either the Entrance Fee or the Annual Subscription. They shall enjoy the same privileges in regard to the distribution of the minutes of meetings, etc. as enjoyed by Life Members (See Art. VI below).
- Art. V **Honorary Council Members** may be appointed in special consideration of long and devoted service to the Branch. They shall be residents of Korea, nominated and approved by majority vote of the members present at the Branch's annual general meeting. These honorary members of the Council may participate fully in the activities of the Council, except that they shall not have the privilege of voting.
- Art. VI **Life Members**, in residence in Korea or abroad, shall enjoy the full right of participation in all activities of the Branch. They shall be entitled to free distribution of a single copy of each Transaction of the Branch published following their attaining Life membership and free distribution of the minutes of Council meetings, general meeting and/or other information such as is promulgated

to the Members of the Branch resident in Korea. The fee for Life Membership shall be determined from time to time by the Council.

Art. VII **Ordinary Members** shall, upon joining the Branch, pay an Entrance Fee and the Annual Subscription for the forthcoming year. The Annual Subscription rate both for resident and nonresident Members and the entrance fee shall be determined from time to time by the Council.

Art. VIII **Associate Membership** in the Branch shall be open to teaching members, students of Korean Universities and such other specific groups as the Council may determine, on payment of an entrance fee and annual subscription to be determined from time to time by the Council. Associate Members shall be entitled to participation in the activities of the Branch at Member rates.

Art. IX The Annual Subscription shall cover the period of one year, specific dates to be determined by the by-laws.

Art. X Applicants for membership who pay the required fees shall be entitled to join the Branch. If a Member, in the opinion of the Executive Committee, is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interests of the Branch, the Executive Committee may suspend his membership and forbid his attendance at meetings of the Branch, pending the final decision of the Council.

OFFICERS

Art. XI The Officers of the Branch shall be:

- A President
- A Vice President
- A Treasurer
- A Corresponding Secretary
- A Recording Secretary
- A Librarian

COUNCIL

Art. XII The affairs of the Branch shall be managed by a Council composed of the Officers for the current years, together with not more than 20 Ordinary Members. Honoary Council Members are not included among the 20 Ordinary Members.

- Art. XIII Council Members who, except for due cause (as determined by the Executive Committee), miss council meetings more than twice consecutively or miss five times during the year shall be dropped from membership on the Council. Council Members may resign from the Council by written notification to the President.

MEETINGS

- Art. XIV General Meetings of the Branch and Meetings of the Council shall be held as the Council shall determine and announce.
- Art. XV The Annual General Meeting shall be held around the end of the calendar year at a date and time determined by the Council. Notice of the Annual General Meeting shall be mailed to all Members not later than one month prior to the scheduled date. At this meeting the Council shall present its Annual Report, which shall include the Treasurer's Statement of Accounts. The Officers for the next year shall be nominated and elected.
- Art. XVI Twenty five members shall form a quorum at the Annual General Meeting and a simple majority of Officers and Council Members at a Council Meeting. The Chairman shall have a casting vote in the event of a tie between pro and con votes. At all Meetings of the Branch or Council, in the absence of the President and Vice-President, a Chairman shall be elected by the members present at the meeting.
- Art. XVII The General Meetings shall be open to the public, but the Annual General Meeting shall be open to Members only.

ELECTIONS

- Art. XVIII The Officers and other Members of the Council shall be elected at the Annual General Meeting and shall hold office for one year, or until their successors have been elected. Officers and Committee Chairmen shall not hold office for more than two terms.
- Art. XIX The Council shall fill vacancies of officers, Committee chairman of council members that may occur between

Annual General Meetings and may nominate temporary substitutes in the event of prolonged absence or indisposition of an Officer or Committee Chairman.

PUBLICATIONS

- Art. XX The Publications of the Branch shall consist of the Transactions and other publications as the council may decide.
- Art. XXI Authors of published books or papers may be supplied with twenty five copies gratis by the branch except as may be determined by the Council.
- Art. XXII The Council shall have power to publish, in separate form, papers or documents which it considers of sufficient interest or importance. All publications of the Branch shall be registered for U.S. interim copyright of five years' duration.
- Art. XXIII Papers accepted by the Council shall become the property of the Branch and shall not be published without the consent of the Council. However, if publication is unreasonably delayed, or if the paper is urgently required for another and unforeseen use, and is requested to be returned by the writer, the Council may release the paper at its own discretion.
- Art. XXIV The acceptance of a paper for reading at a General Meeting of the Branch does not obligate the Branch to publish it, but when the Council decides not to publish any paper accepted for reading, that paper shall be returned to the author without any restriction as to its subsequent use. A copy shall be retained in the Branch's permanent file.

MAKING OF BY-LAWS

- Art. XXV The Council shall have the power to make and amend By-Laws for its own use and the Branch's guidance, provided that these are consistent with the Constitution. Additions, deletions or amendments to the By-Laws shall be promulgated to the members of the Branch who may at the next general meeting overrule the action of the Council.

ADDITIONS, DELETIONS AND AMENDMENTS

- Art. XXVI The Constitution may be amended only at a General Meeting, a quorum present, by two thirds majority vote of the members present. Amendments to the Constitution shall be promulgated to all members at least thirty days preceding the General Meeting wherein the amendment is to be discussed and voted upon.

BY-LAWS GENERAL MEETINGS

- Art. 1 The Session of the Branch shall coincide with the Calendar Year.
- Art. 2 Ordinarily the Session of the Branch shall consist of not less than nine monthly General Meetings, of which the Annual General Meeting shall be considered one. A need for a greater or lesser number of meetings may be determined by the Council, if it is considered to be in the best interests of the Members of the Branch.
- Art. 3 The place and time of meetings shall be determined by the Council. Advance notice of meetings shall be promulgated to all Members resident in Korea, and to all Honorary and Life Members.

ORDER OF BUSINESS AT GENERAL MEETINGS

- Art. 4 The order of business of General Meetings shall be:—
- a. Communications from the Council (Reports, etc.)
 - b. Miscellaneous Business
 - c. The Reading and Discussion of Papers

ORDER OF BUSINESS AT ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

- Art. 5 The order of business at the Annual General Meeting shall be as follows:
- a. Prior to the Annual General Meeting a draft of the Council's report, including Committee reports shall be promulgated to all Honorary and Life Members and to Ordinary Members resident in Korea.
 - b. The Treasurer's Report shall be discussed.

- c. The Council's draft report shall be discussed, modified if necessary, and approved by majority vote of the Members present.
- d. The election of Officers and Councillors shall be conducted from the slate recommended by the Nominating Committee or nominations from the floor.

MEETINGS OF COUNCIL

- Art. 6 The Council at each meeting shall determine the time and place of subsequent Council Meetings.
- Art. 7 Timely notice of each Council Meeting shall be sent to every Member of the Council. With this notice shall be enclosed a draft of the minutes of the previous Council Meeting and reports of Committee Chairmen for review and subsequent discussion, modification (if required) and acceptance by the Council.

ORDER OF BUSINESS AT COUNCIL MEETINGS

- Art. 8 The order of business at Council Meetings shall be:—
- a. Action upon the Minutes of the last meeting and reports of Committee Chairmen.
 - b. Report on the proceedings of the Executive Committee.
 - c. Miscellaneous business.
 - d. Arrangement of business for the next Council Meeting.

COMMITTEES

- Art. 9
- a. There shall be the following standing Committees:
 - (1) Executive Committee
 - (2) Budget and Finance Committee
 - (3) Program Committee
 - (4) Tour Committee
 - (5) Membership Committee
 - (6) Publications Committee

In addition, such other Committees as may be deemed necessary shall be established by the Council.
 - b. All Committees shall report periodically in writing to the Council and shall act in accordance with the decision of the Council on matters concerning both policy and finance.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

- Art. 10
- a. There shall be a Standing Committee, called the Executive Committee, composed of the President and/or the Vice President, one other Officer, the Chairmen of the Committees concerned with the subjects to be discussed, and such others as the President may invite. Meetings shall be called by the President, who shall invite the persons concerned. Its duties shall be to undertake any tasks deputed to it by the President or the Council.
 - b. When matters affecting a particular Committee are discussed by the Executive Committee, the Chairman of the Committee concerned, or a representative nominated by him, shall be present at the discussion.
 - c. Unless previously authorized by the Council to take substantive decisions, the Executive Committee shall only make recommendations to the Council for final decision by the latter.
 - d. In cases where the Executive Committee has been authorized to take substantive decisions, a quorum of not less than half the Committee's members shall be required. Decisions shall be adopted by a favorable vote of not less than two thirds of the members present.

BUDGET AND FINANCE COMMITTEE

- Art. 11
- a. There shall be a Standing Committee, called the Budget and Finance Committee, which shall be composed of the Officers of the Branch. The Committee may co-opt other members of the Branch whose assistance may be desired for particular tasks, but such members shall not vote. Not less than half the membership of the Committee shall constitute a quorum.
 - b. The Committee shall meet not less than once in each half of the calendar year, and shall prepare a budget for submission to the Council.

PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE

- Art. 12
- a. There shall be a Standing Committee, called the Publications Committee, composed of a Chairman to be ap-

pointed by the President in consultation with the Council, and such other members as the Council may designate.

b. The Committee shall:

- (1) Be responsible for the selection, preparation and publication of the Transactions and other works sponsored by the Branch, as approved by the Council;
- (2) Arrange with booksellers and others for the sale of the publications as directed by the Council, send the required number of each issue to the appointed Agents and keep a record of all such business; and
- (3) Draw up a program of future publications, with estimates of expenditure and income, and submit this program and accompanying estimates to the Council for the latter's approval at least once every six months.

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Art. 13

- a. There shall be a Standing Committee, called the Program Committee, composed of a Chairman to be appointed by the President in consultation with the Council and such other members as the Council may designate, at least two of them ordinarily being being Koreans and two of other nationalities.
- b. The Program Committee shall be responsible for determining topics and finding speakers (or other suitable material such as films) for the Branch's regular meetings.
- c. Honoraria and other fees shall follow norms established by the Council. Exceptions shall be specifically approved by the Council membership in regular session.
- d. As a rule, programs shall be of an historical or contemporary nature, which support the objectives stated in Article II of the Constitution. Where practicable, texts of the presentations shall be filed with the Corresponding Secretary of the Branch, so that those considered suitable may be printed in the Transactions.

TOUR COMMITTEE

- Art. 14
- a. There shall be a Standing Committee called the Tour Committee, composed of a Chairman to be appointed by the President in consultation with the Council, and the other members as the Council may designate.
 - b. It shall plan and conduct tours to places of cultural and historical interest both inside and outside Korea.
 - c. Tours shall be conducted by members of the Committee or by such other Members of the Branch as the Committee shall designate. Tours shall be conducted primarily for the edification and education of members of the Branch who shall receive special consideration in computing the charges for tours, and in participating in limited capacity tours. The Committee Chairman shall audit the accounts of all tours before they are submitted to the Treasurer.

MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE

- Art. 15
- a. There shall be a Standing Committee called the Membership Committee, composed of a Chairman to be appointed by the President in consultation with the Council, and such other members as the Council may designate.
 - b. The Committee shall: -
 - (1) Take all suitable measures to increase membership of the Branch;
 - (2) Report to the Council, at least quarterly, on the status of the Branch's membership and recommend measures to maintain or increase membership; and
 - (3) Keep in touch with the views of Members on publications and programs of lectures and tours arranged by the Branch, and brief the Council on the subject at each Council Meeting.

COMMITMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE BRANCH

- Art. 16
- a. Any commitment or disbursement by the Branch of more than \$500 shall be specifically sanctioned by the Council, as recorded in the minutes of its meetings.
 - b. Any commitment entered into by the Branch with the

- concurrence of the Council shall, if it involves the expenditure of more than \$1,000 (over whatever period), be legitimised by a document bearing the signatures of the President (or Acting President in the absence of the President), the Corresponding Secretary and the Treasurer.
- c. No Officer or Member of the Branch is authorized to commit the Branch to any course of action, other than normal day-to-day business, without the express approval of the Council as recorded in the minutes of its meetings.

AUDIT

- Art. 17 Before the Annual General Meeting of each year the Treasurer's Statement of Accounts shall be audited by a team of not less than two Members appointed by the President.

DUTIES OF THE CORRESPONDING SECRETARY

- Art. 18 The Corresponding Secretary shall: -
- a. Be in charge of the office of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society;
 - b. With the assistance of a salaried clerical staff and in consultation with the other officers of the Branch and the Committee Chairmen, assume overall responsibility for the coordination of the Branch's activities;
 - c. Ensure that the Reports of Committee Chairmen and the minutes of the preceding meeting are circulated to Council Members before the next Council Meeting; and
 - d. Arrange for the issue of notices of Council Meetings

DUTIES OF RECORDING SECRETARY

- Art. 19 The Recording Secretary shall: -
- a. Keep Minutes of General Meetings and meetings of the Council;
 - b. Attend every General Meeting and every Meeting of the Council, or, in case of absence, depute the Correspond-

ing Secretary or some other Member of the Council to perform his duties and shall forward the Minute-Book to him; and

- c. Act for the Corresponding Secretary in the latter's absence.

DUTIES OF THE TREASURER

Art. 20

The Treasurer shall:-

- a. Control and account for all funds of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society;
- b. Respond to requests for funds necessary to maintain the day-to-day operations of the Branch. However, any expenditure in excess of \$150, or its equivalent, shall have the prior concurrence of the President (or, in his absence, the Vice-President) and three other Officers of the Branch;
- c. Attend every Council Meeting and present a current financial statement or, if unable to attend, depute some member of the Council to act for him, furnishing him with such information and documents as may be necessary; and
- d. Apply to the President to appoint Auditors and present annually a duly audited financial statement, which shall be available for examination at the Annual General Meeting of the Branch.

DUTIES OF LIBRARIAN

Art. 21.

The Librarian shall:-

- a. Take charge of the Branch's Library and stock of publications, keep its books and periodicals in order, catalogue all additions to the Library and supervise the binding and preservation of the books;
- b. Carry out the regulations of the Council for the use and lending of the Branch's books;
- c. Send copies of the publications to all Honorary Members and to all Ordinary Members not in arrears for their subscriptions, according to a list furnished him by the Corresponding Secretary, and to all Branches and Journals, the names of which are on the list of ex-

- changes;
- d. Arrange for further exchanges as directed by the Council;
 - e. Draw up a list of the exchanges and of additions to the Library, for insertion in the Council's Annual Report;
 - f. Make additions to the Library as instructed by the Council;
 - g. Present to the Council at its November Meeting a statement of the stock of publications possessed by the Branch;
 - h. Act as a member of the Publication Committee
 - i. Attend every Council Meeting and report on Library matters or, if absent, send to the Corresponding Secretary a statement of any matter of immediate importance.

LIBRARY

- Art. 22 The Library shall be open to Members for consultation during the day, the keys of the book-cases being in the possession of the Librarian or other Members of Council resident in the vicinity; books may be borrowed on application to the Librarian.

SALE OF PUBLICATIONS

- Art. 23 The publications shall be on sale by Agents approved by the Council and may be supplied to them at a discount price fixed by the Council.

CHAPTERS

- Art. 24 Members of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society residing outside of Seoul may, with the approval of the Council, organize chapters, with arrangements for such matters as membership, attendance, books, programs, speakers, honorariums, logistics, finance, etc. to be planned by a local committee in conjunction with the Executive Committee of the Council and approved by the Council. There shall be an annual written report from each chapter which shall be submitted to the Council for approval.

Each chapter shall have at least one councillor who is selected by the Korea Branch in consultation with the local chapter. Such councillors shall serve in addition to the regular members of the RAS-KB Council. They shall have full voting rights but may be excused from serving on any of the standing committees.

While councillors from outlying areas are invited to attend all the Council meetings, they are excused from the regular attendance requirements. They shall, however attend at least 2 Council meetings per year. The equivalent of express bus fare will be provided for the two required meetings.

(This Constitution was approved by the general membership on December 8, 1971 and amended on October 20, 1975. By-law Article 24 was added by the Council on March 19, 1980.)

Annual Report of The Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1980

The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland was established by King George IV in 1824 for:

“The purpose of investigation of subjects connected with or for the encouragement of science, literature and arts in relation to Asia.”

The Korea branch of the Royal Asiatic Society was founded on June 16, 1900 by a small group of foreigners who were concerned with the scholarly investigation of Korea and her neighbors.

The activity of the society has been strongly influenced by the historical events which took place in this country. The size of the membership of the Korea branch of the Royal Asiatic Society grew quickly from its initial 17 members in 1900 to almost 1,400 members in 1980, meeting regularly in Seoul as well as in our Taegu and Taejon chapters.

Memberships—The membership increased very rapidly this year from a total of 1,193 members in January 1980 to a total of 1,373 as of the end of last month. This total amount of members comprises 54 life members, 442 overseas members and 877 regular members residing in Korea.

Programs—As of today we have sponsored 20 meetings in Seoul this year including this meeting which is the last one for this calendar year. The attendance at these meetings totaled 1,995, with the largest turnout of about 400 members at the Kangnyōng Mask Dance performance. This was the first meeting of the fall season and brought in many new members.

Tours—We took 1,452 tourgoers on 32 tours including 5 overnight tours. A new feature this year was the “Kut Tour” held at the residence of the Netherlands Ambassador. It had the highest turnout of any tour, with 135 people gathering for the afternoon. The Garden Party, also held at the Royal Netherlands Embassy, had about 250 people in attendance.

Publications—This year we published:

Royal Asiatic Society Transaction vol. 54, 1979

Wind and Bone by Dr. Ruth Stewart

Royal Asiatic Society Ttok Sal desk calendar for 1981

Korean Patterns (reprint)

Douglas Fund—The Douglas scholarship was awarded to Mr. Yoo Han-Geun of the Graduate School of Dongkuk University for the entire semester.

Seoul Programs

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Attendance</i>
January 9	Discovering the Art of Korea (Film)	160
January 23	A Motion Picture from the 1920's (Fr. Egon Berger)	120
February 13	Preservation of Birds in the PRC and the USSR (Dr. George Archibald)	110
February 27	The Confucianization of the Korean Social Order: a look at 17th Century Korea (Mr. Mark Peterson)	130
March 12	History of Korean Typography before the time of Gutenberg (Dr. Canolyn K. Koh (Choo)	90
March 26	SOKJON-JAE, Confucian Ceremony at the Sung Kyun Kwan University (Ms. Barbara Mintz)	95
April 9	Yi Dynasty Court Costumes (Mrs. Audrey Grant)	75
April 23	The Life and Thought of Won Hyo (Dr. Shin Ok-Ki)	65
May 14	Equalization Society of of the 1920's: Hyong-pyong-sa (Dr. William Shaw)	50
May 38	Cuvellier Collection Slides: Korea 1900-1905 (Dr. Horace G. Underwood)	80
June 11	Visual Impressions of Tan/Chong (Red/Blue) Painting (Mr. Thomas B. Kass)	95
June 25	Korea's Cultural Roots (Dr. Jon C. Covell)	105
August 27	Kangnyong Mask Dance Drama (Performance)	400
September 10	Characteristics of Shamanism in Korea (Prof. Taegon Kim)	110
September 24	Korea's Modern Art Song (Prof. Dorothy Underwood)	65
October 8	Early Korean Writing Systems (Mr. Adrian Buzo)	80
October 22	America Comes to Korea: The Early Contacts (Dr. Harold F. Cook)	105
November 12	King Sejong's Life of the Buddha (Mr. Allard M. Olof)	60
November 26	Introduction to Buddhist Iconography (Ms. Greta Sibley)	75

December 10	A Survey of Korean Prehistoric Archaeology (Dr. Peter Kunkel)	85
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1980 Tours

<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Participants</i>
March 29	Churches of Seoul	19
April 12	East Gate Market	15
April 19	Kingdom of Paikjae	73
April 26	Artists in Their Studios	42
April 27	Kangwha-Do	67
May 3	North Han River Valley	74
May 10	Kingdom of Paikjae	80
May 11	Emille Museum	34
May 17	Yuju Area	55
May 24-25-26	Chejudo	32
May 31	Ganden Party, Dutch Ambassador's Residence	250
June 7	Sudoksa, Haemi & Hongsong	57
June 14	Bulgogi on the Han River	75
June 15	Through the West Gate	9
June 21	Yong Wol	36
Aug. 23-25	Taechŏn Beach	20
Aug. 30	National Museum & Folk Museum	30
Aug. 30	Daewongak Restaurant	44
September 6	Ch'ŏng P'yŏng Boat Tour	52
September 13	Kiln Tour	35
September 20	Silk Tour	71
September 27	Taedunsan	27
September 28	Women Artists at Work	39
October 4-5	Namwon, Hwaum-Sa & Songkwang-Sa	21
October 11	Pŏpjusa & Songnisan	31
October 11-13	Chejudo	21
October 18	Inchon	58
October 19	Korea Mini Tour	38
October 25	Magoksa	63
November 1	Kut Tour	135
November 8-9	Andong, Pusoksa, & Hahoe	37
November 15	University Museum Tour	35
November 22	Kimjang Tour	25

Taegu Chapter Committee Members

Chairman: Dr. Lowell Jacobson
 Program: Dr. James Grayson
 Membership, Korean: Dr. Hwang Ki-suk
 Membership, Western: Mrs. Madelon Weaver
 Treasurer: Father Egon Berger
 Publications: Miss Carol Miller
 Secretary: Lt. Col. Dennis Bermingham
 Publicity: Mr. James Weaver
 Councillor: Father Egon Berger
 Social: Mrs. Sigfrid Skvorc
 Mrs. Claudia Bermingham
 Mrs. Hwang Ki-suk

Taegu Programs

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|--------------|--|
| January 16 | Mark Peterson (Fulbright Commission), <i>The Confucianization of Korea.</i> |
| February 20 | Film, <i>Discovering the Arts of Korea</i> |
| March 19 | Samuel Moffett, Presbyterian Mission, <i>The Sam-il Independence Movement and Missionaries.</i> |
| April 20 | James Huntley Grayson, Kyemyōng University, <i>Early Korean Buddhism.</i> |
| May 31 | Ronald Post (American Cultural Center), <i>Communication Between Koreans and Americans.</i> |
| June 17 | Mrs. Audrey Grant, <i>Yi Dynasty Costumes</i> (slide lecture). |
| September 30 | Ch'oe Kil-sōng, Kyemyōng University, <i>Shamanism in Kyōngbuk Province</i> (with video tape). |
| October 15 | Edward Lewinson (Fulbright, Kyemyōng University), <i>A New Perspective on the Korean War.</i> |
| November 19 | Chōng Yong-hwa, Yōngnam University, <i>New Discoveries in the Korean Paleolithic Period</i> (with slides). |
| December 17 | James Huntley Grayson, Kyemyōng University, <i>The Introduction of Buddhism to Korea.</i> |

Members

(as of December 31, 1980)

LIFE MEMBERS

Adams, Edward B.
 Bartz, Carl F., Jr.
 Bertuccioli, Giuliano
 Bridges, Ronald C.
 Bunger, Karl
 Carroll, George M.
 Clark, Allen D.
 Cook, Dr. & Mrs. Harold F.
 Crane, Paul S.
 Curll, Daniel B., III
 Daniels, Mamie M.
 de Vries, Mr. & Mrs. W. Ch. E. A.
 Dires, Frank E.
 Folkedal, Tor D.
 Goodwin, James J.
 Goodwin, Charles
 Gordon, Douglas H.
 Hahm, Pyong Choon
 Henderson, Gregory
 Hoyt, James
 Kinney, Robert A.
 Koll, Gertrude
 Landy, Pierre
 Leavitt, Richard P.
 Ledyard, Gari
 MacDougall, Alan M.
 Mattielli, Sandra L.
 Mill, Charles S., Jr.
 Miller, Carl F.
 Moffett, Dr. & Mrs. Samuel H.
 Murphy, Sunny B.
 Pai, Inez Kong
 Park, Sang-cho
 Peterson, Mark
 Quizon, Ronald P.
 Rasmussen, Glen C.
 Rucker, Robert D.
 Rutt, Richard
 Sleph, Greald
 Smith, Warren W., Jr.
 Steinberg, David I.
 Strauss, William
 Terrel, Charles L.
 Underwood, Dr. & Mrs. Horace G.

Underwood, Horace H.
 Underwood, Peter A.
 Wade, James
 Williams, Won C.
 Wright, Edward R.
 Yoon, Chong-hiok
 Yoon, Young-il

REGULAR MEMBER

Abasolo, Rafael
 Agrawal, Brahm S.
 Ackels, A. D.
 Ackerman, Mr. & Mrs. Merle
 Adams, Dr. & Mrs. Daniel J.
 Addis, Anthony & Sally
 Akay, Amb. & Mrs. Endil K.
 Akers, Karen
 Albarazin, Chantal
 Allison, Stanley C.
 Aller, John C.
 Amir, D. I.
 Anderson, Bron
 Anderson, Florence
 Archibald, Mr. & Mrs. S. D.
 Arnold, Mr. & Mrs. Harry E.
 Backlin, Mr. & Mrs. Melvin
 Bader, Mr. & Mrs. Erich
 Baecker, Mr. & Mrs. Henry J.
 Bailiff, Jennifer
 Ball, Mary Alice
 Balson, John
 Banfield, Mr. & Mrs. Peter
 Baras, Mr. & Mrs. Luc
 Barbier, Mr. & Mrs. G.
 Bark, Mr. & Mrs. Th. J.
 Barker, Miss Joan H.
 Barker, Mr. & Mrs. William
 Barr, Dr. & Mrs. Alan
 Bartholomew, Peter E.
 Batterson, Mr. & Mrs. Paul
 Bean, John
 Beebe, Mr. & Mrs. Larry
 Behringer, Roberta A.
 Bell, Gregory M.
 Bell, Stephen

- Bemis, Nancy M.
 Berger, Egon P.
 Bergholz, Mr. & Mrs. J. A.
 Berlin, Paula
 Birmingham, Mr. & Mrs. Dennis M.
 Berrard, Mr. & Mrs. Jean-Marc
 Beverly, Ann B.
 Bibber, Claudia
 Blacker, Mr. & Mrs. M.C.
 Blackstone, Rev. & Mrs. George
 Blatchford, John T.
 Blakey, Theodore B.
 Boegner, Mr. & Mrs. Dieter
 Boldero, Mr. & Mrs. J. M.
 Bond, Mr. & Mrs. Michael W.
 Boo, Wan Hyuk
 Bourdeau, Mr. & Mrs. Yvon
 Bowie, Mr. & Mrs. N. J. G.
 Bowling, Mr. Mrs. Weldon J.
 Boyd, Wayne C.
 Boyer, Line
 Brain, Yeorge W.
 Brannon, Mr. & Mrs. Peter N.
 Bridges, Maj. & Mrs. F. G.
 Briggs, Mr. & Mrs. James
 Brokaw, John P.
 Brown, Mr. & Mrs. David J.
 Brubaker, Virginia
 Brun, Leslie A.
 Bryner, G. B.
 Burton, Susan J.
 Buthaud, Mr. & Mrs. Herve
 Butler, Laura
 Buzo, Mr. & Mrs. Adrian
 Calabough, Cdr. & Mrs. Jerry
 Cameron, Mr. & Mrs. James
 Campbell, Robert E.
 Campbell, Mr. & Mrs. Stephen
 Cantolupo, Cpt. & Mrs. Louis P.
 Carey, Glenn W.
 Carpenter, Col. & Mrs. R. D.
 Casey, Mr. & Mrs. Michael
 Casler, Mr. & Mrs. Robert R.
 Chai, Jeong-won
 Chang, Yun Deuk
 Charboneau, Mr. & Mrs. Daniel E.
 Charters, Mr. & Mrs. Thomas J.
 Chedoux, Micheline
 Cheesman, W. Gifford
 Cheng, Mr. & Mrs. K. Y.
 Chittender, Ltc. & Mrs. Robert D.
 Cho, In Sook
 Cho, Maria
 Cho, Min-ha
 Cho, Mr. & Mrs. Tae-Kyung
 Choe, Moon-hui
 Choi, Chongko
 Choi, Elizabeth R.
 Choi, Uhn Kyung
 Choi, Wook-Kyung
 Chong, Doo Don
 Choy, Cornelius E.
 Chun, Hae Jun
 Chun, Mrs. Jin Hwan
 Chung, Chung-Ho
 Clause, Lori
 Clawson, Ltc. & Mrs. L. B.
 Clifton, Mr. & Mrs. Brantley
 Cohen, David N.
 Cohen, Mr. & Mrs. I.A.
 Conradi, Mr. & Mrs. Axel H.
 Cook, Alice
 Cooper, Conrad L.
 Cotten, Mr. & Mrs. James E
 Crawford, Graeme C.
 Crawford, Mr. & Mrs. Thomas P.
 Creed, Mr. & Mrs. James L.
 Crewe, Mr. & Mrs. Barry R.
 Cruise, Edwina J.
 Cucullu, Cpt. & Mrs. Gordon C.
 Daalderop, A. M.
 Dacey, Lucker A.
 Daniels, Michael J.
 Darras, Mr. & Mrs. Luk M.
 Daryanani, Ram D.
 David, Eli
 Davies, David C.
 Davis, Sherrill
 Dayton, Nancy
 de Chanterac, Mr. & Mrs. Arnaud
 de Lassen, Edith
 Deschamp, Mary
 Dewan, Mary
 Dewdney, John
 Di Biase, Rafaela A.
 Dickson, Mr. & Mrs. William S.
 Diggelmann, Mr. & Mrs. Richard J.
 Ding, Mr. & Mrs. Mou-shih

- Doi, Kenichi
 Dong, Chon
 Donovan, Joseph R., Jr.
 Dorow, Rev. & Mrs. Maynard
 Duggan, John M.
 Dunlavey, Mary E.
 Dustin, Frederic H.
 Eaton, Mr. & Mrs. William F.
 Ebel, Ria
 Edmonds, Warren B.
 Eger, Amb. & Mrs. Wolfgang
 Eglinton, Margaret M.
 Eickemeyer, Mr. & Mrs. Karl F.
 Ellinger, Dr. & Mrs. Thomas R.
 Elmore, Willena K.
 Erickson, Mr. & Mrs. Robert W.
 Fancher, Mr. & Mrs. Robert
 Ferrar, Gertrude K.
 Ferry, Roxanne
 Feyen, Joseph
 Field, Mr. & Mrs. E. J.
 Finger, Mr. & Mrs. Peter
 Fish, Mr. & Mrs. Ian T.
 Fitzpatrick, Mr. & Mrs. Mark T.
 Foley, Richard B.
 Follin, Amb. & Mrs. Bernard
 Frederick, Mr. & Mrs. Alan
 Fuchs, Mr. & Mrs. Joachim G.
 Fuller, Mr. & Mrs. Robert
 Gallant, Mr. & Mrs. Robert
 Gallant, Thomas A.
 Gardner, Mr. & Mrs. Frank A.
 Geddes, John M.
 Geier, Dolores
 Gerber, Mr. & Mrs. Pierre
 Geuzinge, Mr. & Mrs. Harry Th.
 Gibbs, Chaplain & Mrs. Charles
 Gill, Mr. & Mrs. Stephen
 Gillen, Mr. & Mrs. Charles E.
 Gillett, Mr. & Mrs. Anthony L.
 Glenn, Cmdr. & Mrs. William A. II
 Glick, Mr. & Mrs. Norman
 Goelz, Louis P.
 Gozdzik, Rafal
 Grafius, Mrs. Guy A. B.
 Grant, Mr. & Mrs. Bruce K.
 Grayson, James H.
 Greenough, Mr. & Mrs. Peter
 Grieshaber, Raymond W.
 Griffin, Mr. & Mrs. Roger F. R.
 Grinell, Barbara A.
 Groen, Mr. & Mrs. Clifford J.
 Groggel, Mr. & Mrs. Dwight
 Grubb, Dr. & Mrs. William A.
 Gunnen, Mr. & Mrs. Larry
 Gustafson, John W.
 Gustafson, Martha F.
 Guynup, Lois D.
 Haagna, Alex
 Hach, Ronald
 Hackett, David R.
 Hahn, Arlene C.
 Hahn, Changgi
 Halpin, Dennis P.
 Hammerschlag, Mr. & Mrs. Mark
 Hampton, Marcia W.
 Harbor, Mr. & Mrs. Louis J.
 Hard, Theodore
 Harvey, John H. T.
 Hayes, Jenny
 Hedman, Katarina
 Heeb, Mr. & Mrs. Marcus
 Held, Mr. & Mrs. John H.
 Hennekeus, A.
 Higa, Hatsue H.
 Highfill, Col. & Mrs. James K.
 Hill, Mr. & Mrs. K. G.
 Hill, Nancy-Lee W.
 Hinkle, Mr. & Mrs. Jiffie
 Hintikka, Marja-Terttu
 Hoare, Margaret V.
 Hoelzlein, Mr. & Mrs. Horst H.
 Hoffmann, Hanne
 Holtsbaum, Mr. & Mrs. K. U.
 Hong, Hwan-eui
 Horvath, Mr. & Mrs. Jules
 Huber, Barbara
 Hudson, Mr. & Mrs. David
 Hunt, Betty J.
 Huntley, Mr. & Mrs. C. B.
 Huse, Angelia
 Huston, John
 Hyun, Theresa M.
 Hyun, Mr. & Mrs. Yung-wan
 Im, Dae Heui
 Innis, Mr. & Mrs. Bruce
 Ivanhoe, Philip J.
 Jablonowski, Mr. & Mrs. A. M.

- Jackson, Mr. & Mrs. L. R.
 Jacobson, Dr. & Mrs. Lowell J.
 Jagoe, Mr. & Mrs. Leo J.
 Jang, Mr. & Mrs. Song Hyon
 Janofsky, Rose B.
 Ji, Mr. & Mrs. Dong-Jin,
 Joe, Wanne J.
 Johnson, Mr. & Mrs. K. W.
 Johnston, William W.
 Jones, Bridget
 Judy, Dr. & Mrs. Carl W.
 Jugant, Mr. & Mrs. Gerard F.
 Jung, Nai Dong
 Kang, Heidi
 Kang, Keum-Ja
 Karrer, Maria
 Kauffman, Mr. & Mrs. Dean
 Kawashima, Fujiya
 Kay, Marion
 Kelley, Nancy A.
 Keustermans, Mr. & Mrs. Guido
 Kilbourne, E. R.
 Kim, Mr. & Mrs. Chang Soo
 Kim, Ho Soon
 Kim, Houngh Han
 Kim, Mr. & Mrs. Jae-Suk
 Kim, Jai Hiun
 Kim, Jin Hwan
 Kim, Mr. & Mrs. Jin Wang
 Kim, Jong-Ki
 Kim, Kae-duk
 Kim, Kesook
 Kim, Mi-ja
 Kim Myung-sun
 Kim, Soon-ja
 Kim, Taegon
 Kim, Yang-shik
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